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Abstract 
Name: Chika Charles ANIEKWE  
Title: Collective Action and Everyday Politics of Smallholder Farmers: Examining 
Local Realities and Struggles of Smallholder Rice Farmers in Ugbawka 
Keywords: Collective Action, Everyday Politics, Smallholder Farmers, Institutions, 
Agency, Nigeria, Enugu and Ugbawka   
The research draws on an ethnographic research and explores the everyday practice 
of collective action in Ugbawka in Enugu State by using interviews and participant 
observation.   
The study reveals that smallholder collective action is not best fitted into formal 
institutional arrangement but takes place within a complex and intricate process that 
involves interaction with diversity of institutions and actors. Equally, the interactions 
that occur amongst actors are mediated at the community level through interplay of 
socio-cultural and political factors. This study recognises and places emphasis on 
understanding of agency and the exercise of agency at the local level arguing that 
smallholder farmers are not robot but active individual who exercise their agency 
purposively or impulsively depending on conditions and the assets available at their 
disposition as well as their ability to navigate the intricate power dynamic inherent at 
local context. The thesis thus questioned the simplistic use of formal institutional 
collective action framework in smallholder collective action at the community level 
and argues that institutions are not static and do not determine outcomes but are 
informed by the prevailing conditions at the community level. The study emphasises 
the role of existing institutions and socially embedded principles in community 
governance and argues that actors should be the focus of analysis rather than the 
system in understanding smallholder collective action. The study concludes by 
advocating for further research that could explore the possibility of hybrid approach 
that accepts the advantages of both formal and informal institutional forms of 
smallholder collective action.  
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Chapter One:   
1.0 Introduction and Overview of the Thesis 
1.1 Introduction   
Over the past three decades, shifts in development discourse attempts to place the 
poor at the centre of development programmes, theories and designs. An 
important aspect of this shift is the rise in mainstream approaches that advances 
market imperatives as the panacea for poverty reduction and eradication. An 
offshoot of these approaches is the recognition of the importance of agriculture in 
the poverty discourse. In particular, these approaches recognise that smallholder 
agriculture through collective action could be the path to poverty reduction. The 
World Development Report (WDR) of 2008 titled Agriculture for Development 
brought this debate to the forefront, emphasising that smallholder agriculture is the 
path to poverty reduction (World Bank, 2007). The report further underscored that 
smallholder collective action through the use of cooperatives, farmer unions and 
associations was the path through which to reduce poverty. The report also 
highlighted that for smallholder collective action to function effectively, it was 
important that formal institutions, rules, roles, and rewards and sanctions were put 
in place. This thinking resonates with the view that economic materialism is the 
core motivation for collective action and that institutional design that ensures 
compliance would solve collective action problems (Olson, 1965, Anand, 2003, 
Anand, 2007)   
 
In many developing countries, smallholding is the major source of livelihood for 
the majority of the people. The contribution of agriculture to national growth and 
rural poverty reduction depends on the productivity of smallholder farmers. This 
is linked to the extent to which they can: 
 
 Access market inputs;  
 Own and control assets; 
 Gain access to credit and insurance; 
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 Balance the domineering power of the market middlemen; and  
 Collectively articulate their needs and carry them forward for policy 
changes.   
 
The WDR thus made a case for supporting smallholding as a viable route of 
getting communities out of rural poverty. The WDR suggested that the success 
of smallholdings could be achieved through market integration anchored on 
collective action through cooperatives, farmers’ union, and producer 
organisations with the absence of the state and the moderator between the 
farmers and the private sector. 
 
In most developing countries especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), collective 
action has always been an integral part of the agricultural processes and as a 
strategy for effective cooperation and support amongst the smallholders. The 
shift in smallholder collective action in most of the SSA countries is historical and 
follows the pattern of the development in many previously colonised countries. 
That is as they have moved from the colonial period to the post-colonial period 
and currently to the new era of market liberations. The WDR of the World Bank 
(2007) argues that the failing of smallholder collective action was partly due to 
the failure of successive approaches (colonial and independence) that placed 
emphasis on transferring power from local authorities and the subsequent 
neglect and lack of recognition of the roles of community and local cultures in the 
shaping of smallholder collective action functioning.  
 
As a result of the new wave of understanding of smallholder collective action, 
many development agencies and ministries in developing countries and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have developed market system 
approaches for smallholder collective action based on the institutional design 
approach that focuses on the formal arrangements and eschews informality and 
social realities. Some of these approaches include the:  
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 Making Market Work for the Poor (M4P);  
 Market System Approach for Value Chain Development; and  
 The USAID Value Chain approach amongst others.  
 
These approaches tend to promote managerial reforms and institutional design 
in smallholder collective action. They support the formalisation of producer 
associations, farmers’ union and cooperatives. It is believed that this is due to 
external pressure from external donors and the private sector who are interested 
in larger supply for smallholder products in a coordinated manner (Penrose-
Buckley, 2007a, Markelova et al., 2009). This is evident in the way smallholder 
collective action programmes have tended to ostensibly favour managerial and 
institutional design approach (Jones et al., 2012, Barham and Chitemi, 2009, 
King et al., 2012, Baden, 2013b, 2013a).    
 
In Nigeria, smallholder collective action has gone through different epochal 
stages. Smallholder collective action during the pre-colonial period was rooted in 
the communitarian way of life and borrowed significantly from the cultural 
practices of the community. Means of rewards and sanctions were based on 
cultural practices and were often well known. The colonial period introduced 
smallholder collective action based on cooperative and producer associations. 
The approach initiated during this period has continued to the modern day. 
However, the approach has gone through several evolutionary stages and 
currently it is more a managerial and formal institutionalisation. This is viewed by 
mainstream thinkers and practitioners as the path to smallholder collective 
action. Despite the successes that have been captured in numerous case 
studies using the institutional design approach, it is clear that this approach fails 
to consider social complexities and instead focuses mainly on economic 
incentives as the motivational factor for smallholder collective action.  
 
This approach is promoted in the literature of the Mainstream Institutionalism 
(MI), which promotes formalisation and regulated structures. According to 
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Mainstream Institutionalism, institutions provide information that regulates the 
behaviour of individual members and ensures that rules and regulations as well 
the means for organising and reaping benefits are respected. Underpinning this 
idea is that people can come up with collective design and decide the rules that 
would govern their relationships with each other by sharing of risk, spreading 
costs and benefits equitably in a collective way. The assumption is that the 
potential benefit from working together is enough motivation for collective action. 
Therefore, it is argued that collective action is better through the design of the 
institutional arrangement, which will regulate the relations and actions of 
members (Ostrom, 1990).  
 
Critics of this view like Cleaver (2007), (2012), Osei-Kufuor (2010) and (Toner, 
2008b)question the emphasis on formal system, institutional design and 
managerial components and standards. They argue for Critical Institutionalism 
(CI), saying that it is a nuanced approach to understanding collective action. 
They suggest that CI attempts to position power and social relations draws the 
unpredictable and complex interplay of community life into perspective. The 
supporters of the CI argue for a better understanding of the interplay between 
what is perceived as formal by the MI and the informal reality of everyday 
community life (Lund, 2006). They state that rules, boundaries and processes 
are fuzzy and peoples’ complex identities and unequal power relationships are 
unlikely to be subjected to institutional design (Osei-Kufuor, 2010, Cleaver, 2007)  
 
This study contributes to such debates by exploring how local complexities and 
the socio-political and cultural context engage smallholder farmers at the local 
level towards collective action. The intention is to understand: 
 
i. The nature of collective action institutions;   
ii. How institutions of smallholder collective action among smallholders 
is constructed and formed within local specificities;  
iii. The nature of decision making and the factors that motivate 
smallholders to act collectively;  
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iv. The model of agency that shapes smallholder collective action 
functioning;  
v. The forces that shape individual smallholder farmers’ behaviour 
within a collective action initiative; and  
vi. The potential and practical outcomes of smallholder collective action 
initiative.  
 
The study uses ethnographic approach to explore the everyday practices of 
smallholder collective action of rice farmers in Ugbawka; a peri-urban1 
community in Enugu State, Nigeria. Rice is a commercially driven crop in Nigeria 
and as such the main motivation for farmers is profit and economic incentives. 
The research focuses on understanding whether smallholder rice farmers are 
driven by the same motivation factors when they engage in collective action or 
by other non-economic factors.  
 
Ugbawka presents a good case to study because of the complex realities of 
communities, where local identities and formal government institutions mix. Its 
proximity to the State Capital means it has easy access to state institutions 
unlike other rural smallholder farming communities in the same State.      
The thesis argues that trying to understand smallholder collective action based 
on formal institutional design through the use of cooperatives and/or union and 
placing emphasis on design principles evades the structural inequality and the 
differentiated capacities based on livelihoods, power relations and also ignores 
the diverse motivations, which shape participation in collective action.   
 
I will argue further that institutions that shape collective action at the community 
are diverse and have different shades of formality and visibility. The rules, 
boundaries and people are fuzzy and that complex institutions interact to shape 
the outcomes of smallholder collective action in an unpredictable manner.  
 
                                                        
1
 According to FAO, the term "peri-urban area", cannot be easily defined or delimited through unambiguous criteria. It is a 
name given to the grey area which is neither entirely urban nor purely rural in the traditional sense; it is at most the part ly 
urbanized rural area. Whatever definition may be given to it; it cannot eliminate some degree of arbitrariness. 
 Visit http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x8050t/x8050t02.htm 
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This thesis demonstrates that individual agency is not predicable and not entirely 
purposive and that the dynamic relationships between individuals and institutions 
that shape and condition collective action cannot easily be controlled by design 
and that motivation for collective action can swing based on different incentives 
which could be determined reactively or purposively.  
1.2 Research Problem 
Since 2008 when the World Bank released the World Development Report on 
Agriculture and Development (World Bank, 2007) there has been a huge 
discourse on smallholder farmers and how they can contribute to poverty 
reduction and food security. The report moves the discourse on farming away 
from the big farms to small farms. It also reinforces and recreates a new debate 
on smallholder collective action and market access. It argues for the creation of 
cooperative, farmers and producers’ union as a way of strengthening smallholder 
farmers to make them a unified group capable of competing with large 
companies. As a union they will possess the negotiating power to advocate for 
better living conditions through improved return on their produce.  
 
The report places emphasis on creating and building formal institutions for 
smallholder collective action. It argues in favour of designing rules and 
regulations that would guide such collective action as well as ensuring that the 
creation and organisation of smallholders through cooperatives and producers’ 
organisation is facilitated by external actors. This research therefore interrogates 
the meaning, development and practice of smallholder collective action by 
focusing and investigating smallholder collective action among smallholder rice 
farmers in Ugbawka in Enugu State, Nigeria. The map of Enugu State is 
provided below and Ugbawka is located in Nkanu East. 
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First, the meaning of collective action has divided opinion amongst scholars from 
economical, sociological and political standpoints. Whereas, economics 
perspective on collective action appears to favour formal institutional structures 
based on designed rules, regulations, rewards and sanctions, the sociological 
and political perspectives accept such propositions but argue for a balance and 
acceptance of the social nuances that could render the designed rules and 
regulations as well as formal structures impracticable. Most analyses of 
smallholder collective action that followed the mainstream economics-centred 
institutional perspective lay emphasis on economic incentives like reducing 
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transactional cost, collective marketing, collective negotiation and other 
economic incentives as the core motivational factors (Hellin et al., 2009, 
Markelova et al., 2009, Devaux et al., 2009, Barham and Chitemi, 2009).   
 
Emphasis on formal and institutionalised collective action for smallholders 
appears also to have been sustained and reinforced by some international non-
governmental organisations working in developing countries with smallholder 
farmers whose work seem to have closed the door for an organic development of 
smallholder collective, which is based on local norms and not necessarily formal 
based on design principles with documented rules and regulations.   
 
This research thus provides clarity on the meaning of collective action by 
thoroughly interrogating its conceptualisation and evolution. It argues that: 
 
1. Collective action as presented and conceptualised by the mainstream 
institutional scholars is too simplistic and ignores the complex and 
messy social structures that interact with actors and shape their 
understanding of and participation in collective action. 
2. There is a problem of lack of clarity underlying the meaning of 
collective action that further highlights the problems of theoretical 
expansion and methodological exclusion.  
3. There is also the problem of understanding human agency. The 
question of agency refers to the actor’s ability to exercise his/her will 
either purposefully and reactively and the inability to be predicated 
correctly at every given time. Particularly, the role of the human 
agency in collective action functioning is important in understanding 
collective action beyond the mainstream economics- centred 
institutional perspective.  
 
This research seeks to understand how smallholder collective action works 
among smallholder farmers by asking the question: 
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Does institutionalised collective action among smallholder farmers lead to 
changes in their participation and access to market?  
1.3 Organisation of the Research 
The thesis is organised into eight chapters as follows:  
The introduction constitutes Chapter I and provides an outline of the main 
research problem under investigation, the main research questions and key 
methodological, and theoretical frameworks used to deepen my understanding of 
the research. The Chapter concluded with the thesis outline.  
Chapter Two provides insight into the theories that shape the discourse on 
collective action at different levels including the local level. The focus of the 
chapter is to review the relevant literature to identify gaps in the theories and 
conceptual underpinnings of institutional approaches to collective action. The 
chapter highlights the linear assumption of the Mainstream Institutionalism 
approach to collective action. As stated previously, MI seems to narrow its 
analysis and understanding of collective action to the economic and material 
aspects and engages in solutions that focus on design of formal institutions as a 
way of ensuring a functional collective action.  
Further the chapter explores the thinking of the critical view that looks beyond 
the material conditions and institutional arrangements and recognises the need 
to approach collective action from a critical perspective that recognises the fuzzy 
and complex nature of social structures and the dynamic nature of power at the 
local level. This view also argues for recognition of the informal system in an 
attempt to understand collective action at the local community level.  Views that 
disaggregate formal systems in understanding collective action at the local 
community level miss the interplay between the social and political forces as well 
as the link between the formal and informal especially in developing countries 
where the informal and formal overlap, contribute and shape people’s 
livelihoods. The chapter advocates for an alternative approach to collective 
action that places emphasis on both the economic/material incentives and formal 
institutions on one side and also recognises on the other side, the 
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unpredictability of human agency and, by extension, the socio-cultural and 
political interplay that shape collective action at the local level.    
Chapter Three is the research methodology. It examines the research question 
and objective that guided the study. It presents the philosophy that underpins the 
research, discusses the sampling method used in the research, the multiple 
methods of data collection and analysis and ethical issues applicable to this 
research. It also discussed the evaluation of the data and how my subjectivity as 
the research was managed. Data interpretation and analysis was extensively 
discussed in chapter three while at the same time looking at my position as the 
researcher and how I managed and turned my subjective feelings into strength. 
Chapter three also covers the ethical issues and how the researcher managed 
ethical issues as well as how farmers’ rights as participants were respected. 
Importantly is the fact that, consent in the research location was managed to 
achieve the overall objective of consent without the farmers signing consent 
form. This Chapter explains how consent was sought and secured from the 
participants while respecting community values and way of seeing things.   
Chapter Four is the case study chapter and provides a historical overview of 
smallholder collective action in Nigeria from pre-colonial to post-colonial period. 
The chapter discusses smallholder collective action based on Nigeria’s 
community cultures and reciprocity during the pre-colonial period and extends it 
to the colonial period during which smallholder collective action was based on 
cooperatives and unions, designed, managed and controlled by government.   
It is important to note that smallholder collective action during this period was 
designed to serve the interest of the colonial administration and by extension the 
metropolis country. The chapter further highlights that colonial system 
smallholder collective action continued in the immediate post-colonial period and 
went through a period of inconsistency until the new direction of smallholder 
collective action that coincided with and followed by the neoliberal market 
agenda. This chapter argues that smallholder collective action has been mixed; it 
was initially based on social cultural needs until the period where it was driven by 
government while at present, it is driven by development agencies.  
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Chapter Five explores the origin of smallholder collective action in Ugbawka. It 
provides brief development background of Ugbawka and how it has evolved from 
pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial period. The chapter also explores some 
important practices like the land tenure system and method of land acquisition 
for smallholder rice farmers in Ugbawka. It examines the different livelihoods 
classification of the smallholder rice farmers and how the different category 
access opportunity that allows them to make choices regarding collective action. 
The chapter further examines some social institutions that support smallholder 
collective action in Ugbawka and highlights the important role that family, 
churches and village councils play in collective action.   
 
Chapter Six of this thesis explores the socially embedded practices that shape 
smallholder collective action in Ugbawka. In doing so, it recognises the important 
role of informal systems. This is particularly in view of the fact that lives of the 
local community is made up of socio-cultural and political facets that shape their 
everyday life (Chabal, 2009b). Within the sphere of informality, the chapter 
recognises that smallholder collective action is also engulfed in everyday politics 
of the rural people that requires constant struggle in order to survive and define 
their aspirations for the future. Such ‘everyday politics’ a term made popular by 
Tria Kerkvliet (2009, p. 233)  
“is different from conventional politics but can be nasty, 
derogatory…can come as a joke… often impulsive and directed not 
to achieve unity in many cases but for self-interest and livelihood 
survival”.  
The chapter also recognises the place of culture in local organising and the fact 
that cultural repertoires help in understanding individual action because most 
individual actions are engulfed in desire, frustration, ambition and freedom (Sen, 
2001, 2004). The chapter further examines whether collective action occurs 
within an institutionalised formal system or smallholder collective action is purely 
motivated by economic and material incentives. Based on the field data obtained 
from the case study in Ugbawka, the chapter examines how religious affiliation, 
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political and party politics as well as trust could play an important role in 
influencing smallholder to act collectively.  
 
Chapter Seven explores the institutional complexity and political dynamics of 
smallholder collective action in Ugbawka. The chapter argues that the 
Mainstream Institutional perspective overlooks power in smallholder collective 
action functioning and further illustrates the internal power struggles and how 
family ties are very important in smallholder collective action in Ugbawka. The 
chapter also examines how internal collective action politics leads to labour 
gangsterism and how party politics distorts the working of smallholder collective 
action in Ugbawka.  
 
Chapter Eight presents the findings of the study, conclusions and 
recommendations for policy. The chapter also reflects on the debate on 
mainstream and critical perspective on smallholder collective action and argues 
that institutional collective action perspective is oversimplified and ignores the 
social parameters and local realities at the community level. It argues for a 
nuanced analysis that recognises the diverse nature of individual environments 
and unpredictable nature of individual agency. It also argues that formal and 
informal settings are as important as each other in collective action functioning at 
the community level. Access to and participation in smallholder collective action 
are shaped and motivated by economic, social, political and cultural factors 
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Chapter Two: 
2.0 Conceptualising Institutional Collective Action 
2.1 Introduction  
Collective action as a concept is not new. It has been used in various academic 
disciplines including economics, political science, social movement and rural 
development discourse. It has also been used specifically on smallholder 
organising together as a group (Penrose-Buckley, 2007a, Bandiera et al., 2005a, 
Devaux et al., 2009). The variation in conceptualisation and interpretation 
reflects the diverse nature of the concept as well as its crosscutting 
multidisciplinary usage.  
 
In this chapter, I explore the diverse interpretations of collective action. I then 
proceed to review the literature on collective action from the mainstream 
institutional scholars and the critical scholars while highlighting the key dividing 
and converging points between the two scholarly sides. An important element of 
the literature review relates to the arguments between the mainstream and 
critical scholars on the importance of formal institutions to collective action as 
against informal structures. The idea of structured and non-structured system 
based on design principles also featured as an important dimension in the 
debate. The literature review briefing discussed the agency argument apropos of 
whether individual participation in collective action is purposive or impulsive and 
if such participation can be controlled by formalised institutional design with 
rules, regulations, rewards and sanctions.  
 
This chapter also acknowledges the mainstream argument that economic gains 
are an important factor in collective action but also recognises the need for a 
nuanced analysis in determining what motivates individuals to act collectively. 
With specific reference to smallholder collective action for market access, this 
chapter argues that as much as economic incentives are part of the rationale for 
smallholder collective action, it is nonetheless one of the many puzzles that 
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stimulate smallholder collective action. It highlights and discusses the benefits 
and motivations for smallholder collective action  
2.2 Collective Action: Interpretational Overview 
 
Collective action has always been part of human existence because ‘no man is 
an Island2 The interconnectedness of the world, the environment and human 
existences entail that collective action is required for human coexistence. 
However, further from the primary understanding of human coexistence as a 
form of collective action, there have been scholarly developments of the concept 
in various academic disciplines. Each of these disciplines, have tended to 
construct and interpret collective action from their disciplinary fulcrum. However, 
at the centre of the collective action concept debate lies an attempt to 
understand how human beings relate. Those attempts had led scholars to 
construct and define collective action from diverse interrelated fields but often 
with different interpretations. Considerable amount of work has been written on 
collective action and it has also been applied to divergent academic and 
research strands. The concept still provokes debates and disagreements 
between and amongst academics and academics on the variables and factors 
that lubricate and smoothen collective action.   
 
In 1965, Olson emerged with the logic of collective action based on the rational 
self-interested human being whose natural inclination is to free-ride (Olson, 
1965). In 1968, Hardin followed Olson and chided human nature as exploitative 
of the natural environment (Hardin, 1968). He was particularly concerned of the 
impact of population growth on the environment. Both Olson and Hardin hold that 
cooperation is rather not very possible in the use and management of natural 
                                                        
2 This expression emphasizing a person's connections to his or her surroundings and/or other persons 
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resources and Hardin reckoned that human beings are heading towards ruin and 
tragedy due to limitless and selfish exploitation of the natural environment3.  
 
In 1973, Hardin’s analogy of the herdsmen was used by Dawes in the Prisoner 
Dilemma model who argued that although human beings are self-centred and 
rational and prone to free-riding, collective action is still possible (Dawes, 1973).  
Dawes took a rather optimistic perspective of collective action and argued that 
the fact that the information is available to everyone means that cooperation is 
eventually possible and inevitable. The availability of information to all players, 
means that individual rationality will culminate to collective irrationality and hence 
collective action (Campbell and Sowden, 1985) . Olson’s logic also influenced 
government policies at international scale and generated debates beyond one 
discipline.  
2.3 Acting Collectively; Conceptualising Collective Action   
In conventional terms, collective action is often defined as “the ability to refrain 
from individually profitable actions for the sake of the common good. When 
individuals come together to participate in development activities, they are said 
to be acting collectively. However, the manner and nature of acting collectively 
has been a matter of intense academic discussion and debate and is generally 
referred to as collective action in most development literature. Therefore, this 
thesis will not provide a comprehensive review of the collective action theory but 
could inform the basis for future theoretical analysis.   
 
Many of the theories on collective action consider motivation, incentives, rules, 
sanctions and other factors that condition individuals to act collectively. Olson 
logic holds that to act collectively individuals must be forced to conform by rules, 
rewards and sanctions in a formally structured manner (Olson, 1965). Following 
this line of thought, the game theory scholars argue that collective action can 
                                                        
3
 Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit- in a 
world that is limited. Ruin is the destination towards which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a 
society that believes in the freedom of the commons 1968 pp 1243 - 1248.  
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come through greater participation of the individual based on certain codified 
rules and standards, and that the greater the frequency of participation, the 
better the positive outcome and further involvement (Anand, 2007).  
 
Getting the institutions right thus underpinned institutional Game theorists’ logic. 
However, this view has been accused of oversimplification of collective action 
theory by ignoring the existing social relations as well as the informal relations of 
power in the functioning of collective action (Ratner et al., 2013). Fear of the 
consequence of non-participation forces individual to collective action thereby 
making hegemony an essential enforcer for collective action. Scholars such as 
Ostrom recognise the importance of social relations in collective action but still 
argue that such social relations can be structured to conform to institutionalised 
rules and norms (Ostrom, 1990) . Cleaver disagrees with such ‘structuralisation’ 
of social relations because it ignores the unequal capacity for differently placed 
individuals to effect change (Cleaver, 2007). According to the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), this view of collective action which lends support to 
Olson’s view oversimplifies individual behaviours and places material gains, 
strategic interaction, cost-benefit calculations, logic of consequences, relative 
gains, and individualist rationality at the centre of its analysis and thinking 
(Acharya, 2012)   
 
The problem with this rational mainstream institutional perspective is that it 
assumed individuals will always in accordance to   rules and standards and 
therefore ignore the fact that different rules apply to different set of groups 
depending on number4.  
Another perspective is the view that collective action can occur freely without 
rational thinking and based purely on acceptance from individual actors. 
legitimacy rather than control of individual agency is an important determining 
factor in this sense (Ibid). Therefore, collective action is not only a function of 
rule, sanction, risk, monitoring and control but also a function of normative 
                                                        
4
 The larger the group the weaker the institution of collective action because of the difficulty in aggregating interests 
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pressures, disapproval with institutions as well as through social relations. 
Motivation in this sense does not necessarily lend itself to material incentives or 
benefits. This perspective broadens collective action to include group resistance, 
which is closely associated with social movements. The important element in this 
definition is that, collective action can emanate as a result of inability of certain 
group(s) to agree to existing status quo and on group conviction to oppose long 
established system.  
 
While the rationality perspective lends its arguments that effective functioning of 
collective action depending on the size of the group and the frequency of 
participation, the constructivist views size as irrelevant to collective action. Micro 
processes, cultural and normative preferences/pressures and socialization can 
be much more influential than material incentives and gains. In other words, 
ignoring the diversity of social behaviour, levels of powers, degrees of capability 
to participation and cultural and normative influences that can persuade 
individuals to act in a certain manner assumes that human beings possess, 
agency.  
 
It is based on the combination of the different views by the rationalist and the 
constructivist that led to the argument that collective action is dependent upon 
other capabilities as well as legitimacy and neither is sufficient for collective 
action (Acharya, 2012). Within this constructivist conceptualisation, trust and 
reciprocity are far less of a material gain than preservation of cultural 
preferences and social ties.  
 
In expanding further on the collective action debate, this thesis adopts Cleaver 
(2012) categorisation of the different collective action perspectives based on the 
nature of institutions, the formation of institutions, nature of decision making, 
model of agency, factors shaping human behaviour in institutions and outcomes. 
As such this thesis groups the review of the literature into Mainstream 
Institutionalism and the Critical Institutionalism and critically interrogates 
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literature that dwells on collective action and smallholder collective action in 
particular. 
2.4 Mainstream versus Critical Institutionalism  
 
The Mainstream Intuitionalism includes common property scholars based on 
New Institutional Economics from the work of scholars such as  Ostrom (1990), 
Ostrom et al. (1994), Ostrom (2005) and North (1990). These scholars content 
that institutions provide information that regulates the behaviour of individuals 
and ensures that rules and regulations as well as the means for organising and 
reaping benefits are respected. Underpinning this idea is the view that people 
can collectively design and decide on the rule that would govern their 
relationships with each other by sharing risk, spreading costs and benefits 
equitably in a collective manner. The potential benefit accruable from working 
together is enough motivation for collective action. Moreover, agreement will 
come through the design of the institutional arrangement that will regulate the 
relationships and actions of group-members. This assertion lean on the view of 
Hardin (1968) in his tragedy of the common that without control human beings 
will tap natural environment without limit.    
 
Ostrom, a leading proponent of the mainstream institutionalism, pioneered the 
design principles arguing for collective action based on cost and benefits as a 
means of achieving an enduring and lasting governance of group-relationships 
(Ostrom, 1990, Ostrom et al., 1994). The popularity of this view hinges on the 
fact that it offers the neo-liberal market thinkers the room to juxtapose 
participatory ideas and market orientation. In support of the institutional 
rationality view, Johnson argues that material relations are at the heart of 
collective action, which influences how to mobilise for collective action and that 
the creation of institutional arrangements will ensure compliance and end 
individual free-riding (Johnson, 2004). Therefore, collective action is about the 
search for collective material gain (Ibid). This assertion is further supported by 
other researchers who criticized Hardin’s tragedy of the commons that captured 
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human beings as uncooperative. Therefore, the mainstream institutional view 
seems to have merged the idea of a moral question and economic entitlements 
in collective action by arguing in favour of formal structural arrangements that 
reward and sanction individuals   (Ostrom, 1990).   
 
The view of the Mainstream Institutionalist stretches to case studies in natural 
resource management (Agrawal, 2001, Baland and Platteau, 1996, Rasmussen 
and Meinzen-Dick, 1995, Ostrom et al., 1994) and on agricultural and rural 
development particularly in smallholder collective action for market access 
(Hellin et al., 2009, Devaux et al., 2009, Markelova et al., 2009, Baden, 2013b). 
These case studies that support the design principles place strong emphasis on 
formalisation of rules and delineating of clear boundaries and rules of 
engagement.  
 
Emanating from the MI view is the assumption that the nature of institution 
should be formal with vertical and horizontal linkages as a prerequisite for 
transparent and accountable collective action. By clearly delineating formal rules, 
means of resolving conflict will be embedded and channels of complaint and 
redress will be made clear. Also embedded in the mainstream institutional view 
is that without formality, obstruction can occur. Therefore, formality “makes good” 
the deficiencies of the indigenous arrangements by transforming the informal into 
the formal through careful design principles that should serve as indicators rather 
than blue print (Ostrom, 1990, Wade, 1998, Ostrom et al., 2007, Heikkila et al., 
2011).  
 
On the nature of the institutions, the mainstream thinkers see the institution as 
that arrangement capable of regulating human behaviour and conditioning 
people to follow stipulated rules or risk sanctions. By primarily focusing on 
formalising the system, the proponents nonetheless recognise the importance of 
norms, conventions and self-imposed code of conduct in building an acceptance 
institutional framework. However, norms and informal constraints can be 
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conditioned in a way that would reflect the general acceptable condition for 
participation and use, transforming thereof as means of transmitting information, 
mediating transactions, facilitating the transfer and enforcement of rights and as 
a way of managing the degree of competition (Shiferaw et al., 2009, Shiferaw et 
al., 2008). In other words, formal institutions provide the coordination mechanism 
for collective action. 
 
Critical Institutionalism (CI) argues against this individual rationality and 
functionality idea of the MI. This line of thought attempts to position power, social 
relations and the unpredictable and complex interplay of community life into 
perspective. It focuses on the interplay between what is perceived as ‘formal’ by 
the MI and the ‘informal’ reality of everyday community life (Cleaver, 2002, Lund, 
2006). From this perspective, rules, boundaries and processes are fuzzy and 
peoples’ complex identities and unequal power relationships are unlikely to be 
subjected to institutional designs (Cleaver, 2007, 2012, Osei-Kufuor, 2010)). 
Scholars from this perspective call for a more critical and nuanced approach in 
the discourse of collective action.   
CI argue that such labelling of informality and local norms as constraints to 
collective action presents an analytical notion of informality and local norms as 
forms of societal disorder. There is obviously a radical contrast between an 
arrangement focused conception of collective action and a realisation focused 
understanding of collective action: the latter concentrates on actual behaviour of 
people rather than presuming compliance by all within ideal behaviour.  
 
Furthermore, critical scholars question the mainstream institutional thinkers’ 
analysis of individual action. Drawing from the rational choice theory, resource 
mobilisation and the game theory, mainstream institutional scholars view 
individuals as actors that will act purposively and collectively to maximize their 
interests given the availability of information. The fear about trustworthiness of 
others and the extent to which members will follow a morally acceptable pattern 
of behaviour is said to be dealt with by properly designed rules - individual fears 
21 
 
will be lifted and cooperation assured (Ostrom, 1990). The problem with the 
mainstream institutional view regarding individual actors comes in various ways.  
 
i. First, the thought that individuals are purposive actors takes away the 
active and unpredictable nature of human agency from the analysis and 
assumes that rules, sanctions and rewards are enough to compel 
individuals to act in a certain way.  
ii. Secondly, it also fails to adequately position local complexities into the 
analysis while attempting to subvert existing norms and local 
peculiarities as anomalies (Nuijten, 1992b).   
iii. Thirdly, it pays little attention to the political dimensions of social 
interaction (Cleaver, 2012, Robbins, 2010). According to Cleaver 
(2012) the choices that individuals make regarding their livelihood 
opens them up to more than one option. Their choices are influenced 
by a diverse range of factors that are geared towards ensuring the 
sustenance of the livelihoods which can be based on social concerns, 
psychological preferences, cultural and historical norms, economic and 
political needs. 
 
From this perspective, people can be influenced to purposively take part in 
collective action but are also not immune from acting impulsively for self-interest. 
Individual actions can also draw from historical precedents and past actions 
unconnected to present interest as well as from emotional, economical, moral or 
social rationalities  (Boelens, 2008).. Everyday actions of people are not always 
purposive and can come in the form of careless, impulsive action and struggle 
for survival. The difficulties that people find themselves in, especially the poor, 
often push them to explore diverse range of options, which could lead them to 
draw and act on their different forms of agency. The inequality in power and the 
differentiated capacity of people in a given situation means that some people are 
able to use and benefit from collective action more than others. Those 
differentiations thus place collective action in the realm of resistance, 
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contestation, conflict, negotiations, discords and misunderstanding in social 
setting, which are not always reconciled to the satisfaction of all. There are room 
for hiding emotions as there are opportunities for unpredictable actions. Besides, 
there is no clear separation between the spheres of private and social life in 
collective action in most developing countries as there are in developed societies 
because of the intermix and blurred space between formal and informal systems 
in most developing countries. There is wider and more anonymous interaction, 
which draws and mixes both private and social life (Abraham and Platteau, 2004, 
p. 212).  
 
Bonded rationality as a model of agency as espoused by mainstream 
institutionalism ignores how conflicts, negotiations, discords and 
misunderstanding in social relations spill over between private and social life. It 
neglects how those uncertain outcomes generate potential antagonisms that 
could propel individual to work against group collective action as a way of getting 
back at individual relationships and misunderstandings. The wrangles of private 
life are likely to interfere with decision-making in collective action owing to ill 
feelings at the level of interpersonal relationships or historical factors. According 
to Bandiera et al. (2005b), lack of trust could lead to non-participation and 
resistance to the institution by the individuals.  
 
Some MI proponents have tried to argue that the complexities of local systems 
and contexts can be captured in a properly designed principle (Poteete and 
Ostrom, 2004, Meinzen-Dick  and Di Gregorio, 2004). However,  Cleaver (2002) 
and Cleaver and de Koning (2015)   argue that despite attempts to bring  social 
realities into the analysis and design,  mainstream institutionalism has 
maintained the core notion underlining the idea based on changing local norms 
and attributing negative connotations to informal processes and systems. There 
must be a recognition by the MI that informality and local norms are not distortive 
but part of everyday life of the people. The attribution of negative connotations to 
‘informality’ caricatures people’s way of life.        
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The point of departure is that while MI often focuses narrowly on predictive 
outcomes through institutional design, the critical view is more nuanced in 
recognising that designing and improving institutions is less than a perfect 
solution to situations and processes interwoven with social relationships and 
interactions among individuals. It can be argued that because MI views the 
nature of institutions as formal systems designed to correct informal disorder 
inherent in local systems, they view the role of collective action on informal 
systems as rehabilitative. Meagher argues that MI ignores the messy and 
constantly evolving new forms of organisation and interaction through which 
different cultural orientations are blended in everyday life of people by the 
juxtaposition of influence from global and local systems (Meagher, 2010). 
 
For CI, organising is not limited to formal institutions but includes a set of 
informal practices, which are often used differently by different actors either 
impulsively or purposively and can be very unpredictable. The interaction 
between people and institutions draws from more than institutionalised formal 
arrangements.  Informal social networks, relationships of reciprocity, patronage, 
sets of norms and practices rooted in everyday life and routines are all part of 
institutions and involve (in some cases) little or no organisation, which are often 
impulsive with no room for reflective action (Tria Kerkvliet, 2009).  Organisation 
as conceived by  Nuijten (1992b) is a set of practices and not restricted to formal 
arrangements; institutions are not things but the results of what people do 
(Cleaver, 2012), and are continually reproduced, re-enacted and redefined 
(Cleaver, 2001, Rocheleau, 2001). Rather than viewing institutions as bonded 
social systems and the object of analysis, a deeper understanding of institutions 
needs to take a rather more dynamic approach in which institutions should be 
analysed as a process in which the flow of action of participants are examined by 
asking more nuanced questions regarding what is going on and the practices of 
everyday action building around social realities (Nuijten, 1992b, Cooper and 
Burrell, 1988, Wolf, 1990). Long (1989) argues that there are different scales of 
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emergent phenomena in institutional interaction, which are intricately interrelated 
and often do not operate in clearly defined frameworks. Cleaver et al. (2005), 
argue that they elude design. Hence understanding institutions needs an 
analysis of the diversity that characterises the actors, through an approach that 
examines the actions of actors rather than formal organisational action (Scoones 
and Thompson, 2000, Long and Long, 1992, Long, 2003).  
 
The point that the critical view is aiming at here is that collective action can 
reflect a mixture of both formal structures and informal interactions through the 
process of blending. Meagher argues that contrary to the mainstream view, the 
challenge of Africans lies in bad cultural practices, her research on informal 
sector in Nigeria shows that, that informal economic institutions and networks are 
filling the gap created by rapid liberalisation and weakening of the state through 
the practices of informality built around culture and politics of everyday life 
(Meagher, 2010). There is also a possibility of institutional design mismatch in a 
society where operationalisation of formal structures is blurry and incapable of 
addressing social relationships based on trust and norms (Hellin et al., 2009, 
Lund, 2006, Lund, 2010). What this implies is that institutions evolve in a 
contested terrain through both conflict and reconciliation culminating from the 
juxtaposition of both formal and informal system. It can occur in transition and 
from an attempt of the state to impose new laws, policies and organisational 
structure into local settings with different ideas of governance, decision making 
and ways of ensuring and maintaining power and equity in collective action 
(Koppen et al., 2007, Sikor and Lund, 2009).   
 
Finally, Cleaver (2002),  highlights that mainstream institutionalism is clear, and 
instrumental, while the critical view provides insight into the complex rubrics of 
individual interactions which are often fuzzy, continuously negotiable and 
unpredictable. Whilst MI focuses on rules, constitution, formality and the idea 
that organisation is formal rather than every day practice and presents a picture 
of institution in a static form, the critical view interrogates social relations, power, 
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trust and norms that cannot be designed into sanctions and rules. The next 
section of this chapter reviews literatures that dealt specifically withsmallholder 
collective action.   
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Features Mainstream Institutionalism  Critical View 
Nature of institutions Formal/public institutions in nested 
layers with horizontal and vertical 
linkages  
Blurring of boundaries and of scales, 
blending of institutional logic and forms (e.g. 
formal and informal)  
Formation of institutions Institutions formed through crafting; 
design principles characterise robust 
institutions  
Institutions pieced together through practice, 
improvisation, adaptation of previous 
arrangement  
Nature of decision making Decision making and negotiations 
mainly conducted in public fora 
Decision making and negotiations 
embedded in everyday life, shaped by 
history and politics  
Model of agency Bounded rationality model of agency 
as strategic and purposeful- 
individuals as resource appropriators  
Agency as relational, exercised consciously 
& non-consciously- individuals with complex 
social identities & emotions  
Factors shaping human behaviour in 
institutions 
Information, incentives, rules, 
sanctions and repeated interactions 
Social structures and power dynamics, 
relationships, norms, individual creativity  
Outcomes Institutions can be crafted to produce 
efficient resources management 
outcomes 
Institutions evolve to “socially fit”: 
functionality may result in access to or 
exclusion from resources  
 
Table 1: Mainstream Vs Critical Institutionalism - Culled from Cleaver (2012)
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2.5 Is Institutionalised Smallholder Collective?  
 
The 2008 World Development Report by the World Bank (WB) titled Agriculture for 
Development embodies the MI thinking and framework for institutionalised 
smallholder collective action (World Bank, 2007). The Report proposed that 
smallholder collective action must be structured in the form of cooperatives, 
producers’ associations and farmers’ unions in order to become more effective and 
efficient.  
 
Producer organizations can engage in more effective collective action to access 
services, achieve economies of scale in markets, and acquire voice in policy making 
(Ibid p 138). This idea is underpinned by a number of arguments. On the one hand, 
researcher emphasize the positive effects of risk-sharing through collective action. 
According to  Shiferaw et al. (2008), for example, institutionalised collective action 
minimises the risks associated with transaction costs while maximising collective 
gains and outputs. In research on non-wood forest products in Cameroon, Mala et al. 
(2012) showed that institutional smallholder collective action requiring risk sharing 
between smallholder forest farmers led to an increase in the prices of products from 
20 per cent up to 100 per cent. The research notes that the positive profit recorded by 
the farmers is a result of  institutional arrangements that allowed the farmers to share 
transaction costs collectively while spreading the risk and gains evenly.  
 
The second argument relates to power. Burns and Stöhr (2011), recognise the 
importance of power and note how it is central to institutional arrangements for 
smallholder collective action. They further suggest that power can vary both vertically 
and horizontally in smallholder collective action, albeit it is critical for the survival of 
the unit. Through institutionalised collective action, market power between 
smallholders and large-scale farmers can be more evenly distributed. Therefore, 
smallholder collective action serves to balance the asymmetric power that exists 
between smallholders and big farmers on the one hand and smallholders and buyers/ 
contractors on the other. Thus, the common proposal for rectifying this power 
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imbalance according to the mainstream institutional view is to set up farmers’ or 
producer organisations to act collectively and to bargain as a collective unit 
(Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi, 2008, Glover, 1987, Thorp et al., 2005).  
 
Related to the argument on power is the argument for advocacy and smallholder 
participation in policy dialogue. It is increasingly argued that institutionalised collective 
action allows smallholders to participate in policy dialogue and decision-making 
through group representation and advocacy that would reflect the diverse views of 
members of the collective. Individual interests are aggregated and pushed into the 
policy domain through collective action. An example is provided by the work of (Bruns 
and Brun, 2004) on irrigation in which it was shown that institutionalised collective 
action was instrumental for policy reforms that changed how the government could 
provide financial support to smallholders.  
 
There also is the argument that smallholder collective action facilitates innovation and 
information sharing among farmers within the group. This is in line with the earlier 
argument regarding risk sharing in the sense that by organising collectively, individual 
smallholders would automatically share information with others, and will also work 
collectively towards innovation to improve collective goals. Using the case of Papa 
Andina network, Devaux et al. (2009) showed how the development of a network of 
smallholders through institutionalised smallholder collective action generated 
commercial, technological and institutional innovations, and created new market 
niches for Andean native potatoes grown by poor smallholders in remote highland 
areas. They further contend that the benefits of this innovation cut across both 
smallholders and other market actors (Ibid).  
 
Empirical research that support the MI view appears unanimous on the role of 
institutionalised smallholder collective action in increasing smallholder participation in 
the market space. It is also argued that it empowers smallholders to make informed 
decisions between alternative market choices while ensuring accountability and 
transparency (Coulter et al., 1999, Rondot and Collion, 2001, Wilson et al., 2011b)  
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The retinue of case studies on institutionalised smallholder collective action actually 
substantiate the claims for smallholder collective action based on design principles. 
However, what the evidence fails to show is if such outcome would not have 
happened in non-institutionalised smallholder collective action. Secondly, the 
evidence also falls short of showing if institutionalised smallholder collective action is 
equal to increased participation of smallholders in collective action functioning. The 
question that remains open is whether institutionalised smallholder collective action 
guarantees increased participation of smallholders in collective action.   
In chapter one, I mentioned that one of the approaches that emanated from MI 
institutionalised and designed smallholder collective action is the Making Markets 
Work for the Poor (M4P). In this section, I will review whether Promoting Pro-Poor 
Opportunities in Commodity and Service Markets (PrOpCom) project, which is a 
Making Market Work for the Poor (M4P) approach funded by the UKAID to facilitate 
increase smallholder collective action in Nigeria.  
 
An M4P is an overarching approach to development that provides agencies and 
governments with the direction required to achieve large-scale, sustainable change in 
different contexts (DFID and SDC, 2008). It focuses on the underlying constraints that 
prevent the effective development of market systems around poor people. An 
important element of the M4P approach is that it focuses on understanding the 
system context and can be applied in different sectors to link the poor and the market. 
Case studies of M4P so far cut across agriculture, finance, investment climate and 
livelihoods as well as water, health and education sectors. The basic idea about M4P 
is the facilitation of market-access for the poor. In other words, M4P relies much on 
third party facilitation between the poor and the market. In the agricultural sector, M4P 
interventions have been used to facilitate institutionalised designed smallholder 
collective action for market access. The M4P tries to examine market stakeholders 
and actors in a holistic and systemic view in order to clearly identify the role each of 
the actors could play in a particular sector and is keen on functions and rules.  
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M4P is based on identifying and pursuing the causes rather than the symptoms of 
constraints. In this sense, M4P prides itself in addressing fundamental problems of 
poverty through system analysis that allows the underlying issues to be identified. The 
identification of the issues then leads to identification of the systemic causes of 
market failures within the particular sectors and how other market aspects could 
either impede and/or support further development of the sector. M4P believes in the 
interconnected nature of markets and that markets can also impinge on one another. 
Therefore, addressing market constraints in one sector could result in addressing 
constraints in other sectors (DFID and SDC, 2008). In short, M4P’s focus is on 
correcting market imperfections and using the poor as experimental tools5.  
 
MP4 recognizes the importance of actors within the system, and its focus lies on 
institutional design, i.e. building membership and setting rules and sanctions. 
However, this design-orientation takes away actor-oriented interests and perspectives 
due to its search for perfectly fitting institutions. By identifying yet ignoring the need to 
focus on the actors, M4P detracts from the actual complexity of human relations and 
its interaction with the society and social forces.  
As a way of forcing actors to function within the designed institutional rules, M4P 
recognises the need for external facilitation – an organisation that stands outside the 
market system and facilitates the tinkering of the actors to conform to the system 
(DFID and SDC, 2008, p. 32). Practically, the role of the external facilitator involves 
different tasks, which depend on the extent and nature of the system as well as the 
market constraints to be addressed. Strengthening supply-side capacity, introducing 
new ideas and innovations, enhancing networks and exchange, providing information, 
increasing demand-side awareness is the range of tasks assigned to the external 
facilitator by the M4P framework.  However, the role of the facilitator is viewed as 
temporally because it is assumed that primary actors would eventually take 
responsibility for liaising and interacting with other market-actors without the service 
                                                        
5
 Most of the farmers as will be shown in interview complained that they were not consulted during the 
project design and they feel strongly that, the project uses them as experimental tool  
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of an external facilitator. The role of the facilitator is therefore independent and 
transient (ibid). 
 
It has been argued that M4P is a viable approach to addressing problems of 
smallholder collective action and a way through which smallholders can actively 
participate and engage with the market in the same manner that large corporations 
engage with the market. Many international development agencies adopted the M4P 
approach in creating smallholder collective action in different agricultural sectors. 
Below I use the case of PropCom Nigeria to examine how the smallholder collective 
action functions using the M4P approach. Let me also emphasise that the PrOpCom 
M4P is not specifically rooted in the case study of the thesis, but is used in this 
section broadly to present how institutionalised smallholder collective functions in 
practical sense in Nigeria. 
 
2.6 M4P:  Making Market Work for the Poor 
Promoting Pro-Poor Opportunities in Commodity and Service Markets (PrOpCom) is 
a market development programme funded by the DFID and implemented by 
Chemonics International in Nigeria. As an M4P programme, PrOpCom seeks to 
facilitate growth and a pro-poor outcome in the agricultural market in Nigeria (DFID 
and PrOpCom, 2011). According to report for DFID, the goal is to improve 
performance of selected agricultural produce in the country. Within the PrOpCom 
project, Chemonics International plays the role of the external facilitator as envisaged 
by M4P (Ibid). To implement the project, DFID and its implementing partner 
Chemonics International identified specific agricultural products to be supported 
through collective action. Rice, soya beans and cassava were selected as crops that 
would benefit from the project. The report clearly confirmed that the identification of 
the products was based on their market importance and attractiveness for private 
investments. In addition to the products and potential for scale up and mechanisation, 
the programme also identified crosscutting sectors with potential impact on the 
selected market products. Business development services, enterprise training and 
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agricultural policy support were targeted as crosscutting areas for impact on the 
primary market products.  
 
Based on MI principles, Chemonics International as the external facilitator was 
responsible for offering a new challenging approach to poverty reduction as the 
overall objective of the programme, facilitating reforms that were expected to create 
sustainable and functioning market systems, and communicating outcomes to market 
stakeholders. Some of their identified responsibilities also include facilitating reforms 
that would influence all key aspects of the market systems: culture, policy, institutional 
change, support services, rules and regulations and competitiveness. The external 
facilitator is also expected to bring innovations to the market quickly in order to test 
risk-failure as quickly as possible before the project is broadened and scaled up 
(DFID and PROPCOM, 2009). External facilitator are not expected to deliberately 
work with and through others but focused on   using  interventions that consider 
gestation periods, costs, risks and scale of impact while making decision (DFID and 
PROPCOM, 2009). As expected in a design arrangement, Chemonics was tasked to 
leverage links with private investments to participate in the overall programme and to 
bring investments for scale-up but also to ensure continued support after the initial 
programme intervention.      
 
To implement the programme, a rice cluster was identified in Abeokuta and Kano and 
a further analysis was conducted to determine the potential success of the 
programme. Rice was identified as having the highest potential for economic growth 
and poverty reduction because of its market attraction. As part of its effort to launch 
the project in the two states, the facilitator carried out a stakeholder analysis in which 
it also identified local stakeholders and partners who were interested in investing in 
the projects and in ensuring its sustainability after initial donor support. The outcome 
of such campaign and advocacy was the creation of groups of smallholder rice 
farmers who would act collectively to secure promised benefits from PrOpCom 
intervention but also to ensure coordinated supply of the products from the farmers to 
the private sector. This effort also included grants to facilitate the development of a 
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service market in the project as well as procurements of the necessary facilities 
needed for the functioning of the project–functional mills and equipment. Furthermore, 
the grants were also meant to support the capacity-building of the project-
implementers, so that operational viability was also part of the effort to strengthen the 
project for effective outcomes. According to the report, PrOpCom also facilitated the 
creation of a service network to support the effort of the rice farmers towards the 
objective of creating a functional smallholder collective action project (DFID and 
PROPCOM, 2011). These service networks cut across fabricators, engineers, and 
representatives of technology centres, universities and end users that represented 
various interest groups.    
The brief background above is to show the approach that the PrOpCom project in 
Nigeria as a smallholder collective action initiative followed in its intervention. Efforts 
by the external facilitators of the project were to create a smallholder collective action 
and not to support smallholder collective action. The report highlighted that the 
different phases of the project were aimed at creating a viable collective action for 
smallholder rice farmers in the selected areas of the different project states. In an 
attempt to reform and create an effective smallholder collective action in Nigeria, the 
PrOpCom-approach followed the MI thinking that espouses the imperative of creating 
a formal structure through which rules, regulations, sanctions, benefits and other 
functional elements of the unit would be coordinated. By selecting cash crops as the 
focus product for the smallholder collective action project, PrOpCom assumed that 
economic gains are the trigger for increased interest of smallholders. The potential 
profit from the project was assumed to be a huge incentive for smallholder rice 
farmers in the selected states to participate actively. However, as indicated in the 
project's inception report, several months after the end of the capacity support, these 
networks could not operate independently of the project that birthed them, as the 
members’ main interest appeared to have been to obtain donor funding (DFID and 
PROPCOM, 2011, p. 22).  
 
Exploring the literature and report on M4P and specifically on PrOpCom reveals that 
the project was initiated in response to market demands and not out of an organic 
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need of the smallholder rice farmers to function collectively as a group. Therefore, 
farmers play little attention to the success of the project because the ownership was 
in the first place placed in the hands of the facilitators and funders. Further interviews 
with the farmers and project staff revealed that there was a clear lack of interest and 
in some cases farmers were persuaded to join the project and often further persuaded 
to attend project meetings. Most of the farmers were in a sense more interested in the 
monetary benefits of the meetings and workshops rather than on the prospective of 
functioning as a collective, and little attention is paid to organising as a functioning 
unit. This sentiment resonated broadly across the smallholders that are part of the 
project. In the words (translated version) of one of the interviewed farmers: 
 
I was not part of the initiation of this project like many other farmers, I was invited 
and selected and because I believed there could be benefit, I accepted to join. 
However, I will not allow this project to derail my farm or other important 
household activities. If I have the time, I will attend meetings and partake in the 
discussion but if I am occupied with other work, then, this project will have to 
wait- how am I even sure of this project if I invest my time and resources in it. It 
is likely going to go the same way as the other initiatives by other NGOs and 
government- when this NGO goes, the project will end  
 
(Anonymous farmer explaining that his lack of interest is linked to ownership and 
sustainability of the project- interview conducted in June 2010) 
Further analysis reveals that the farmers are still accustomed to the subsidy policy of 
the past Nigerian governments and have not shifted focus to the new market 
approach with minimal government intervention. Furthermore, there is still a very 
huge gap and lack of linkage between the formal institutions like banks, private 
lenders, vendors and farmers. Farmers were of the view that the private institutions 
were not ready to make concessions for the projects to succeed. For instance, one of 
the farmers revealed that he was asked to use his tractor as collateral. He was certain 
about his prospects of generating profits to repay the loan, but apprehensive that 
given a natural disaster or unforeseen causes beyond his control, he risked forfeiting 
his tractor to the bank. He argued that institutionalised smallholder collective action as 
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proposed and designed by PrOpCom is in fact designed to benefit other interests than 
the smallholder interest. Institutional rules espoused such as collateral security is one 
such critical issue where the smallholders felt that the project was not designed to 
support them in the first place.  
 
Government should do more to protect us. They want us to put down 
our properties and farm implement as collateral- why would I do that in 
a project that I am not sure of. I have been living in this village since I 
was born and cultivate here and sell in the market season after season. 
If they want to support us, they should talk to government and then 
provide support. I cannot give my tractor as collateral. It is not that, I will 
run away with their loan, but I do not know what will happen tomorrow. I 
have been having good harvest for years, but who knows what might 
happen if I have bad harvest this year. This tractor will save me if I have 
bad harvest and I am not willing to put it down as collateral. If they want 
to help us they can do so, if not they can leave us alone to continue in 
our own way 
  (Anonymous farmer who is frustrated at the collateral conditions- Interview 
conducted in June 2010) 
It was further revealed that the proposed insurance for the farmers did not materialise 
because farmers felt that investing in insurance within the mainstream insurance 
proposal would usurp their little capital needed for investment in farming. According to 
the PrOpCom report, financial institutions were hesitant and in some cases lacked the 
capacity to innovate agricultural leased product that would benefit the farmers. They 
were often incapable of undertaking their own risk analysis and required outrageous 
loan guarantees of farmers (DFID and PROPCOM, 2011). The lack of success of the 
PrOpCom project appears to question the mainstream rationale for formalisation and 
institutionalisation of an already functional informal system of smallholder 
organisation.  
There also is an embedded question of trust in the system, which cannot be restored 
by institutional design. Widner (1991)  argues that effective collective action by 
hitherto informal groups is hindered by the pervasive lack of trust between the 
informal groups and government/private institutions. This lack of trust is explored 
further in Chapter four of this thesis. There also is an argument that collective action 
among informal groups are undermined by weak and limited resources that restricts 
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the extent to which they can embrace new changes in the market through the full use 
of their agency (Tostensen et al., 2001) A similar study of the informal sector in 
Johannesburg, South Africa, found that problems of political powerlessness, legal 
marginality, weak accountability structure and disaffected membership caused by 
failed experiences of relying on institutions hinders informal groups from participating 
in institutional collective action and they are often left vulnerable to opportunistic 
leadership and state manipulations (Thulare, 2004). 
 
Further evidence from the PrOpCom project reveals that farmers are also very 
worried about their opportunities and possibilities in a system created for them and 
not by them. The fear of elite capture, lack of government commitment for project 
sustainability and past experience of donor impromptu support and exit were among 
the major concerns for smallholders to engage actively and to commit to the 
PrOpCom collective action project. Reno (2008) and Lemarchand (1988) argue that 
politics of elite capture in which popular political interest are inevitably submerged 
under a project undermines smallholder collective action functioning. Unashamedly, 
elite capture has transformed informal systems into agents of government used for 
achieving political ends – these are repeatedly manifested in donor projects 
implemented collaboratively with international partners and governments in 
developing states including Africa such as projects Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda 
(Reno, 2002) 
 
PrOpCom experience as a smallholder collective initiative in Nigeria demonstrates 
that smallholder collective action is complex and complicated. It requires an 
understanding of the need to focus on developmental rather than perfect institutional 
systems. Furthermore, the project demonstrates how an institutional design approach 
to collective action attempts to hijack smallholder policy space through its facilitation 
process.  
 
Policy decisions as pointed out by farmers in relation to insurance were executed by 
the external facilitators even when the actors involved and primary users were the 
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smallholders. Thirdly, the project demonstrates that such designed collective action 
often neglect smallholders input and the influence of their input to the project design 
by approaching them as recipients rather than as actors. The project design clearly 
addresses the smallholders as either recipients or as beneficiaries, which 
underscores the underlying problem associated with the conceptualisation of 
institutionalised smallholder collective actions6. A report for the DFID on PrOpCom, 
Ahmed, pointed out that, indeed, PrOpCom was not designed for poor smallholders 
but rather aimed at tweaking market systems to benefit the poor (Ahmed, 2010). An 
important part of the new form of smallholder collective action is the role played by 
NGOs as external facilitators. Since the new market initiative on smallholder collective 
action, various NGOs have acted as external facilitators to different smallholder 
groups in various products.  In the next section, I examine briefly the role of NGOs in 
smallholder collective action in Nigeria.  
2.7 The Non-Governmental Organisations as External Facilitators 
 
Government reforms in the 1980s that ushered in Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs) engineered the removal of support to smallholder farmers and promote 
market oriented policies that focused mainly on the idea of getting the institutions 
'right' –, on massive economic growth and on the rural agricultural sector (World 
Bank, 2004). The expansion of this thinking also led to growth in the role of NGOs in 
development projects with market imbued orientations including the direct delivery of 
support to rural households. This led to an increasing focus on mainstream 
participatory approaches to market interventions, and on the need for external 
facilitation of market relationships with different actors such as the smallholders. In 
2008, the World Development Report reemphasised this new role of NGOs by calling 
for the linking of smallholder to the market through institutionalised collective action 
that increases the voice of smallholders and grant them access to market information. 
What the World Bank tried to do was to draw rural growth linkages especially with 
                                                        
6 93,000 beneficiaries in northern Nigeria benefited from rice intervention, generating $24.3 million in increased income and 
creating 15,114 jobs; 1,973,163 farmers benefited from fertilizer interventions, creating 1,760 jobs and increasing net income by 
$56.6 million; 49,000 beneficiaries reached through improved access to farm technologies, creating almost 11,000 jobs and an 
additional $30.9 million in net income; 185,000 farmers affected by improved agricultural policies in Kano, Ogun, and Adamawa 
states. 
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regards to smallholders towards formalised collective action facilitated by an external 
actor within a formalised institutional system. 
 
The new wave of market and collective action opened spaces for NGO-participation 
and led to a shift towards the creation of institutionalised smallholder collective action 
by different NGOs (Bingen et al., 2003). Recent research conducted by Oxfam, 
Concern Worldwide and Self Help Africa shows that UK Aid to agriculture and 
specifically to smallholders has been significantly channelled through development 
agencies and NGOs in recent time  (Mikhail et al., 2013). Oxfam International is one 
such NGO that carved a niche in facilitating institutionalised collective action for 
different smallholder groups in different developing countries such as China 
(Bromwich and Saunders, 2012), Ethiopia (Anand and Sisay, 2011) Mali (Dia and 
Traore, 2011)) and various other developing countries (Minh and Maerten, 2012). 
Oxfam also points to the advantage of formal collective action for women and 
marginalised groups (Jones et al., 2012).   
 
In Nigeria, NGOs and development partners manage formal smallholder collective 
action projects which are funded by different agencies. One of the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) projects on smallholder collective action through 
external facilitators is the Growth and Employment in States (GEMS), which has been 
on since 2012 and will last up to 2015. It is funded by both DFID and the World Bank, 
and implemented by Coffey International, the Enhancing Nigerian Advocacy for a 
Better Business Environment (ENABLE) by Adam Smith International and Pro-Poor 
Growth Policy and Knowledge Facility and the EFINA programme7.  
 
The development partners and local NGOs that act as external facilitators of 
smallholder collective action primarily manage these projects. Some of the projects 
are also funded by private sector groups with vested interests in particular agricultural 
products. This particular movement towards privately financed smallholder collective 
action saw an entry of commercial banks in supporting formal smallholder collective 
                                                        
7 See https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/countries/NG/  
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action. For instance, the Stanbic Bank inclusive business model bundles is an 
initiative that provides exclusionary technical assistance and training with commercial 
financing to link smallholder famers to formal markets as an example of privately 
financed smallholder collective action (Stanbic IBTC Bank, 2012). The Stanbic 
smallholder finance scheme aims to address the gap in agribusiness financing and to 
increase access to markets for 5,000,000 smallholders over five years (Ibid).  
 
Most of the roles of the NGOs reflected in the creation of new cooperatives and 
revitalisation of moribund cooperatives have been clearly documented (Bingen et al., 
2003). The NGOs are responsible for coordinating and managing the projects and 
equally for ensuring that the products supply to the market and more precisely to the 
private corporations who are already linked to the project. It is also argued that NGOs 
have not only entered into the space, but that the space has also facilitated the 
emergence of new NGOs that focus specifically on collective action.   
 
However, the NGO form of collective action is in itself exclusive and marginalises 
other farmers who are not part of the group. It also creates unequal advantage for 
certain and targeted farmers, thereby creating what is referred to as “market space 
conflict” by  (Porter et al., 2010) . (Bingen et al., 2003) argue that this form of 
collective action created and managed by NGOs often transforms to loose and 
opportunistic groups seeking credit and supplies and rarely continues when the 
donors refocus their funding and their program priorities. Nevertheless, the World 
Bank (2002) argues that supporting  the political voice of smallholder producers within 
the market space would ensure balance between political power and market 
opportunities. Another crucial point against the MI approach to smallholder collective 
action is that it assumes preference of economic incentives above anything else. 
Therefore, economic incentives are equalised with motivation for smallholder 
collective action, but is that really the case? 
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2.8 Is Economic Incentive and Gain Imperative?  
 
Critics of the mainstream perspective on smallholder collective action have 
questioned the idea that economic incentives lie at the heart of collective action 
(Porter, 1993, Porter et al., 2003, Porter et al., 2010, Porter et al., 2007, Lyon and 
Porter, 2009).   This thinking ignores the very nature of human beings, and attributes 
a robotic feature to human agency. Evidence from the literature has shown that 
collective action can emanate from both economic and non-economic reasons. Lyon 
and Porter (2009) argue that although the main goal of smallholder farmers dealing 
on cash crops in the market space might be economic, other non-economic factors 
can and have influenced their decision to participate in collective action. Non-
economic persuasions like trust, policy dissatisfaction and other social relational 
factors can determine if smallholder participate in collective action – or not.  
 
The motivation for smallholder collective action is not always economic - there is a 
great importance attached to social benefits which farmers experience by working in 
groups (Gyaua et al., 2012) This also collaborates with another research which shows 
that smallholder collective action group formed for economic gains of marketing 
agricultural products performed better financially and on paper compared to groups 
which were originally formed in order to satisfy social needs but at the same time 
engage in economic activity as a product of group cohesion (Gyaua et al., 2012)   
 
Smallholders’ collective action can also occur as a resistance towards established 
authorities, and express a quest for freedom from existing institutional arrangements. 
When the latter works against some farmers’ personal or social bias, it could lead to 
collective action aimed at forging and creating alternatives. Other non-economic 
incentives include the perceived clarity regarding conflicts with social norms and 
values like trust and other important moral orders. Lyon and Porter (2009) argue that 
despite institutional design aimed at governing interactions in smallholder collective 
action, motivation for collective action in Nigeria draws significantly from expectations 
of others. As such, formal arrangement and perceived economic gains are not 
enough to motivate Nigerian smallholders to act collectively. In such cases, personal 
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trust is a motivation for smallholder collective action because laws cannot possibly 
cover all contingent circumstances (Moore, 1994). In other words, “I know him” is 
more valued in collective action than “we have rules” (Lyon and Porter, 2009, p. 912).  
 
This also demonstrates that the assurance of trust as opposed to economic incentives 
is a strong motivation for smallholder collective action. It also challenges approaches 
that merely understand different cultures as low or high and fail to properly distinguish 
between personalised and institutional trust, and the roles both types of trust play in 
collective action. Therefore, farmers often seek information and are more interested in 
individual members of the group rather than in the strength of the law as the main 
determining factor for their participation in collective action. Evidence from Lyon and 
Porter (2009) demonstrates that MI thinking that economic incentives are enough to 
foster collective action for smallholders failed to take into account the social realities 
of everyday life of smallholders within the social terrain within which they coexist. It 
also shows that formality does not necessarily guarantee collective action functioning 
for smallholders while at the same time it endorses the view that informal social 
relations can lead to strong bonding and collective action for smallholder farmers.  
 
While the critiques of designed institutionalism as the basis for smallholder collective 
action are beginning to grow outside the neoliberal market, we are faced with the 
problem of balancing the analysis of the diversity of factors that motivate smallholders 
to engage in collective action. Although economic incentives are important motivating 
factors, there are other important factors that drive and facilitate smallholders’ 
collective action.  While it is crucial to remain open about accepting the role economic 
incentives can play and the need to institute rules that ensure compliance in order to 
reward and sanction members, the idea that economic incentives are paramount is 
unconvincing - other social cultural realties are as important if not more than 
economic incentives.   
 
Critics of this approach like Cooke and Kothari (2001) argue that participation has 
become the new tyrant and an approach through which neoliberal development is 
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foisted on  the Global South (Williams, 2004). Indeed, participation as a concept, 
which often interrelates with collective action, is accused of placing too much 
emphasis on personal reform and conformity to institutions but ignores realities of 
political struggles associated with community life. It is also accused of obscuring local 
power differences by placing too many celebratory emphases on “the community” 
(Williams, 2004). In essence, the MI approach avoids context by ignoring the 
contextual realities that inform individual actions and misunderstands power dynamics 
that shape human interactions (Cooke and Kothari, 2001, p. 14). What is thus 
required is an approach that accept the strengths of the MI approach but also spreads 
towards the sociopolitical realities of smallholder collective action.    
2.8 Towards a Nuanced Approach to Smallholder Collective Action 
 
The literature on collective action as so far discussed and examined has revealed that 
when applied within the context of smallholders, collective action is multifaceted, 
complex and contains myriads of interesting aspects that cannot be easily subsumed 
under a particular theory. Issues of power, authority, social norms, culture, and 
political associations appear to remain very much embedded in the discourse of 
smallholder collective action while at the same time, economics of ‘who gets what and 
how (Lasswell, 1936)’ continues to resurface. In addition, the literature suggests that 
a particular pattern of successful smallholder collective action might not be replicated 
in another context. In short, the complexities of smallholder collective action appear 
messy and based on local specificities that might cut across groups, level of 
interaction with external actors, economic interests, livelihood sources, age, gender 
and tribal or extended family lineages. Imperatively, the practice of smallholder 
collective action from the CI perspective should engage with local socio-political, 
cultural and economic realities.  
 
The review of the literature also revealed that although different scholars and 
disciplines have interpreted collective action differently, none could essentially be 
faulted completely. Each of the interpretations and viewpoints lends itself to some of 
the functioning of smallholder collective action and ways in which smallholder 
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organise themselves as collectives in different parts of the world. Early authors like 
Olson argued that collective action should be viewed from an economic perspective 
(Olson, 1965), other scholars that followed have tended to deviate slightly in favour of 
a design principle approach that will consider non-economic factors (Ostrom, 1990). 
Recent scholars also tend to be divided along economic and non-economic factors 
and scholars like Toner argued that perhaps, an approach rooted in local culture 
could offer a better understanding of rural collective action and participation (Toner, 
2008b). There are also others who argue for a wider conception of politics and power 
in order to understand collective action (Osei-Kufuor, 2010) The result of this diversity 
in the discourse on smallholder collective action has therefore led to different 
understandings of what smallholder collective action means to different people.  
 
The economic theory perspective views smallholder collective action as an economic 
activity of the farmers aimed to achieve economic gains and benefits. This angle has 
influenced many international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) like Oxfam, 
whose design of smallholder collective action project has followed this line of thinking 
(Penrose-Buckley, 2007a, Baden and Harvey, 2011).  Therefore, smallholder 
collective action from this viewpoint is to manage common resources and to attract 
better economic returns. As cooperation is important, it is necessary and imperative 
(Gyaua et al., 2012, Gyau et al., 2014). Therefore, it is a means of gaining and 
sharing surplus by the farmers collectively.   
 
Another perspective assumes that smallholder collective action is solely a voluntary 
means of assemblage by smallholder farmers without any economic undertone. 
Collective action is understood as a cultural practice handed over from generation to 
generation, though exhibited in both economic and non-economic manner (Fischer 
and Qaim, 2014). This perspective links to the viewpoint that relates smallholder 
collective action as part of community exercise by farmers and as a means by which 
decisions amongst the farmers are taken democratically. This view is also related to 
the participation theory that assumes that participation through collective action brings 
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empowerment and development (Chambers et al., 1989, Chambers, 2003, 
Chambers, 2014).   
 
Interpreting smallholder collective action as a way of counter-organising and/or 
resisting also resonates in other academic work. This perspective links to the 
activities of smallholder farmers in Latin America such as the La Via Campesina8 who 
organise in the form of unions and mainly act to oppose government policies and 
initiatives on farming and to challenge the international capitalist system (Borras Jr, 
2008, Isaacman, 1990, Desmarais, 2002, Desmarais, 2007, Desmarais, 2008).  
 
The Critical scholars recognise these divergent views, the myriads of issues and the 
complexities that could foster smallholder collective action including economic and 
non-economic factors. They recognise that smallholder collective action could not be 
situated within a linear perspective and advocate for a nuanced approach that would 
recognise the socio-cultural, economic and political imperatives. Such an approach 
would acknowledge individual actors as active agents while putting power, 
differentiated access and capacities at the centre of discussion to critically interrogate 
individual actor’s abilities to influence their everyday agency through personal, 
political or strategic means.  
 
For this thesis, I propose to use Critical Institutionalism (CI) as adapted by Cleaver 
Cleaver (2012) to theorise collective agency. CI recognises  
 
a. the blurring of boundaries and of scales, blending of institutional logic and 
forms (e.g. formal and informal) in the nature of institution;  
b. That institutions are pieced together through practice, improvisation, 
adaptation of previous arrangement;  
c. That decision making and negotiations embedded in everyday life, shaped by 
history and politics influences collective action;  
                                                        
8 For more on La Via Campesina kindly visit https://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/organisation-mainmenu-
44/what-is-la-via-campesina-mainmenu-45 
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d. Recognises agency as relational, exercised consciously & non-consciously 
by individuals with complex social identities & emotions;  
e. That social structures and power dynamics, relationships, norms, individual 
creativity play critical role in making collective action work; and  
f. That institutions evolve to “socially fit”: and that functionality may result in 
access to or exclusion from resources (Cleaver, 2012).  
2.9 Conclusion  
 
The call for community-development recognises the value of collective action and 
participation, and has been central to mainstream institutional approaches. However, 
buzzwords like participation, empowerment, and collective action are often used 
uncritically by painting a picture of harmonious community development while 
seriously ignoring the critical relationship between people and their society. Of 
particular concern is the way in which local community’s way of life has been treated 
and conceptualised in a derogatory manner, e.g. connoting concepts such as 
informality very negatively. Glaringly ignored are the power dynamics entailed in 
collective action as well as the influence and mix of cultural tendencies and 
repertories in community life. For instance, Nuijten (1992b) argues that the lack of 
analytical understanding of forms of local organisation is in part due to the persistent 
notion of formal rationality implicit in the mainstream development approaches to rural 
development.  
 
The mainstream view on smallholders’ collective action often overestimates the 
agency of the smallholders and pays little attention to the different meanings that local 
forms of organisation have for people, and the way they apply them whilst 
participating in collective action. It is also criticised for failing to appreciate the role of 
existing forms of organisation as it views the informal way of life as distorting and an 
exception to the rule. Drawing on sociological theory and on the works of scholars like 
Long and Long (1992), Nuijten (1992) and Meagher (2010) argue that it is crucial to 
recognise organisation practices not from the formal perspective as a bonded social 
system but from the perspective of processes. This means a set of practices that can 
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take forms in which smallholders organise themselves in everyday life drawing on a 
mixture of political and cultural tendencies (learnt, evolving and traditional). This set of 
practices allows for the hybridising of formal and informal culture while recognising 
the individual actor’s ability to act purposively and impulsively based on human 
beings’ internal pluralistic nature and capabilities.  
 
As a framework for analysing and understanding smallholder collective action, this 
research adapts the critical school of thought that recognises the role of social 
realities, informality and power dynamics in collective action. Meagher (2010) offers a 
way to analyse the complex interplay and the socio-cultural relationships that often 
occur in  collective action functioning by recognising the evolving relationships 
between the formal and informal structure. Cleaver argues for a recognition of all the 
factors that interact in collective action (Cleaver, 2007). In order to be able to make 
sense of why primarily, economic motivation is not the only motivation for smallholder 
collective action, we must bear in mind that the rural informal system is the way of life 
of the people and not an anomaly or a disorder. Again, while recognizing the dynamic 
and evolving nature of culture that takes different forms and often opposes each other 
within a given society, we must also accept that politics does underscore the 
everyday life of rural smallholders. 
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Chapter Three 
3.0 Research Methodology: Context and Interaction with Rice Farmers   
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the methodology for this thesis by discussing its theoretical and 
conceptual framework. It explains the approach and how the research was 
conducted, discusses the process of data collection, analysis and interpretation. The 
chapter is divided into the following sections: 
 
 The first section of the chapter examines the methodological foundation of the 
research.  
 The next section then discusses the rationale for conducting the research and 
is closely followed by the research objective and research question before 
presenting the thesis’s theoretical orientation.  
 The third part then examines the data gathering, analysis and interpretation; it 
discusses how data was gathered, collated and subsequently processed and 
analysed.  
 In the final section presents the research ethics, an insight and evaluation in 
the conduct of the fieldwork and the issues of reflectivity.  
 
This research adopts Critical Realism (CR) as a philosophical perspective and 
accepts to engage in the process of extracting, creating and analysing data from the 
complex and mix layers of the social world. I also accept that these layers are 
interdependent and socially embossed and require a permeation of the social realm to 
uncover the interdependences. The task which this research demonstrates is that 
original knowledge, is generated through data collected and interpretation. 
Constructing and negotiating narratives through data collection methods such as 
interviews require an understanding that agency can (re) create and be created by 
structures. In this research, data analysis avoided interpretive procedures that 
deconstruct subjects into socially derived elements by ensuring that individual cases 
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become the point of discovery and the starting point of inferences about social 
structure (Rustin, 2002, Toner, 2008b).  
 
This research does not in any way claim knowledge or offer explanations on deeper 
realties of social structures but makes tentative inferences concerning the relationship 
between individual agency and structural factors in smallholder collective action. To 
avoid contestation of which data collection method is best suited for this research, I 
used a range of methods, adopting qualitative techniques through triangulation, which 
is a means of learning from the data and seeing the data in different ways (Harriss, 
2002, May, 2011, Olsen, 2005).. It also used numbers to represent the characteristics 
of the farmers.  
Furthermore, this research also takes an actor oriented approach and combined it 
with institutional analysis in order to examine critically the interplay between actors 
and institutions and how individual agency and structural factors shape outcomes of 
smallholder collective action. 
3.2  Research Rationale  
 
My interest in this research is a culmination of both my professional experience and 
my academic interest. Firstly, as a Programme Officer with Actionaid Nigeria, I was 
involved with projects that supported smallholder farmers in different states in Nigeria. 
The aims of the projects were to support rural agricultural development especially in 
the areas of food security and market access for rural smallholder farmers. I observed 
that much of the projects focused on creating systems for smallholder farmers but not 
on supporting the existing systems of smallholders. The projects borrowed 
significantly from neoliberal market paradigm and were more interested in creating 
market space for private investors through smallholders’ collective action.  
 
Another important aspect I noticed was that there was lack of interest from the 
smallholders who were part of the projects. It was during my time with Actionaid 
Nigeria that I started reflecting on smallholders’ collective action that would be based 
on farmers’ cultural practices and embedded in a system that are rooted in the 
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farmers’ way of life. The problem of lack of interest from the smallholders was also 
widespread in other parts of Nigeria where I worked in other agricultural projects that 
whose objective was to support smallholders to gain access to the markets. There 
was also an apparent lack of support from state agricultural institutions and ministries. 
This was surprising especially given the role smallholders played in Nigerian 
economic development in the pre-colonial and colonial period before the discovery 
and boom of oil and they continue to play a significant role in the current post-colonial 
period.  
Apart from the obvious absence of the state investment in smallholders’ development, 
I also noticed that smallholder rice farmers in some parts of Nigeria were tied to 
middlemen due to individualism and inability to organise collectively. The gap 
between the final market price of rice in Nigeria and the price at which the smallholder 
sold to middlemen was very significant. The gap in the final price was huge and 
smallholders who cultivated the rice gain little profit from the overall rice market. 
There was also clear lack of information and access to input was also rare. 
Smallholder farmers have relied on their indigenous skills in the acquisition of 
agricultural inputs, value addition and marketing of their produce without support from 
the state and within a context of huge infrastructural gaps and decay.   
 
With that initial interest in smallholder farming, in 2007, I began a Master’s degree in 
International Development Management and was particularly interested in 
smallholding in Africa and model of collective action that could support their 
organisation as a unit. That eventually culminated into my MA dissertation, which was 
on the impact of economic globalisation on smallholder farmers in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The dissertation was based on desk research and relied on secondary data 
and was conducted in six (6) months. The research pointed to several areas for 
further inquiry, including a critical understanding of the position, interaction, 
relationships and conditions of the smallholders in the market and how smallholders 
can best organise themselves as a unit rather than individuals.  
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The insight that I gained during my MA in International Development motivated me to 
explore alternatives for smallholder farmers in Africa. The 2008 World Development 
Report was an important literature that expanded my interest in smallholder collective 
action and influenced my MA dissertation where I examined the impact of economic 
globalisation on cotton, rice and coffee smallholder farmers in Burkina Faso, West 
Africa and Ethiopia respectively. This thesis therefore is borne out of my interaction 
with smallholder farmers in Nigeria and my academic interest during my MA studies.  
 
The study seeks to understand smallholder collective action from a nuanced 
perspective including what motivates individual smallholders to act collectively. 
Particular attention is on the specificities, the motivation, incentives and interest to 
participate in collective action and the relationship that transpire amongst the 
smallholders within a particular context. In 2008, the World Bank underscores the 
imperative for smallholder development for poverty reduction (World Bank, 2007). 
That snowballed into divergence of frameworks on making the market work for 
smallholders through collective action in form of producer organisations, cooperatives 
and farmers unions. Evidence from the literature suggests that most smallholder 
collective action projects are adopting private market oriented approaches to 
smallholder collective action underpinned by the MI approach based on making 
institutions work for the poor. This approach has been criticized due to its lack of 
attention to the dualism of individual agency and the overreliance on institutional 
arrangements as the panacea for bringing smallholders to work collectively as a unit. 
Less attention is paid to the other social factors that inhibit smallholders’ participation 
in collective action and also the impact of sudden change in rural communal life on 
the motivation to participate in collective organisation.  
 
Like institutional decentralisation, institutional formation of smallholder collective 
action is oversimplified in policy documents but the reality is messy and complex and 
requires more than designed principles structured to ensure enforcement of rules, 
regulations and standards (Besley and Coate, 2003) There are concerns by scholars 
that institutional arrangements for participatory social organisation are prescriptive 
51 
 
and more likely to exclude the weaker and poorer in the rural communities (Hickey 
and Mohan, 2005, Franks and Cleaver, 2007). There is also similar concern that the 
institutional approach to collective action is incapable of renegotiating norms or 
challenges inequality that hinders claims of rights and access to resources because of 
the agency’s influence which shapes and is shaped by social relationship and 
institutions (Cleaver, 2007, Toner, 2008b). The institutional arrangement on 
smallholder collective action reduces human agency to a controllable object while the 
reality is messy and unpredictable.  
 
The research was undertaken in Ugbawka, a rice farming community in Enugu State, 
South Eastern Nigeria. Ugbawka is a peri-urban community in the eastern axis of the 
state. I collected the data between January and October 2010. The research 
contributes to the debate on the distributive and allocative power of smallholder 
collective action for market integration by exploring ethnographically the socio-political 
and cultural realities that influence the formation, participation and practice of 
smallholder collective action.   
3.3 Research Question  
 
The main research question guiding this thesis is: 
Does institutionalised collective action among smallholder farmers lead to changes in 
their participation and access to market?  
The main objective of the research is to collect and critically evaluate the evidence 
and determine whether institutional collective action results in the participation of 
smallholder farmers in the market.  
 
Anecdotal evidence as previously discussed suggests that there is little participation 
among the smallholder farmers in Nigeria in collective action. This therefore poses the 
question as to why would smallholder farmers opt against institutionalised collective 
action despite presumed market gains and possible economic incentives?  
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3.4 Research Objectives  
 
The study explores the influence of socio-political and cultural factors in smallholder 
collective action and examines whether designing of institutional rules is enough to 
guarantee individual smallholder farmer’s participation in collective action. The 
following are the specific objectives of the research: 
 To examine whether the design of institutional arrangement is enough to spur 
collective action among individual smallholders and guarantee compliance by 
members; and 
 To explore the extent of influence of socio-political and cultural factors on 
smallholder collective action functioning. 
Examining the research objective requires an exploration of the practices of 
smallholder collective action in Ugbawka in order to understand the factors that 
motivate smallholder to engage in collective action and to explore why some farmers 
would opt for inaction despite potential market benefits. In this research, emphasis is 
placed on the action and interaction of smallholder farmers as social actors and their 
engagement with diverse institutional arrangement and how their interactions inform 
the outcome of their organisation as farmers within a group. These thinking guided 
the design of this research.  
3.5 Research Case Study 
 
In order to achieve the study objective and research question, Ugbawka was selected 
as the case study for the research and smallholder rice farmers was also chosen as 
the research participants. The choice of Ugbawka was informed by two important and 
interrelated factors. First is that in order to answer the research question, it is 
important to select crop whose primary reason for cultivation was cash. In other 
words, cash crop would situate the research question better to be able to investigate 
the motivational aspect of smallholder collective action. Secondly, Ugbawka also 
represents a community that has witnessed a mixture of informal smallholder 
collective action and formal institutionalised forms of smallholder collective action. 
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Whilst smallholders in Ugbawka have maintained their ties to their informal systems of 
organising collectively, some have participated in previous projects that are based on 
formalised smallholder collective action. Three of such projects in which Ugbawka 
smallholder participated and are still participating are examined in this thesis in 
chapter five. Ugbawka has also continued to retain elements of smallholder collective 
action based on embedded social practices. Therefore, Ugbawka smallholders 
present a combination of farmers who were involved in projectized smallholder 
collective action as well as community socially embedded smallholder collective 
action. As a peri-urban community closer to the capital city, it presented a particular 
research motivation to see how community and city life influences the farmers 
especially in view of their access to State capital and their attachment to community 
life. The case study approach was important in order for the research to be holistic 
within a particular context and for phenomena to be understood in relation to their 
interaction with the social environment (Fox-Wolfgramm, 1997).     
3.6 Data Collection Approach  
 
This research takes a Critical Realist perspective that recognises the existence of 
deep social structures and strives to uncover real the essence of social phenomena. It 
also takes a qualitative descriptive and data based approach that focuses on 
generating data from the natural setting in order to allow for high level of interpretive, 
holistic and reflective reasoning (Creswell, 2014). In gathering the data, I will use a 
combination of an interventionist model and a sociological approach that allows me to 
be guided by theories, but at the same time open to new ideas that can initiate, refute 
and/or organise the theories better (Long and Long, 1992, May, 2011) Data was 
therefore collected through a combination of primary and secondary means.   
 
To examine and critically deepen the understanding of the dynamic relationship of 
individual smallholders as members of a collective action group and the interplay 
between group structure and individual agency, I adopted a research design based on 
qualitative narrative and non-numeric approach (Mason, 2002), to understand 
individual smallholders’ meanings and accounts of the events and the underlying 
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reason behind their actions in a collective action setting (Maxwell, 2005). The 
research therefore adopted an actor-oriented approach to illuminate the details and 
significance of social practices and interactions as they occur differently to different 
individual smallholders (McLeod and Thomson, 2009).   
3.6.1 Actor-Oriented Approach  
 
The actor-oriented approach provides a wider framework for analysing the choices 
and the rationale that underpin the choices of individual smallholders. The emphasis 
is on studying and understanding social actors and how they interact with their social 
milieu differently (Long and Long, 1992). Therefore, great attention is paid human 
agency within the context of the recursive relationship between agency and structure 
(Giddens, 1984) . The concentration on social actors is a key feature of the actor-
oriented approach and is also based on mapping and reviewing relationships and the 
flow of information between actors in order to provide the basis for reflection and 
action (Biggs and Matsaert, 2004). Its theoretical foundation reflects the flaws of the 
conventional structural development ideologies and approaches and acknowledges 
the complex interaction that occurs between actors in social setting (Long and Long, 
1992, Biggs, 1997, Jackson, 1997, Grindle, 1997). The actor-oriented approach is 
equally very particular on the important of participation, empowerment and the 
reliance on local actors as the possessor of local knowledge (Nemes, 2005). This 
approach considers social actors as reflective and subject actors who are aware and 
capable of controlling their interaction with the social environment including taking 
responsibility for the outcome of their actions (Greener, 2002, Hoggett, 2001, 
Giddens, 1984).  
 
The Action orientated approach holds that social actors are not mere observers and 
objects in the social environment. They are not controlled by institutional settings and 
arrangement but rather employ structural arrangements to suit their day-to-day 
interaction with each other. According to Giddens (1984), we are not merely 
observers but reflective agents who are capable of giving account of our actions and 
the underlying reasons behind our thinking. Although, social actors might not always 
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give an articulated account of the rules that inform their action, they nonetheless will 
demonstrate tacit and practical knowledge of their action (Hoggett, 2001). Long and 
Long (1992) argue that despite the transformative changes and the influence of 
external actors like the state in our everyday interaction with each other, it does not 
necessarily deflect social actors from acting reflectively but rather, they become part 
of the system which social actors interact, mediate and transform.  
 
The value of this approach lies in its understanding of social change as something 
which results from interplay between both internal and external factors as well as 
between structure and agency in a relationship that recognises the centrality of 
human action, consciousness and consequences. It therefore positions the research 
to look beyond the structures, which might have changes overtime to actions of 
individual social actors. According to Osei-Kufuor (2010, p. 70), it provides the 
researcher with the analytical lens to examine how different and specific knowledges 
are shaped by social reality and the platform to examine the differences in actors’ 
abilities and power dynamics in social relationships. The Actor-oriented approach 
equally reveals to the researchers the divergent responses that might come from 
different actors within the same social setting using the same resources. According to 
Hoggett (2001), we always have choices albeit not in all circumstances of our own 
choice but are always re-inventing our choices to suite the changing circumstances 
engineered by structural and external changes. Therefore, the actor-oriented 
approach positions the researcher to understand the extent to which changing 
circumstances apply to individual social actors differently to either a subject agency 
who can control their interaction with the social setting or as an object agency who 
are incapable of responding to external changes. In other words, it employs the 
researcher to examine both the intended and unintended consequences of external 
imbued change.   
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3.6.2   Critical Institutionalism and Actor Oriented Approach  
 
The actor oriented approach equally recognises the six-point framework of the 
research based on work of (Cleaver, 2012, pp. 16-24). Cleaver (2012, p. 56) argues 
that a narrow focus on form institutionalism ignores factors such as history, politics 
and geography as context and conceptualises social relations, culture and norms as 
forms of institutional glue, which should be drawn upon to support formal institutions. 
In short these is rejected as anomaly, which bring disorder to the system. The Actor 
oriented approach on the contrary recognises the first blurry nature of institutional 
boundary. Reality to an actor-oriented researcher comes from many different 
institutional domains and arenas (formal and informal) (Long, 2003, p. 47) and argue 
for the nesting of both sides of the institutional domain in our analysis of individual 
reactions to the society. 
The actor-oriented approach therefore offers insight into the smallholder farmers’ 
everyday life, the decision-making processes and how their decisions are linked to 
other broader social relations with their environments including external factors. It 
understands not only the formal processes that individuals are bound to obey but also 
how informal processes and practices including previous historical arrangements 
shape institutional outcomes. The research framework based on Cleaver offers the 
same interpretative understanding, highlighting that the formation of institutions is 
beyond crafting and designing of rules, occurring rather through piecing together 
practices, improvisation and adaptions of previous arrangements (Cleaver, 2007, p. 
16). The framework is used to understand elements of Ugbawka practices that 
shaped and blended to form their way of life. Reality to an actor-oriented researcher 
comes from many different institutional domains and arenas of social action (Long, 
2003, p. 47). Knowledge is therefore a combination of multiple realities and the co-
existence of different decisions, actions, interpretations and application of different 
experiences.  
 
Through an actor oriented approach embedded in Critical Institutionalism, individual 
smallholders’ everyday life will form the focus of analysis in understanding decision 
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making processes of the farmers. Historical trails and traces that shape individual 
actor behaviour and interaction with society and their influences on the farmers’ 
decision making are better understood and analysed through actor oriented approach. 
Therefore, variables like trust, which is a recognised form of social relation in the rural 
setting are important in this approach (Dionysiou et al., 2005). Epistemologically, the 
actor oriented approach aligns with the CI framework for this research in that both 
accept that knowledge is derived from multiple realities which can be interpreted 
differently from various understanding and experiences. Reality is not out there to be 
discovered, it comes by exploring meanings, raising the how and why questions and 
by attending to propositions and constructing meanings (Sumner and Tribe, 2004). In 
addition,, CI views decision making as part of embedded practices and accepts the 
suitability of ethnographic methodological design in order to understand everyday life 
of the actors and the process by which images, identities and social practices are 
shared, contested, negotiated, and sometimes rejected (Long, 2003, p. 48). It calls for 
reflectivity in understanding to be able turn subjectivities to analytical advantage.     
 
The narrative freedom associated with actor oriented approach applies to the  CI 
framework.  This research applies a relational approach to agency in understanding 
the actions of individual smallholders as agents. Their actions are viewed as varied, 
with complex social identities and emotions, but not as bounded and static pursuing 
only strategic and rational goals. In its approach to data collection, this research 
undertakes to look at social structures, power dynamics, relationships, norms and 
actor’s creativity as important elections that shape how individual smallholder’s 
behaviour. While rules, regulations, rewards and sanctions within smallholder 
collectives are important factors, they nonetheless do not cover the gamut of factors 
that shape the behaviour of the different farmers. This research framework based on 
the Cl six-point framework provides guide.  
 
Using the CI six-point framework as an embedded approach in data collection 
provides a good framework for understanding how different actions of different actors 
could result to different outcomes; positive or negative and for the research to accept 
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that outcome of collective action is not necessarily pre-determined and does not 
always produce desired outcome. Outcome vary for different actors.    
 
While the actor oriented approach is criticised for focusing narrowly on the local 
realities and less on the interaction between local actors and the external institutions 
and structures, the Critical Institutionalism’s six-point provide the framework for 
understanding of both the local and the external; the formal and the informal. This CI 
framework by Cleaver (2012) also provides the framework for understanding agency 
and interactions  within institutions and not in isolation from institution.  
 
Social life is complex and our capacity to decipher specific issues depends on our 
understanding of the wide diversity of social forms and cultural repertoires that 
influence different actions. Analysing contextually and examining the differentiated 
capacities, power dynamics and the process by which social processes are produced, 
reproduced, consolidated and transformed beyond structural outcomes is imperative 
in social research of this nature. Thus this research is interested in the mechanism by 
which the farmers are empowered, constrained and equally disempowered differently. 
Adopting an actor-oriented approach and using the Critical Intuitionalism six-point 
framework provides insight into the farmers as social actors within a collective unit. 
This is therefore crucial in answering the research question that seeks to understand 
whether institutionalised arrangements guarantee smallholder collective action.  
3.6.3   Ethnographic Approach to Data Generation   
 
Social life is heterogeneous or polymorphic (Long, 2003, p. 49), it throws up new 
changes and realities on a daily basis (Osei-Kufuor, 2010, p. 79) and there are bound 
to introduce various forms of social orders, accommodations, oppositions, separations 
and contradictions and various actors are engaged in different meanings and 
practicalities of livelihoods, values and organising process (Long and Long, 1992, 
Arce and Long, 2000). Clifford Geertz also wrote that culture is intrinsically incomplete 
and that the more deeply it goes, the less complete it becomes. Therefore, to commit 
oneself to semiotic nature of culture and an interpretative approach is to commit 
59 
 
oneself to the ethnographic assertion of what is essentially contestable (Geertz, 1973, 
p. 29).  
 
My decision to adopt an ethnographic approach in gathering data borrows strongly 
from the views expressed by the authors in foregoing paragraphs. I therefore adopted 
ethnographic case study in gathering data in order to understand the underlying social 
realities of smallholder farmers in Ugbawka community. Ethnographic study seeks to 
understand and document the daily lives of communities and social groups and to 
illuminate the details and significance of social practices and interaction as they 
happen and unfold in the present  (Atkinson, 2001). It is underpinned by its deep 
focus in uncovering history, meanings, social structures and power relations. It is 
focused in understanding how people interpret and apply the world around them and 
it gives researchers the space and commitment for first-hand experience of the life of 
social actors within a specific socio-cultural setting.   
 
The positive of using ethnography is that it allows the researcher to use a variety of 
methods in generating data and gives room for multiple data sources (Mason, 2002, 
p. 52, McLeod and Thomson, 2009, p. 80). Similarly, researchers using ethnographic 
approaches are well placed to look beyond predetermined settings and generate data 
across all settings without restriction to already defined settings (Webster and 
Engberg-Pedersen, 2002). It provides researchers with the opportunity for 
“immersion” and to investigate more deeply into the practices and conceptions of 
social actors looking deeply at the interplay between actors’ cognitive and dynamic 
relations with the structures and institutions that attempt to shape their lives. Another 
utility of this approach is that it allows the researcher to observe routines and 
disruptions to the daily activities thereby allowing the opportunity for changes to be 
captured as they occur. Overall, ethnography avoids rush and encourages in-depth 
study, which places the researcher in a position to distinguish between routines and 
exceptions (Nayak and Kehily, 2008).  
 
60 
 
Since this research adopted an actor-oriented approach which sees social action as 
implying both social meaning and social practice (Long, 2003, p. 47), I employed 
different data collection methods that reflect and enrich the actor-oriented 
ethnographic approach. I used semi-structured in-depth interviews, observation and 
informal group discussions. The adoption of multiple data gathering methods allowed 
me to compare processes and enhance completeness of data. It also gave me the 
advantage of seeing things in context and to review historical antecedents’ associated 
with events. I used triangulation to observe different actors, settings, events and to 
understand their divergent roles. Applying more than one method in generating data 
enabled me to think critically about the strengths and weaknesses of each method 
and to try to complement each method with the other. It was also an opportunity for 
me to move around different research strategies in order to generate credible data for 
answering the research question and in achieving the research objective.  
 
Using ethnography provided me with first-hand experience in observing and 
discussing with the smallholder farmers in effort to understand their activities and 
action as it relates to collective action.  By applying an actor-oriented ethnographic 
approach with the use of multiple data generation methods, I explored various 
smallholder farmers’ motivation for collective action and the meaning and 
understanding these farmers attached to collective action. I examined their 
experiences of collective action and how previous experiences of collective action 
influence and shape their decisions to engage in collective organisation as farmers. I 
also examined how access to resources shaped their decision to either participate or 
decline from collective action. Ethnography also helped me to explore both the 
internal and external dynamics of power and influence on access to different types of 
power on smallholder collective action. It was useful for me to observe the interaction 
that occurs in community settings. I was able to observe interactions in the market 
and also the social relations in the rice farms as well as community gatherings and 
market meetings. I also sought to find out the structures and institutions that influence 
the farmers’ decision to participate in collective action and how those institutions are 
historically linked. I further examined the change and interferences in community level 
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authority and influence of new democratic space in Nigeria in relation to how political 
capital plays an important role in smallholder collective action. Using ethnography and 
living in the community amongst the people provided me with a unique platform to 
understand the different ways power holders exercised their agency and how they 
derive their legitimacy from the people. I also examined the differentiated capabilities 
and gender disparity in access to and control of resources for collective action. Using 
an ethnographic approach provided me with the research lens to observe and 
interpret the different ways in which people exercise their agency and the way in 
which power is diffused and legitimised through interaction between different social 
actors.  
3.6.4 Negotiating Access and the Research Sequence  
 
In the Case Study section, I discussed the rationale for selected Ugbawka as the case 
study for the research. The decision regarding the country and community the 
research would focus on was a sole decision, although approved by my supervisor. I 
am from Enugu State, the same state as the case study community and I speak the 
same language; Igbo, which is the native language of the people of Enugu State in 
South East, Nigeria.  
 
The research was designed with the view that working with smallholder farmers is 
important in gaining full access to the community and observing and generating data 
for analysis. There was also a recognition that in understanding formal smallholder 
collective action, identification of smallholder collective action projects is an important 
step and element of the research journey. Therefore, when I set out from the United 
Kingdom to Nigeria, I already knew the research community although I had never 
lived there. I had only visited the community as a child on few occasions. Therefore, it 
was important to establish links with the community in order to access my research 
participants and data sources. 
Prior to my return to Nigeria for data collection, I had initially written to the Secretary 
to the State Government (SSG) explaining myself and my research and requesting 
attachment at the Ministry of Agriculture of the State during some part of my data 
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collection in the State. The SSG, responded in affirmation.  The first step I took, when 
I returned to Nigeria and to Enugu State, was to make contact with the SSG who then 
introduced me to the State Ministry of Agriculture where I interacted with the 
commissioner for Agriculture.  
 
Prior to my return to Nigeria for data collection, I was interacting with the SSG who 
had agreed that I will be accepted as an Intern within the Ministry of Agriculture. The 
terms of the internship were flexible and allowed me to focus on my data collection 
while supporting any of the projects as might be required. The nature of the agreed 
support included report writing, attending meetings and providing analytical briefs to 
the SSG, contributing to Governor’s briefs and document review as might be required. 
The nature of the TOR allowed me to provide support to the Ministry in a flexible 
manner. Therefore, in some instances I would travel from Ugbawka to the state 
capital to attend meetings and get back. I write my reports from my base in the 
community in some instances. 
 
The next important step during this phase of seeking access was the introduction to 
the different smallholder project managed by the Ministry of Agriculture. They 
included the Agricultural Development Project (ADP), the Commercial Agriculture 
Development Project (CADP), the SONGHAI Enugu Initiatives and the FADAMA 
project. The Commissioner introduced me to the Project Managers of the respective 
projects but also to the Head of Finance at the Ministry. The Head of Finance in this 
instance is also from Ugbawka. The Head of Finance then introduced me to another 
key community member who lived both in the city and travelled to the community 
frequently and also had a community shop where he sells groceries and other 
household items.  He took me to the community and introduced me to other members 
of the community as research student and asked for their support on my behalf. He 
also assisted me in securing a house at his family house.  
The next phase was my settling in phase. The first few days was difficult. I struggled 
to approach the smallholders directly and knowing where to go and who to approach 
despite his introduction to a few farmers. It was during this stage that I decided upon 
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a Research Assistant (RA) to aid in my navigation of the community to reach all the 
farmers and to bridge the familiarity gap between the farmers and I. I hired a young 
undergraduate student called Smart who was studying Biochemistry at a University. 
He is the grandson of my landlord who is also one of the oldest men in the 
community. His understanding of what research means was very good and proved to 
be very useful because he took the responsibility of initial interaction and in bridging 
the familiarity gap with the farmers. I also followed my guide and avoided 
misrepresentation.  
 
The next step was the mapping of the community. Ugbawka is divided into two man 
quarters; Obinagu and Amafor with a total of eight villages namely Uhuona, Obeagu, 
Amankwo, Umuisu, Ishienu, Amagu, Amauzam and Isigwe villages (Mbah, 1997). 
With the support of the RA, I mapped out my data along these eight villages. It must 
be mentioned that these villages are connected without any visible boundary. Division 
into villages are mostly through previous ancestral locations.  
 
The next phase was introduction to the gate keepers in the community, which 
included:  
 the ward councillors; 
 recognised church leaders such as Catholic Parish priest; 
 recognised elders; 
 leaders of community groups; and 
 people of good will.  
 
During one of such introductory meeting, one of the gatekeepers requested for a clear 
explanation of my mission in the community, which was an opportunity to explain 
clearly my research objectives, but also recognises participants right of expression 
and the representation of their knowledge of social world (Bergold and Thomas, 2012) 
Eventually some of the gatekeepers assisted in identifying other smallholders’ as well 
as in providing some useful historical insight about the community (Bryman, 2012). As 
a practising Catholic, I identified the nearest Catholic Parish and established contacts 
with the local Parish Priest. I also met a Pastor of an Evangelical church and the 
councillors of the three wards in Ugbawka. One of the ward councillors introduced me 
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to other councillors. The mapping phase set the stage for identification of possible 
research participants across the eight villages between 4 to 8 possible target to be 
interviewed from each village.  
 
I used different methods to integrate myself into the community, some of which 
include ordinary evening visits to the farmers, which was based on the advice of the 
research assistant that it is important to build relationships with the farmers prior to 
interviews to avoid the gathering of wrong data due to lack of trust.  Trust is a crucial 
element of gaining access requires, which in turn requires talking to research targets 
and building rapport with them in order to be positioned to learn from them (Feldman 
et al., 2004, Russell, 2005). 
 
Gradually, I became partially immersed into the village and started playing football in 
the evening with the boys. I also started hanging out in the evening after farm with the 
farmers in the local market, joining gradually in their conversation in Igbo language. 
This approach then allowed me to enter into the farmers’ social world and realities. It 
also helped in forging bond between the community and I because gradually I was 
accepted and fully integrated into the community. My integration enhanced the quality 
of my relationship and interaction with the farmers and gave the farmers the 
confidence to share information about collective action with me. As a researcher, I 
was very careful and cautious about my positionality in order to avoid establishing 
close and empathetic relationships with the farmers (Taylor, 2011, Krieger, 1985) 
Coffey (1999, p. 47). Coffey (1999, p. 47) opines that  
“relationships we create in the field raise our awareness of the 
ethnographic dichotomies of, for example, involvement versus detachment, 
stranger verses friend, distance verses intimacy … Friendships can help to 
clarify the inherent tensions of the fieldwork experience and sharpen our 
abilities for critical reflection …They do affect the ethnographer’s gaze and 
it is important that that should be so”.  
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I had an agreement with the SSG that my internship will be part time and on need. 
Important also is that the internship aided my access to the Ministry of Agriculture 
where I interviewed the Commissioner as well as participated in workshops where I 
meet smallholder farmers that are part of the formal smallholder collective action 
projects managed by the Ministry. Therefore, the sequence of my data collection 
included time in the community and some other calculated time with the ministry. In 
managing my time between the community and my internship with the ministry, I 
spent most of the Monday with the ministry until June when my internship ended and 
the rest of the days of the week in the community until October 2010. In summary, the 
sequence of my research activities include the following: 
 Meeting with the Secretary to the state Government on return to Nigeria  
 Introduction with Key Personal at Ministry of Agriculture  
 Meeting and initial introduction in Ugbawka  
 Recruitment of Research Assistant  
 Meeting with gate keepers  
 Mapping of the community and identification of potential research 
participants (smallholders)  
 Data collection – interview with smallholders, migrant labourers, market 
traders, milling centre mangers, Parish priest and middle merchants.  
 Interview with participants at various workshops and seminars organised 
by Ministry of Agriculture under different projects  
      
3.7 Data Collection Methods 
3.7.1 Semi-Structured In-Depth Interview 
In-depth interview was used interchangeably with other methods in this research for 
data collection. I adopted this method to allow flexibility and rich responses from the 
smallholder rice farmers.  I went beyond direct yes and/or no responses to elicit rich 
responses by seeking clarification and elaboration and at the same time allowing the 
farmers to bring up any important point they deemed relevant. It gave the farmers the 
freedom to express themselves and take me through issues that otherwise would not 
have been possible under structured interviews. It also gave the farmers the space to 
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answer questions from within their own frame of reference and draw upon ideas and 
meaning which they are familiar with without necessarily using my own ideas and 
guideline. The meaning they attribute to events and how they relate to those events 
was captured from their point of view through their experiences.  
 
The importance of using this approach lies in allowing the researcher to gather data 
from people from different socio- economic and cultural backgrounds (Bryman, 2012, 
Bryman, 1989). I was able to probe further into the different types of emphasis placed 
on different kinds of questions by each farmer. This was very important because 
allowing the farmers to speak their minds became a better way of discovering 
complex issues rather than checking for correctness of responses (Denscombe, 
2007).  
 
Although, I developed themes and issues that would guide me during the fieldwork, 
these themes were not static but are allowed to evolve as the data collection exercise 
unfolds. This is in line with the idea that most qualitative research evolves – it also 
hinges on the thinking that knowledge is situated and contextualised and that 
researchers are allowed the opportunity to ensure that all the issues are brought into 
context to ensure that situated knowledge is produced (Osei-Kufuor 2010). These 
interviews took place at their homes, in the market, during evening time in a bar or 
during face-to-face conversations (Bahora et al., 2009).  
 
Using in-depth interviews allowed me to gain insight into the farmers’ social relations 
and means by which they struggle for livelihood opportunities as well as the political 
contestations and negotiations that occur in the bid to either work collectively or 
individually. Actually, using in-depth interviews allowed me to go deeper into the 
minds of the farmers and to find the reason(s) behind their actions as members of 
broader group of rice farmers in the community. It also allowed me to probe why they 
would prefer to work collectively with other smallholder farmers and what 
circumstances would make them participate in such collective action. It was equally 
important to explore who wields what type and level of power among the smallholders 
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and whose action either sustains or militates against the survival of the farmers as a 
unit. Issues such as the attitude and motivation of individual farmers towards 
collective action was explored deeply using this approach. The research was 
designed in such a way so as to explore how farmers exercise their agency and 
participate in decision making processes – community members usually engage in 
interaction every evening at the village market and such informal gatherings provided 
me the platform to explore through their conversation and further deepen the 
interviews on social relations between smallholder rice farmers and how they engage 
with each other and for what reason. Conversations with the farmers also provided 
the platform for me to explore the various actors whose link with the external actors 
beyond the community impacts on smallholder collective action in the community.  It 
was also an opportunity to understand better how rules apply in the governance of 
smallholder groups, but importantly to examine if there is consistency by particular or 
selected smallholders against such rules and why. Issues such as how the farmers 
access labour and the organisation and governance of farm labour sources is equally 
an important area which the in-depth interview helped in uncovering.  
 
Another significant aspect of using in-depth interviews was the revelation of gendered 
collective action among women smallholder rice farmers in Ugbawka. Interviews 
revealed that women are also attracted to collective action based on specific 
elements that favour them and other elements which are perceived as less attractive 
by men. It revealed the deep division of labour between men and women both as rice 
farmers and rice sellers. Equally useful from using this technique was the revelation of 
the different educational backgrounds of the farmers and its influence on smallholder 
collective action. In-depth interviews helped to reveal how different smallholder 
farmers use available institutional spaces and how power permeates those spaces as 
well as the dual interaction between formal and informal spaces where they exist. 
    3.7.2 Informal Focus Group Discussion 
 
Beside the in-depth interview, I also used the informal focus group method. I choose 
the term informal focus group because it was not a planned workshop with stated 
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date, time or venue but I always knew it was going to happen. Also there is no 
moderator or facilitator. Discussions are open and fluid from one person to the other 
without facilitation like a planned focus group discussion. During evening sit-outs, I 
would always make my way to the village market square where farmers and other 
villages converge after farming. In some instances, I would begin a conversation with 
the group to elicit revelations into the village life in order to understand the 
interactions among the farmers, but also to gauge social relationships. This form of 
discussion provided useful insights on the new political dispensation and how it 
became an instrument of power through which some smallholder rice farmers in 
Ugbawka access support from the State. Further insight on how the political 
dispensation created new powers in the community and how such powers challenged 
village level authority that have been in existence for hundreds of years were also 
revealed through the several informal focus group discussions.    
 
 
Additionally, I employed a life history approach in interviewing some of the farmers 
and other members of the society especially those who are viewed as repository of 
knowledge and wisdom in the community; the elders. I used the life history approach 
mainly to trace historical evolution of smallholder collective action in Ugbawka and 
also to verify some of the important historical data regarding the community. Taking a 
life history approach, I interviewed three (3) selected members (elders) of the 
community.. Selection was based on the age of the men; from 85 and above. In 
addition, participants always make reference to these three men when they want to 
refer to any historical process or events. My interaction with these three elders was 
key in understanding for instance the evolution of smallholder collective action, 
historical family feuds, evolution of land use in Ugbawka, the changing pattern of 
village governance, role of women in the community and market and overall historical 
overview of Ugbawka. It also provided a historical view of power changes and how 
actor’s responsibility changes overtime as a result of new changes in the political, 
social and economic arena within and beyond the community. These interview was 
important especially in view of the lack of written text about the community.    
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The table below presents the number and categories of people interviewed. The 
criteria for selection are discussed in the demographic section in chapter 5.  
Table 2: Number and categories of participants interviewed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7.3 Observation 
 
Observation was adopted based on the conviction that interaction and action of the 
social actor are crucial in understanding the micro-level interactions and politics of 
smallholder collective action. The ontological perspective for this research is to see 
the action, behaviour and interaction of social actors as a central element (Mason, 
2002, p. 85). Observation entails looking and listening very carefully with the aim of 
discovering particular information, behaviour and action of social actors (Langley, 
S/No Category of institution/ organisation  Male  Female Total  
  Smallholder Rice Farmers 21 15 36 
  Rice traders from the city  3 3 6 
  Religious leaders  2 0 2 
  Elders/ community leaders  3 0 3 
  Migrant labourers  6 0 6 
  Government Officials  2 0 2 
  Development Project Officials  3 0 3 
  Supervisors at rice milling centre  2 0 2 
  NGO officials  1 1 2 
  FADAMA Desk Officers 8 4 12 
 Total  51 23 74 
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1988). My observational technique involved using both participation and non-
participant approach. In some cases, I sat during interactions amongst different 
smallholders, but also participated in such interaction in some cases. In the latter 
case, I had the opportunity to elicit discussion towards the research and I recorded 
information on my note book as soon as I return to my house. I also observed 
activities and events as they occurred in the farms, market and in the village square. 
My observation and participation transformed and enriched my data because rather 
than assuming a passive role, I took up roles and participated in functional activity in 
order to uncover the reality (Yin, 2003, pp. 93-4).  Atkinson (2001) highlighted that 
ethnographic research is embedded on first-hand experience and the exploration of 
particular setting. It helps researcher to focus on observing those tiny pieces of 
information and actions by social actors through the immersion of oneself in the day-
to-day life of the social actors (May, 2001, p. 148).  Mason (2002) reckoned that 
observation allows the researcher to gather multidimensional data on social 
interaction in specific context as they occur rather than relying on retrospective 
account of events.  
 
Through observation, I was able to gather data from different community settings, 
social spaces and directly from the actions of the smallholder farmers. It provided an 
environment of natural setting that allowed me to observe how smallholders related 
with each other in different places and contexts. It also enabled me to experience how 
meanings are conceived and interpreted and to gain insight on how social relations, 
cultural norms, and economic factors shaped smallholder farmer associations and 
participation in collective action. I was also able to identify different blocks and 
groupings within the smallholders. Through observation and in-depth interviews, I 
gathered information regarding the migrant labourers and how they influenced and 
controlled labour power in the research context. 
 
I observed smallholder farmers’ activities in their farms, the markets, village square, 
milling centres and other social settings including village sit-outs and restaurants. 
According to Creswell (2009, p. 178), good qualitative research should select 
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purposefully participants and sites that would help the researcher understand the 
problem and the research question. I also observed negotiation for labour between 
the farmers and the migrant labourers, interpersonal relationships between farmers 
and how their interactions related to the wider relationships for smallholder collective 
action in the community. 
 
Observation in the market enabled me to understand market power dynamics, gender 
differentiations, level of cooperation and interaction between the rice farmers/sellers 
and how power spaces are negotiated and exploited. I took notes on rules, norms and 
practices that shape negotiation. I also observed negotiations, contestation on the 
one hand and agreement and disagreement on other hand at the farms and markets. 
I also observed an event that involved the State government distributing fertilizers and 
hybrid rice seeds in the research community. These observations enabled me to 
establish who belongs to which group and who wielded what power. It also helped me 
to discover the influence of political capital in collective action and how different 
farmers attempt to establish link with external political actors.  
 
My observation in some instances revealed deep mistrust and struggles rather than 
organised collective action. The motivation for collective action varied from one farmer 
to the other and depended on interlinked factors that can be interpreted differently into 
social, economic and political factors. Issues that were of interest to the research 
were noted down and followed up through interviews and conversation. Much 
importance was placed on how smallholder collective action functions amongst the 
farmers but also on the interplay between politics and power between smallholder 
farmers in effort to gain advantage over one another and as the main obstacles that 
inhibit farmers from working collectively.  
 
During my evening visits, I observed and listened to interactions between the farmers 
and the migrant labourers and how individual farmers attempted to influence the 
decisions of the labourers. What was fascinating was the way the labourers turned 
farmers’ politics into an advantage to control the labour and allocation of labour time 
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to different farmers. I also observed how inputs from the government were shared and 
the individual farmers that participated in the sharing. I routinely took field notes, 
which I later used as a basis for follow-up in-depth interviews in order to broaden the 
understanding why certain farmers participated, while others had no knowledge of 
such support. I also observed gender participation in the distribution and sharing of 
inputs and thereafter explored further what qualified certain women to participate in 
the sharing and distribution meetings. 
3.7.4 Secondary Data Sources 
 
Secondary data sources on the subject are very sparse and the meagre data on 
secondary sources covered most history of the communities and social life. There are 
a few secondary data sources on agriculture and smallholding, which I sourced from 
Enugu State Government Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the 
Agricultural Development Programme (ADP) and the Commercial Agriculture 
Development Project (CADP). Secondary data comprises both published and 
unpublished documents such as ADP reports and published book on Ugbawka. 
Secondary data that dealt specifically on smallholder collective action in the 
community were non-existent and I relied more on secondary data that broadly 
covered agriculture and to some extent on smallholder collective action. As most of 
the secondary data dealt with community life including the social organisation of the 
farmers, I did not rely much on secondary data sources to respond to the research 
questions.     
3.8 Type of Data Generated 
This research benefited from various types of data, which I generated from the field 
research and secondary sources.  
 
i. The first type of data, which I generated, came from ethnographic observation 
within the community settings; the farm, market, village social interactions, 
farmers’ social evening groups, personal visits to the farmers and places where 
labour negotiation occurred.  
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ii. The second type of data came from field notes, transcript of in-depth interviews, 
video and tape recordings and informal discussions. I will discuss in the next 
section, how the data generated was recorded and analysed. 
3.9 Data Recording and Analysis 
 
Analysing the data generated for this thesis was very complex, difficult and tedious. It 
took a lot of time with constant movement between the data and its analysis. Bearing in 
mind that the research methodology is ethnography, data analysis started while I was in 
the field with the first set of conversations, interviews and notes from observation. Data 
analysis was thus an on-going process that started from the early stage of data 
generation till the end (Glaser, 1978). Field notes, observed trends and recorded in-
depth interviews were integrated together in order to develop themes, concepts and 
categories. The concepts developed were checked with the research question to ensure 
focused data generation and I was constantly comparing data with the concepts and 
themes as I move further and deeper into data gathering (Bernard and Ryan, 2010). At 
the end of each day, I listened to data collected through in-depth interviews which I 
digitally recorded and also compared the interview data with the notes from informal 
focus groups and from field observation. It helped me to reflect on what part of the 
interviews and which respondents needed further follow-up interviews. It was also 
through such reflection that I was able to plan subsequent visits and/or which farmers 
would be interviewed further. Listening through daily interviews helped me to develop 
next lead for data collection. 
 
Data collected were then integrated into the analysis and I was able to compare data 
with patterns and themes and also compare them with research question and 
objectives as they emerge. In most cases, this allowed me to refine my strategies. I 
developed key words, themes, categories and relationships in order to correctly align 
data to correspond to correct set of variables and patterns. I also constantly engaged 
in data check and comparison between what I observed and what I was told during 
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the in-depth interviews or during focus group to avoid pursuing wrong patterns 
(Mason, 2002).   In analysis of the data, I followed the following steps:  
3.9.1 Data Transcription    
 
The first important step was to listen to all the interviews recorded in Igbo language 
and transcribed them to English language. It was time consuming and took minimum 
of two working days 8 -5 to transcribe one interview completely. Data transcription 
was important but equally tested my positionality as a researcher. I ensured that I 
transcribed exactly what they farmers said and I used my positionality as someone 
who speaks the same language to capture expressions which could not be translated 
literally.  
3.9.2 Comparing Transcribed Data with Field Notes  
 
After transcription, I compared the transcribed data with field notes and comments. I 
had two kinds of notes. The first is the notes from field observation and the second is 
the notes from informal focus group discussion. Some notes were made in short hand 
and so, I had to compare data sets from interview, observation and informal focus 
groups and three life histories with each other. This is the process of constant 
comparison, by initially comparing data set to data set from different data collection 
methods and then by comparing and checking the data set to theory. This also 
involves matching and selecting related data.  
3.9.3 Using the Data Set to Code into Themes and Categories  
 
I used open coding process whereby I will pay attention to one key idea and review 
the data set and match the idea around the data set. Points that were regarded as 
important to the research were cross checked across different data sets and noted 
down to form an identifier. This was done throughout all the interviews and 
crosschecked with field notes and other narratives. Thereafter ideas with common 
theme were grouped together. Ideas with commonalities then emerged and were 
further categorized. The commonalities then begin to form the concepts and with 
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constant comparison and interaction different categories of concepts then begins to 
emerge. I went through the dataset to ensure that issues were grouped correctly in 
themes and categories as well as patterns and research questions.  
This was done manually without the use of any computer aided data analysis 
software such as Nudist or Nvivo software. My decision was to ensure that no data 
was lost in transition while using computer-generated answers. The data generated 
from the field was also bulky, rich and embedded with powerful narratives from the 
respondents. the careful steps taken ensured that data was not lost.    
 
Using non-computer based manual data analysis helped me to meticulously discern 
the different layers of meaning from emerging data. As I mentioned earlier in the 
previous paragraph, during data generation, I used field notes in which themes and 
concepts coming out from the data were categorized into different groups as a guide 
to grouping the data. In the end, the grouping and categorization resulted in bulky and 
messy data that needed thorough and meticulous organisation.   
3.10  Reflectivity and Positionality  
 
The role of the researcher in constructing meanings in the research process has 
gained some degree of acceptability especially in qualitative research (Neuman, 
2006). Recognition of this agency by the researcher as well as of the influences, 
biases and impossibilities of the researcher approaching the research from the point 
of view of a blank slate without preconceived ideas is called reflectivity (Nightingale 
and Cromby, 1999).There is a tendency for researcher’s position and background to 
influence the research process and outcome and how the researcher interacts with 
participants. In some cases, the angle of the investigation, the method used, the 
findings considered as appropriate and the way in which the research is framed might 
be influenced by the researcher’s background and the need to satisfy different 
audiences requires that a decision must be made on how to present the research 
data. Although, I recognise that this research might interest policy makers, I 
nonetheless write for academic audience.  
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The importance of reflectivity is that it limits personal biases of the researcher and 
enables actions to be understood within its own particular context while explaining the 
link between the researcher and the research participants (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992, May, 1998, Garfinkel, 1984). Most importantly is that it helps for better 
understanding of the ontological structure of the participants rather than imposing 
those from an already dominant culture (Worsley, 1997). 
 
Following my decision to use Ugbawka as my case study, I began to reflect deeply on 
my experiences in Nigeria; growing up in Enugu and working with ActionAid where I 
was involved in a smallholder project. Specifically, I asked myself the following 
questions: 
1. What role would my positionality as a student outside of Nigeria play in my 
interaction with the smallholder?  
2. What role would my positionality as Igbo and indigene of neighbouring 
community play in my interaction with the smallholders?  
3. How should I use this two different positions of mine – what space exist for 
their usage and how to I ensure balance?  
4. How would I ensure that I remain neutral and guided by the research 
objective?  
 
The nature of qualitative research practically sets the researcher as the data 
collection instrument and as a human being who is researching on social issues, it is 
expected that my belief political stance, cultural background are important variables 
that may affect the research process. In social research, the participants’ social 
context is important but that is also the same of the researcher. In my case, I was 
constantly aware of my position as a young educated person from Enugu state and 
how my education has shaped my understanding of the local realities and I was 
conscious of the educational gap between the farmers and I. I was conscious of 
building trust with the farmers and also that conducting a study on issues that touch 
on the daily lives of the farmers could be touchy. I viewed my position as both an 
insider and outsider and was aware of the danger of revealing my own biases. I also 
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accepted that, until trust is established (even after in some instances) that I could still 
be subjected to an outsider position especially when farmers with strong political 
capital are discussing confidential plans on allocation of input or gaining of access.  
 
The understanding of self as the researcher instrument as a researcher means that 
the researcher accepts the possibility and responsibility of his or her subjective biases 
interfering with the research including the reporting of the findings. There are two 
important issues in interpretation. First is the way the researcher accounts for the 
experiences of the subjects on the one hand and his/her experience on the other 
hand and second the way in which the participants make meaning of their 
experiences. Within this frame, voice is crucial in reporting the finding -  through voice 
that the researcher imprints his/her signature onto the research. It is essential that 
researcher ensure that experiences of the participants are carefully captured through 
their particulars (Eisner, 1991).    
 
There is no expression without positionality (Bourke, 2014) and positionality is crucial 
for voice and expression in qualitative research and represents the space where 
objectivity and subjectivity meet (Hall, 1990, Bourke, 2014). Objectivity and 
subjectivity exist in dialectic relationships and to say that one achieved pure 
objectivity in social and qualitative research is naïve because we can never devoid 
ourselves of subjectivity. As researchers, we must strive to remain objective but 
always mindful of our subjectivity – accept who we are as social beings and member 
of a group in different social positions. Such is positionality.   
 
As a researcher who is from a nearby community but lives and studies in the United 
Kingdom, what does it means to interact with the smallholders whose view of you is 
as an outsider and those who regarded me as a member of the same society. First of 
all, I have to be careful not speak for the farmers especially those that view me as an 
outsider. Such effort will reinforce their view and severe any existing trust built. I have 
to allow them to express themselves and ensure that, I depose myself of any power 
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during our interaction. I have to show them that my role is to allow their experience 
and voice to be captured and properly represented and presented in the finding.   
 
As I prepared to collect data through interviews, observation and other informal focus 
group discussion, I accepted that I could be judged based on the four indicated 
lenses. My position as an outsider in a sense helped me and became reversed 
through data collection. My conscious effort to built trust and to listen carefully created 
space for expression of voice in all counts. For those farmers who either believe I am 
an agent of the state, to those who believe that I am a young man from a nearby 
community, to those women who were excited to speak and to those, who never 
discussed their experience as smallholder farmers and their daily life etc. Therefore, 
by recognising my positionality, I ended up creating space to the different groups of 
farmers to be heard.  
 
Equally, by recognising my positionality, based on language connection, I was also 
able to follow their expression and reactions and to understand when I was expected 
to respond and empathise. My positionality as an Igbo person who understand the 
culture was used to positive effect. It also allowed me to understand when to give 
space and retreat and when to continue a particular line of engagement. Language 
was important in building trust and bridging the insider/outside gap. I know when to 
draw on particular cultural value. For instance, I know that I cannot refuse food when 
offered and I must say good morning, good afternoon or good evening as the case 
maybe whenever I walk past elders or people senior to me in age else I will be 
qualified as an uncultured young man, which could affect my reputation and my 
relationship with the farmers.    
 
The issue of positionality remained throughout the data collection exercise. I never 
lost focus or relaxed on my role as a researcher. I was always aware of the different 
perceptions about me. One particular farmer did ask me one evening during an 
informal group discussion about governance and politics, which party, I belong to (you 
must belong to one party or you must support one party). That sudden question called 
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my positionality into the open and the others were keen to know which side of the 
political divide I support. I was here to ask the question and not the other way round. I 
responded by confirming that I had left for studies since 2007 and that before my 
studies I was working in NGO and not for any government. I was trying to build a line 
of conversation that would confirm to them that I am not a member of any political 
party and neither do I share any affinity for any. Then one of the men said to the 
other, “remember he told us that he is here because of his studies and not for 
government” and I said yes, that I am here because of my studies then touched on 
our initial introductory meetings where I explained my research objective to them.  
Perhaps, the man who raised the question was still not convinced that I was a student 
(I showed my student ID during the introductory meetings) but tried to ascertain again 
by throwing the question at me all of a sudden. But the intervention from the second 
man also proved that, trust has been established to a certain extent because he 
statement was echoed by other four men sitting with us that evening. It also made me 
very aware of my position as a citizen and indigene of the State. Henceforth, I 
avoided politically sensitive discussions in order to keep my political neutrality.   
 
My reflection and positionality definitely played some part in the way I approached the 
data collection. For instance, having worked with an international NGO in Nigeria and 
also with smallholder farmers in the past, I was aware of my personal bias in favour of 
the smallholders. I am familiar with the neglect of smallholder farmers by the 
government including the diversion of input by middle agents and politicians for 
personal gains. Being aware of my positionality and reflecting on them allowed 
subjectivity to meet objectivity in data analysis.  I constantly ensured that some key 
responses from farmers especially with regards to external actors, NGOs and 
government are verified and that follow up interview was done to ascertain the 
authenticity of the data.  
 
Finally, not only was the outcome and product of this research mediated through my 
positionality, the participation of the farmers as research participants was also 
mediated through my positionality. However, what is certain is that the way I mediated 
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between my positionality and the research created space for farmers of different 
inclinations to find their voices and share their experiences.  In fact, the data 
collection exercise was a learning curve for me as a researcher.  
3. 11 Ethics and Validity  
 
This section reflects on some of the ethical dilemmas involved in undertaking this 
research. Prior to my fieldwork, I designed a consent form that stated the research 
rationale and choice of case study. The consent form was approved. However, on 
getting to the community, I adapted the content of the consent form to fit into local 
context. I knew that most of the farmers would not be comfortable reading and signing 
the consent form. So, before I embarked on any interview or observation, I sought the 
consent of the farmers concerned and ensured that they understood what I was going 
to do. I also ensured that I pre-informed the respondents before visiting their homes 
and ensured that I was welcomed before I conducted any interview. All respondents 
gave their consent before the interview and I also informed them of their rights to opt 
out at any period or stage of the research process.   
 
Similarly, I made it clear to the farmers that they could choose to remain anonymous 
and some of the farmers also sought confidentiality, which I granted and ensured. 
Anonymity and confidentiality were very important to some of the farmers in order to 
reveal some vital information. Confidentiality was vital for them especially in 
discussion of their family life, relationships & social tiers. Consent was always sought 
from the farmers before any recording or photos were taken. I also ensured that I 
informed them about my intention to write down some of the key points before the 
start of any interview. All my respondents gave their consent for the use of the audio 
recorder in private interviews with them, although in some instances some farmers 
requested anonymity. 
 
One of the critiques of qualitative ethnographic approach to data collection is the 
absence of standard means of ensuring data reliability and validity (Robson, 2002, p. 
168). In this research, I adopted the argument of Lincoln and Guba (1985., ) and 
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Mason (2002) that qualitative research is neither passive nor neutral but interactive, 
creative, selective and interpretative. Although there are concerns regarding 
generalisation of flexible ethnographic research, it nevertheless allowed me deeper 
insight into the contextual specificities of the socio-cultural, economic and political life 
of the farmers. While the argument on the generalizable tendency of micro level 
ethnography appears genuine, contextual and detailed micro research and analysis is 
certainly an opportunity to examine how local dynamics drive broader trends (Osei-
Kufuor, 2010). Lincoln and Guba (1985) argue that credibility, transferability, 
dependability and confirmability should be the focus of flexible research rather than 
scientific validity based on generalisation. This is to say that researchers should focus 
on the atypical and the unusual in order to contribute to knowledge.  
 
This research was more about investigating the micro level and contextual interaction 
in collective action amongst smallholder rice farmers. It is a way of contributing to the 
larger picture on the theory of collective action and particularly on the new thinking 
around smallholder collective action and market. This study could certainly add to the 
body of knowledge beyond the case study. It is important to note that concerns over 
generalisation of flexible research beyond and above similar settings and context 
reduces policy making into a guess and probabilistic endeavour. Findings from this 
research limit generalisation to contexts dissimilar to that of smallholder farmers in 
Ugbawka. The objective of this research was not to generalise but rather to 
contextualise on smallholder farmers’ social relations at the micro level and how they 
(smallholders) function as a collective. 
3.12 Conclusion  
 
The previous chapter focused on the limitations and assumption made in the 
conceptualisation of collective action, this chapter shifted the attention to the 
philosophical underpinnings of this research and beyond the research question 
guiding this research. It provided an overview of the ontological and epistemological 
foundation of this research anchored on the Critical Realist philosophy, which 
recognises that social structures are real on a deep level and can be understood 
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through the empirical level (Toner, 2008). The research took an actor-oriented 
approach to epistemology that views social actors as knowledgeable and capable of 
constructing their own meaning.  Actors are thus research subjects not objects and 
contribute to the shaping and constructing of meanings to the research. The study 
also adopted multiple methods of data generation in order to gather individual 
farmers’ experiences of collective action functioning. In-depth interview and 
observation were employed in generating data. Data analysis was done manually 
without computer based software and used to answer the research questions.  
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Chapter Four: 
4.0 Smallholder Collective Action and Rice Farming in Nigeria   
4.1 Introduction 
 
Smallholder farmers have continuously remained the backbone of Nigerian agriculture 
throughout history (Awotide et al., 2015). From the pre-colonial era to the post-
colonial period, smallholder farmers have always adapted to the changing agricultural 
landscape of Nigeria through various measures but predominantly through collective 
action. This chapter deals with the historical development of smallholder collective 
action in Nigeria by concentrating on the historical contradictions that have worked 
and continue to work against smallholder rice farmers. Specifically, it examines the 
distortive effects of historical processes and developments on the established way of 
life of the farmers. I highlight the historical development of smallholder collective 
action in Nigeria in a way that effectively exposes the complex mix of movement 
through the ages to their present situation.  
 
The first part of this chapter examines the practice of collective action in Ugbawka in 
an Igbo community. It provides an understanding of how historical events interfered 
and subsequently distorted the community’s way of life in Ugbawka resulting in a 
mixture of collective action practices. The second part of this chapter examines how 
the distortive nature of Nigerian agricultural policies on collective action hindered the 
development of smallholder rice farmers in Nigeria. Nevertheless, it highlights the 
adaptive nature of Nigerian smallholders by shedding light on their survival through 
different policies trajectories despite challenges and market obstacles. 
4.2  The Igbos and Collective Action: The Pre-Colonial Context   
 
Conventional thinking is that Western influence has "emancipated” Africa.  Europeans 
often justify colonialization on the grounds that it was a moral duty to “uplift” Africans 
from their primitive state (Khapoya, 2010). However, ample evidence suggests that 
colonialism was a distortive influence that not only robbed Africans of their cultural 
development but moreover undermined their progress as a people (Rodney, 1981). 
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The Igbos occupy the South East Nigeria population of over forty million people 
(Ekwe-Ekwe, 2006).  Prior to the British’s annexation of Nigeria, collective action in 
the Igbo traditional system was culturally embedded and rooted in community 
practices (Ijere, 1992). The Igbo way of life was very communitarian in nature and is 
closely linked to both the political and social systems that define the Igbo society. For 
instance, land ownership during this period was predominantly based on customary 
law rooted in communal ownership but also structured in a way that individuals are 
not denied security of tenure. This practice of communal ownership of land, 
entitlements and security of tenure typifies the Igbo nation (Jones, 1949, p. 313), 
There was great sense of collectiveness, and the society and the wealth around it 
were regarded as belonging to everyone. It also promoted a culture of respect and 
sharing as a way of preserving and maintaining equity in the community (Onyeiwu, 
1997). 
 
The culture of collectivism indirectly enforces the culture of collective action and 
cooperation in farming, and provides smallholders the opportunity to access skills, 
tools and services from one another. Collective action among smallholder farmers 
during this period cuts across the different stages of farming; in land preparations, 
cultivation, post-cultivation activities like weeding and harvesting. Collective action 
during the precolonial period provided space for labour reciprocity in smallholder 
farming, which is based on trust, collective support, non-material rewards for 
cooperation and amicable resolution of conflicts. According to Onyeiwu (1997, pp. 
409-10) 
 
For generation[s], the Igbo cooperated in many aspects of their economic 
and social activities in ways that defied standard neoclassical 
assumptions of self-interest and utility maximization. For expositional 
convenience, cooperative behaviour among the peasant Igbo can be 
classified as follows: labour reciprocity, trust, support for the unfortunate, 
non-material reward for cooperative behaviour, and amicable resolution of 
conflicts (pp. 409-410). 
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Labour reciprocity as a form of smallholder collective action provides a platform that 
allows the individual famers to benefit from collective support, but also to give back to 
the group in a mutual circle of reciprocity. Wage labour was an exception rather than 
the rule because farm labour was based on reciprocity. Through the associated 
community life, sources of labour come from large networks of relatives, extended 
family, kinship as well as age grades. According to Onyeiwu (1997), the labour supply 
was purely voluntary and there were no sanctions applied. Even though there were no 
sanctions, the spirit of collective action based on reciprocity ensured that the circle of 
labour exchange is completed amongst the members of the group. This medium 
created an informal framework through which smallholder farmers achieved their 
goals of collective action informally (McCarthy et al., 2004). Smallholder collective 
action in the Igbo pre-colonial period through labour reciprocity exemplified a unified 
political and cultural alternative to wage labour through a mutually reinforcing 
framework based on self to community and community to self.   
 
Trust was another important elements of smallholders’ collective action. Labourers 
volunteer with utmost commitment and expect that the farmers would fulfil their 
commitment based on the socio-cultural practices without any prior agreed contract 
(Onyeiwu, 1997). Trust between the labourers and farmers draws significantly from 
the Igbo belief in Ofor which is the belief in the supremacy of God and the 
acknowledgement that one is inclined to succeed by embracing three fundamental 
principles of freedom, obligations, and tolerance (Ibid). This tendency also eschews 
aggressiveness in acquisition and less interest in individual materialism. The Igbo 
community believes that cooperation and collectiveness strengthens the community 
but also that human deeds are recorded and monitored by the Supreme power Njaka 
(1974, p. 29). In Igbo, the term Ofor is used to refer to uprightness and cooperation 
with communal spirits. 
 
Ofor in Igbo land has an important social status attached to it and is represented by a 
symbolic tree- Detarium elastic. Ofor is very revered in Igbo land and it is to the Igbos 
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that Sycamore in ancient Egypt was sacred to “Osiris (Jeffreys, 1956). Ofor is a 
symbolic instrument for engendering social cohesion among the pre-colonial Igbo 
traditional societies. Its’ mediating effects and significance stems from the fact that the 
society’s social values are intertwined and in fact founded upon its belief systems. 
Whereby the Ofor symbolises, characterises and exemplifies all the desirable values 
such as honesty, forthrightness, harmony etc., which are also values extolled in the 
traditional Igbo religious belief systems, its’ significance forms the guiding standard of 
behavioural conducts within the society in which trust is built. For the purpose of 
clearer comparative analysis, Ofor was/is to the traditional Igbo society what the Bible 
and/or Qur’an is to true Christians and Moslems. 
 
Aside from its religious or belief-oriented significance, Ofor went beyond to become 
the symbol of pre-modern tort law in the society. The social standards/expectations 
placed by Ofor on the members of the society could be summarised by borrowing 
from the famous quote of Lord Atkin in the seminal tort case of Donoghue v 
Stevenson (1932) that “You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions 
which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour”9.  
 
What then is the mode of enforcement of those Ofor standards/expectations? As 
explained earlier, the symbolisms and significance of Ofor is embedded in the 
peoples’ belief system. An infringement of the Ofor standards hardly ever occurs. 
When it does, the punishment is both comprehensive and overarching (having social, 
religious and spiritual consequences). An infringement of an Ofor value or standard 
triggers a punishment that could be likened to Latae Sententiae (ie according to the 
code of the Catholic canon law, a latae sententiae is a penalty that follows ipso facto 
or automatically by the force of the law itself when contravened). In other words, there 
does not need to be any formal pronouncement of punishments or its terms. As the 
                                                        
9
 This case established the modern law of negligence and established the neighbour test. Lord Atkin asserted that “The rule that 
you are to love your neighbour becomes in law you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question” Who is my 
neighbour?" receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions, which you can reasonably 
foresee, would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be persons who are so 
closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am 
directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question." 
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values and standards are embedded in the peoples’ subconscious minds, so are the 
penalties for flouting them.  
 
Among the Igbos, Ofor brings respect to the holder, and bestows what the Igbos refer 
to as “ugwu”. “Ugwu” also refers to the right or worthiness of goodwill that inheres in 
an individual or a group (Afigbo, 1982, p. 18). Therefore, one of the civic 
advancements in Igbo land is striving to be revered as “Oji Ofor,” which literally 
means ‘Ofor titleholder’ as it comes with responsibility on the one hand and 
communal trust on the other hand. A holder can participate in decision-making 
processes in the community and also represents the community within and outside 
the community. The centrality of Ofor is that it underpins the instrument of trust within 
a community. Therefore, an Ofor holder is comparable to the modern day English 
knights.  
 
The third component is communal living, which equally defines the pre-colonial Igbo 
society. It is reflected in the way smallholders organise themselves collectively to 
achieve common goals.  Farmers constantly assisted each other in various farming 
activities and in other activities like fencing and repairing of leaking rooftop. These 
practices were not formally entrenched with rules and regulations but were engraved 
in the cultural practices of the Igbos. It is also associated with the thinking among Igbo 
of pre-colonial Nigeria that leadership should be based on community service. This 
community-sense is also linked to reciprocity and trust as part of the broader 
elements that ensure the functioning and realisation of communal living. According to 
Hardin (2001), collective trust and reciprocal norms directly impact on a sense of 
responsibility and character to the individual actors as well as to the group – truth 
binds, bonds and ensures that groups respect is ensured and that responsibility and 
obligation are derived and not forced.  
 
Thus, for the smallholders, collective action signifies a way of life, and embodies a 
way of community-living. Their culture is predicated on self-regulation to common 
interest. The farmers derive their freedom and strength from the community to which 
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they owe allegiance (Njaka, 1974, p. 56). Hence, collective action among smallholder 
farmers in Igbos of the pre-colonial Nigeria was socio-culturally motivated and rooted 
in the day-to-day way of life of the people. Uchendu (1965, p. 33) summarises the 
cooperative and collectiveness of the Igbo thus: 
 
Igbo individualism is not “rugged” individualism; it is individualism rooted 
in-group solidarity. There is a great emphasis on communal cooperation 
and achievement. The idea of cooperation, illustrated in work groups, 
credit associations, and title-making societies, pervades all aspects of 
Igbo culture 
  
One of the classical examples of smallholder collective action that cut across the 
various Nigerian societies and exemplified collectivism based on trust during the pre-
colonial period is the Isusu or Osusu (Igbo), Esusu (Yoruba) and Adashi (Hausa). 
Isusu is an informal financial saving system based on groups that started in Nigeria in 
the 16th century. Isusu adopts a rotational saving and credit system whereby 
members contribute to the general savings for the benefit of all members on a 
rotational basis. This system was strongly embedded in the principle of trust and 
reciprocity without any form of formal agreement10 and was eventually exported to the 
Caribbean during slave trade as a community financial credit system (Bascom, 1952, 
Seibel, 2007). It originated from rotational labour based on reciprocity and extended 
to financial contribution based on trust and reciprocity. Isusu continued to adapt and 
to advance from the pre-currency period to the modern period when cowries, pounds 
and later Naira became legal tenders.  Ijere (1992) highlighted that it embodies those 
aspects that deal with people’s way of life in the community – mode of behaviour, 
attitude to life, relationship with others and customs. It promotes honesty, fairness, 
equity, democracy and mutual empathy (Nwachukwu, 2015) According to Ofuoku et 
al. (2009) neither socialism nor capitalism, nor mixed economy espouses and 
                                                        
10
 For instance, the savings are not kept in the bank during the pre-colonial period but kept by one member who presents the 
savings when required and was in-charge of advancing credit to members of rotational basis. 
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enshrines these virtues and standards better than the Nigerian “Isusu” system with an 
effective and efficient self-repayment system (Ofuoku and Urang, 2012).  
 
The pre-colonial system in Ugbawka as part of Igbo society existed with a high sense 
of collective action that cut across various aspects of community life. Smallholder 
farmers as part of the large community tapped and benefited from this form of 
collective action and formed various forms of collective action initiatives amongst 
which was the Isusu system. Brautigam (1997) pointed out that the Igbos are 
successful in substituting for the state and can resort to a range of cultural and 
historical features that enable them to create stateless and informal organisations 
through which they build strong achievement orientation and community based 
networks to support each other. Meagher (2010) argues that the strength of the Igbos 
lies in the constellation of independent communities that depends on the smallest and 
closest unit of the community through collective action and cooperation to build 
sustainable networks. Despite its reliance on close-knit associations and ties, they are 
capable of drawing on inter-regional long distance associations and networks that 
often emanate from and link to community networks, and also relied upon links 
developed with different communities. Smallholders during this period relied on these 
networks and linkages through collective action for trade and commercialisation of 
their farm produce. The smallholder collective action systems in Igbo land during the 
pre-colonial period provided the foundation for the survival of colonial agricultural 
policies and systems, which was reliant on the smallholder but also destroyed an 
already existing and functional system of collective action.   
4.3 Smallholder Collective Action and Colonial Contradictions  
 
The usurpation of smallholder powers by the colonial government and the coercion 
towards formal cooperatives and unions was one of the key challenges to smallholder 
collective action during the colonial period. According to Helleiner (1996), the colonial 
administration exploited the existing structure of smallholder collective action for 
purchasing their agricultural outputs for export. This section thus examines the 
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contradictions that came with the colonial systems and its effect on the existing forms 
of smallholder collective action in Igbo societies.  
 
Reforms in agriculture during the colonial period began with the Nigerian land policy, 
which was conceived by the colonialist as a way of exerting control over agricultural 
produce and ensuring minimal British investment in Nigerian agriculture. This colonial 
agenda was predicated on retaining the smallholder form of agriculture and to rely on 
smallholders’ ability to collectively organise and produce (Buchanan and Pugh, 1995). 
In his statement, the former Consul of the Southern Nigeria, Sir Hugh Clifford, 
asserted that peasants and peasants’ way of farming would serve British interest 
more as despite upheavals, African peasants would remain in their farms and would 
guarantee the supply of agricultural produce required for the home industries whilst 
plantation farmers would flee the farms during crisis (Batten, 1949).  
 
In Clifford’s view, smallholders were comparably cheaper than plantation farmers 
especially in terms of sustainability of supply, suitability to natural conditions and the 
systems of labour. It also guarantees access to large number of farmers through a 
single entry point. Although Clifford presents a valid argument regarding the 
advantage of smallholder farming, the motive for continuing to use the smallholder 
method however offers a critique of his view when he affirmed that Britain is a 
manufacturing country and it is in the interest of Britain to sustain any means of 
production which ensures steady supply of produce in ever increasing quantities of 
the highest quality. He reiterates that “it is important that Nigeria should be able to 
produce and not only Nigeria but other colonies the maximum of raw materials” as 
cited in (Ijere, 1974, pp. 298-9). To achieve this objective of creating a money 
economy, the burden was placed squarely on the smallholders through their system 
of collective action. The colonialists sought to achieve this by creating various 
systems and platforms that aim to formalise smallholder collective action as well as 
exert control of the smallholder production system and output including the use of, 
creation of formal cooperative and Union, the introduction of an indirect rule system of 
administration through warrant chief in Igbo land.   
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4.3.1 The Disruptive Effect of Warrant Chief System 
 
One of the colonial initiatives that contradicted the collective action system in the pre-
colonial Igbo land and Ugbawka was the creation of a warrant chief system. The 
warrant chief system was created by the colonial administration as a substitute to the 
republican and acephalous organisation of the Igbo precolonial system that survived 
on collective action based on trust and reciprocity. This system disrupted the 
collective action in Ugbawka and the entire Igbo society in two major ways. 
 
First, the system transferred power away from the community to individuals and 
therewith altered an existing functional system of collective action and community 
Authority and recognition were given to certain individuals, who consequently became 
chiefs and usurped power for themselves and the colonial lords. They were the 
judges, tax collectors, and providers of conscripted labour (for colonial exploitation) 
for their respective areas, and generally served as the keepers for the colonial regime 
(Nwaubani, 1994).They wielded overwhelming power and reported only to the British 
colonial officer. In effect, individuals became more powerful than the community they 
were meant to serve. The chiefs demanded forced loyalty through different means 
including coercion, intimidation and exploitation. Consequently, the collective essence 
of the community was altered (Afigbo, 1982). According to Nwaubani (1994), the 
chiefs became rulers who, with British backing, carried themselves with self-centred 
assuredness and panache- substituting community self of collective action with 
individualism. 
 
The second effect of the colonial institutionalisation of warrant chiefs in an otherwise 
republican and functional acephalous system based on collective action was the 
impact it had on the trust that existed in the different communities in Igbo land. As 
highlighted in the section on its precolonial system, trust was an essential part of the 
Igbo community and has shaped the way people, including farmers, interacted and 
organised themselves. The value attached in the Ofor system was one of the ways 
through which communities preserve the trust system inherent in Igbo communities. 
However, with the creation of the warrant chiefs and the preponderance of power 
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bestowed on them by the colonial administrators, trust gave way to individualism. The 
sphere of influence of the Chief cutting across executive, judicial and political power 
created an upwards accountability system away from the community to the chiefs. 
Through a new system based on loyalty and exploitation, communities gradually 
began moving away from a system of collective action towards individualism due to 
fear of colonial repression.  
 
Through their power based on intimation and exploitation, the warrant chiefs were 
used to great effect by the colonial administration in the management of smallholder 
farmers. They became a vehicle for the implementation of colonial agricultural policies 
on smallholder farmers and ensured that agricultural produce from the farmers were 
assembled and transferred onwards to export. One of those policies which the 
warrant chiefs helped to institutionalise in Igbo land was the farm cooperative system.   
4.3.2 The Cooperative Approach to Smallholder Collective Action in Nigeria  
  
One of the official agricultural policies of the colonial administration in Nigeria was to 
retain the smallholder system of farming. The administration opted against the large 
scale farming system in favour of smallholder farming. The administration’s view was 
to rely on the smallholders’ ability to collectively organise and produce. Moreover, it 
was assumed that it will serve the British interest better in the face of socio-political 
upheaval (Buchanan and Pugh, 1955, Batten, 1949).   
In 1935, a study was commissioned to examine the prospect of collective action using 
cooperatives. This study was led by Mr C.F Strickland who also recommended that 
smallholder collective should formalised through cooperative in order to ensure 
control of the farmers as well as to ensure a steady supply of the farm produce (Agbo 
and Chidebelu, 2010). Therefore, smallholder collective action in the form of 
cooperatives and farmers’ union was also created to ensure quantitative and 
qualitative supply of farm produce for onward export to British industries. The 
acceptance of the report thus marked the origin of formal smallholder collective action 
in Nigeria (Agbo and Chidebelu, 2010).  
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The decision to create formal farmers’ cooperatives was in line with the British policy 
aimed at finding a sustainable means of farm supply for export. This was an attempt 
to facilitate the movement of rural farm produce from hinterlands to the coast for 
export and to ensure a coordinated approach of collective supply of smallholder 
produce in a coordinated manner and through a controlled channel.  As a result, the 
colonial government created an Agricultural Commodity Marketing Board based on 
Strickland’s report primarily for marketing exportable agricultural commodities 
produced in Nigeria on behalf of the smallholders’ producers, albeit without their full 
consent and on negligible rate (Ojowu and Mensah, 1988). Ekpere (1980) argued that 
the formation of the new cooperative based on Strickland’s report did not take a new 
form but emanated from existing clusters of farmer groups in the different regions of 
the country purposely for the growing of major cash crops such as cocoa, cotton, and 
palm produce for colonial export. This was easier for the colonialists because the 
different existing forms of collective action were efficient and functional with deep ties 
in the communities from where the derive them.   
To exert full control, colonial administrators created a centralised control, and 
established monopoly marketing of smallholder agricultural products in Nigeria. This 
was done with the introduction of colonial commodity boards in 1947 which 
centralised commodity export (Williams, 1985). The policy also ensured that the board 
controlled value chain processes including setting the prices as well as the return to 
smallholders, which were well below world prices (Abdu and Marshall, 1990). This 
was justified as a way of minimising the price fluctuation in the world commodity 
market (Hinderink and Sterkenburg, 1983). Meanwhile, the surplus accumulated were 
invested in Britain and not in Nigeria (Williams, 1985).         
 
Furthering the objective of controlling the smallholder products, the colonial 
administration in 1954 created a federal structure with three (later four) powerful and 
largely autonomous regions with the objective of decentralising the control of 
smallholder collective action through cooperatives (Watts, 1983). Ojowu and Mensah 
(1988, p. 248) opined that decentralising the structure into regions and the creation of 
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regional marketing boards were aimed at strengthening the power and control over 
smallholders and to speed up the process of product supply for export by the Nigerian 
Produce Marketing Company (NPMC).    
 
The impact of colonial policy was felt in Ugbawka like in many other Igbo 
communities. As a transit community for farm produce from parts of the Eastern 
Nigeria, Ugbawka witnessed first-hand the disruptive influence of the colonial policies 
on the smallholder farmers and the community at large. The colonial cooperative 
policy took away farming ownership from the smallholders because of their inability to 
control the outcomes of their labour. In fact, the system of cooperatives simply 
exploited the farmers without the same commensurate benefit for their labour. The 
system of reciprocal support, trust and other communal sense of collective action 
gave way to a formal and institutionalised system of cooperation dictated from outside 
the community. It also planted a great sense of lack of interest in farming on the 
farmers because of their inability to control their means of farming production and 
supply.  
According to Mbah (1997), many farmers gave up farming and looked for jobs that 
were linked to the colonial government. Farmers abandoned their farms and migrated 
to the Enugu in search of service jobs. Therefore, smallholder collective action in 
Ugbawka which was mediated through a system that eschews dishonesty and 
promotes trust and integrity became powerless. The private sectors, which handled 
and coordinated the marketing of smallholder products, were largely unregulated by 
the colonial government and were allowed freedom to wield economic and political 
power above the farmers. Ojowu and Mensah (1988) argue that the economic power 
relations between the farmers and the private sector favoured the latter, which in 
effect cowed the farmers’ interest and motivation for farming. Meanwhile, the 
cooperative approach to smallholder collective action did not improve cooperation 
amongst the farmers. Farmers became less interested in agriculture and in 
community service. Most of the incentives for collective action were stripped away 
with the introduction of the new cooperative approach. The system did not create 
room or opportunity for the farmers to negotiate the price for their commodities. The 
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farmers were also unable to control where and who to sell their product, and were 
thus unable to control the price of their commodity. Moreover, the system was 
accompanied by an agricultural programme that jettisoned local knowledge and 
promoted foreign knowledge. Ijere noted that to achieve the objective of economic 
exploitation of the smallholder farmers, through consistent supply and control of 
smallholder produce, the colonial government educated the farmers in scientific and 
economic methods of agriculture and in the importation and distribution of agricultural 
implements perceived to be superior to those locally manufactured (Ijere, 1974, p. 
299).  
 
Inevitably by controlling the way and means by which the farmers work and 
cooperate, the colonial government crafted and determined the political, moral and 
material conditions upon which the success and failure of the labour of smallholders 
were measured. Beside the quest to control the smallholder product, the colonial 
motivation was also to ensure less foreign competition in the products. For instance, 
the British were very cautious about German interest in Nigeria’s agricultural 
products. As a consequence, they reserved the country’s trade and commerce to 
British companies alone (Ijere, 1974). Therefore, the structure and operations of 
smallholder collective action was an exclusive reserve of the British. Non-British 
private firms who wanted to export smallholder produce paid fines and fees that were 
not redistributed to the smallholders. Around 1919, there was a £2 per tonne duty on 
all palm kernel purchased in Nigeria by non-British merchants and eight-ninth of palm 
kernel and four-fifth of other commodities were reserved for shipment to United 
Kingdom only; an economic policy and return which was never ploughed back to the 
development of smallholders in Nigeria, and which was also designed to ensure lack 
of alternative foreign interest in Nigerian agricultural products (Hancock, 1942, p. 
116). The smallholder collective action through cooperative was not voluntary. 
Farmers were coerced and forced to either join and/or face severe sanctions. Colonial 
administration institutionalised mandatory membership up until 1950. (Chidebelu, 
1986) noted that the colonial government through the divisional governments forced 
compulsory registration and membership of cooperatives on all smallholders. This 
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lack of ownership is the reason why (Agbo, 2009) contends that there is still sceptism 
around cooperatives and formal smallholder collective action in Enugu South East 
Nigeria.   
4.4 Smallholder Collective Action and Post-Colonial Policy Inconsistencies  
 
The introduction of formal collective action in form of cooperatives in Nigeria during 
the colonial period marked a change in the way smallholder collective action 
functioned. Moreover, it constituted a shift towards the use and purpose of 
smallholder collective action in Nigeria as a means of organising farmers. The 
formalisation of smallholder collective action through coercive membership by the 
government on the farmers created a lasting negative impression and perception of 
collective action through cooperatives (Chidebelu, 1986, Agbo, 2009). At the initial 
period of the post-colonial era, there was a shift away from forceful and compulsory 
membership to voluntary membership that was supervised and controlled by regional 
governments.  
 
After colonialism, the regional government adopted the colonial pattern of smallholder 
collective action by sticking to the use of cooperatives as a way of ensuring continued 
control of farm produce. Agbonlahor et al. (2012) noted that after Nigeria’s 
independence, the regional governments retained the use of cooperatives as a way of 
securing quantitative increase in farm output, as well as a way of ensuring the control 
of the movement of farm products from rural farms to export points. Abdu and 
Marshall (1990) pointed out that independence in 1960 did not actually bring about 
any major change in agricultural policy but rather, the post-colonial government 
embarked on the First National Development Plan (NDP) that was ill-conceived and 
less strategic. The NDP continued the import substitution policy that had begun in the 
1950s throughout the early 1960s. Colonial policy continuation thus affected Nigeria’s 
agricultural economy during the fall in world commodity prices in the early 1960s, 
thereby threatening the fragile financial stability of the newly independent Nigeria. In 
order to mediate the effect of the fall in world commodities, the government increased 
taxation and further reduced the commodity price of smallholder - produce. In the mid 
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period of 1960s, there was a change in policy after a warning from the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation (FAO) that pushed the government to revert to the 
centralised system of agricultural control, and to improve the public spending for the 
agricultural sector. At this juncture the government had gone deeply into in the use of 
cooperatives to control the supply and export of the major agricultural commodities in 
Nigeria.  
4.4.1   The Pains of the Civil War  
 
In 1967, the Nigerian-Biafra Civil war affected agriculture in Ugbawka and other 
communities in Igbo land. The war dislocated almost the entirety of smallholders in 
the Eastern Region. Families were separated and forced into different areas as 
internally displaced people and refugees in other parts of Nigeria and neighbouring 
countries. Most of the policies and programmes of the post-independence 
administration of Eastern Nigeria were either temporarily halted or completely 
abandoned following the eruption of the civil war. Plantations, farm settlements and 
other agricultural establishments that characterized government policies at the time 
were abandoned. Even the aggressive marketing of fertilizer and other government 
agricultural extension services suffered severe neglect. Food production came under 
server attack as the outbreak of the war disrupted the smallholders’ food production 
and several agricultural infrastructures were destroyed (Iwuagwu, 2012, Kirk-Greene, 
1971) .   
 
The outbreak of the war also led to the conscription of able bodied men into the Biafra 
army, thereby depleting available hands in agriculture. According Kirk-Greene (1971, 
p. 357)  
“The young man who sneaked about the village, avoiding service in his 
country’s armed forces was unpatriotic; that young and able-bodied school 
teacher who preferred to distribute relief when he should be fighting his 
country’s war, was not only unpatriotic but was doing a woman’s work, while 
those who helped these loafers to dodge their civic duties should henceforth 
re-examine themselves”   
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It has been argued that the action taken by the Biafra government was necessary for 
the survival of Biafra. However, it also had tremendous effects on the agricultural 
sector as labour hitherto engaged in agricultural and commercial activities was 
henceforth channelled to the war effort.  Igbo in other part of Nigeria also returned to 
the Igbo land and added pressure to an already pressured food economy. In effect, 
the ensuing war not only sapped the area of its manpower resources, but also 
increased the demand for food resulting from the additional mouths that now had to 
be fed due to high number of Igbo returnee (Martin, 1988). In addition, up to one 
million lives were also lost during the war thereby reducing further the manpower 
required for agriculture in Igboland  (Igbokwe, 1995). There was also the loss of 
farmland following the evacuation of conquered areas and movement into the hitherto 
reserved farmland for abode. Nigerian soldiers not only killed human beings, they 
destroyed farm lands and crops. Reports indicate that communities in Igbo land 
whose harvests were either destroyed or eaten up by these soldiers never recovered 
from the loss. Nigerian army was also using hunger as a war tool against Biafra and 
targeting crops and farm land was one of the strategies used by Nigeria during the 
war. The sporadic attacks by the Nigerian army could also not allow farmers to 
continue their farming as they don’t know where the next strike will be. By the end of 
1968, virtually all the major food producing areas of Igboland had come under the 
federal troops (Iwuagwu, 2012).  
 
By the time the war ended, most smallholder farmers in Ugbawka and many Igbo 
communities had lost their crops, harvest and, in some cases, farmland. For an 
economy that depended on farming and commercial activities, there was nothing to 
come back to. The purposeful targeting of the farm lands and markets by the Nigerian 
Army also resulted in a complete lack of motivation of farmers to get back to farming. 
Former farmers who were also recruited into the Biafra Army were disillusioned with 
agriculture and unwilling to return to farming considering the high taxation imposed on 
crops (Idachaba, 1985). The movement of the Igbos during the war also resulted in 
occupational change and many had taken up different occupations.  
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On the other side, some communities had no other alternative than farming as the 
only way of sustaining their livelihoods. There were no economic activities to go back 
to and farming became the only alternative. It was also reported that famers had 
buried some of the crops like yam, cocoyam and other seed crops in the ground to 
preserve them for later years (Iwuagwu, 2012).  
 
The war had a grave effect on Igbo economic life in general and agriculture in 
particular. After the war, the environment for production was lacking– smallholders 
lacked institutional support from the government but returned to smallholder collective 
action based on community assemblage anchored in trust and reciprocity.     
4.4.2   The Post War Agricultural Development Policies 
  
The second phase of agricultural policy in Nigeria was the period after the 
Nigerian/Biafra civil war. Soon after the war, agricultural output declined. The war 
dislocated agriculture and the transport system through which export was enabled 
(Watts and Shenton, 1984, p. 188), and the smallholder farmers were unable to 
continue smoothly having lost most of their input and farm tools during the war.  In 
most cases, many could not afford a start-up input in farming any longer. In eastern 
Nigeria, for example, palm oil plantations were completely destroyed (Daramola et al., 
2008). Not surprisingly, the export of the three main export crops cocoa, palm oil and 
groundnut fell by 20%, 40% and 50%, respectively (Wells, 1974). Besides, the 
discovery of oil and the growing oil production salvaged Nigeria from impending 
doom. However, the proceeds from the oil boom were not invested in agriculture but 
rather conscripted into commerce, construction and manufacturing in favour of urban 
real sectors, leading to the abandonment of agriculture which was left in tatters This 
boom in construction and services in the city necessitated the migration of both land 
and labour from the rural agricultural sector to the urban industrial sector. However, 
despite labour migration, at least 70% of the total population was still employed by the 
agricultural sector in the 1970s (Sokari-George, 1987).  
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In response to the negative growth in agriculture, the second phases of agricultural 
policies in Nigeria saw a reversal from a laissez faire- to an interventionist approach. 
In the face of a noticeable decline in the performance of the agricultural sector, the 
government launched noticeable interventions in policies to revive the agriculture 
came in force with the establishment of new agricultural institutions and programmes. 
The broad aim was to facilitate agricultural marketing, to reduce production costs, and 
to enhance product prices as incentives for increased agricultural production 
(Manyong et al., 2005, p. 39). The federal government then took over broad 
agricultural development from the regional government. Some of the policy- highlights 
included the establishment of an agricultural commodity marketing and pricing policy 
in 1977 during the third national development plan to replace the hitherto regional 
multi-commodity boards inherited from 1954 (Federal Republic Of Nigeria, 1975, 
Manyong et al., 2005). Nevertheless, the new boards were still established along 
commodity lines and focused mainly on export crops: cocoa, groundnut, palm 
produce, cotton, rubber, and food grains. While the major export crops had separate 
commodity boards, the food grain was lumped under one board, thus underlining the 
attention on cash crops and less consideration for food crops.   
 
The establishment of the food grain board was the first initiative, and was a response 
to the increasing food decline. It administered a price policy system whereby the food 
price was fixed nationally and, in most cases, the board intervened as buyers of last 
resort during price fluctuations and volatility. The government was also responsible for 
input supply and distribution and equally implemented an agricultural input subsidy 
policy inherited from most of the regional governments under whose control the 
agricultural sector was vested in the first period. Between 1976 and 1979, fertilizers 
attracted 75% of subsidies wholly borne by the federal government, and later 
reversed into a shared policy between the federal government and the regional 
government and the farmers in the ratio of 50% (federal), 25% (regional) and 25% 
(farmers) respectively. Seeds also attracted 50% subsidy, agrochemicals 50% and 
tractor hire which was operated at the state level attracted between 25% to 50% 
subsidy at different times of the period (Manyong et al., 2005, p. 41).     
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Reacting to the migration of rural agrarian labour into urban construction, 
manufacturing and services industry, the government also came up with an 
agricultural mechanisation policy to substitute for the lack of agricultural manpower. 
There were tractor hire units at the states; liberalised import for farm equipment; land 
clearing assistance from the government and the launching of a machinery ownership 
scheme in 1980 to encourage farmers to own farm machines through government 
shared cost formula (Federal Republic Of Nigeria, 1976, Federal Republic Of Nigeria, 
1975).  Equally, applicable during this period was the policy on the mobilisation of 
rural smallholders through cooperatives that also served as channel for distribution of 
subsidized farm inputs as well as imported food commodities. Gradually, Nigeria was 
becoming a food import economy River Basin Development Authority was also 
established in 1977 in the various zones of the country to provide land and water 
needs for agricultural and rural development, which came after the creation of the 
Nigerian Agricultural Credit Bank (NACB) in 1973 as a specialized credit institution for 
loans to smallholders and large scale farmers under the second National 
Development Plan (Federal Republic Of Nigeria, 1970, p. 3 &110, Abdu and Marshall, 
1990). Extension services were encouraged as a knowledge transfer mechanism 
through which research and development outcomes are passed on to rural 
smallholders.  
 
The government also enacted some legal frameworks and decrees to promote 
agricultural development. Amongst them were the enterprises promotion decrees of 
1972, which were synonymous with indigenisation and encouragement of Nigerian 
investors into agriculture on a large scale. Of the existing enterprises, 28 were 
reserved exclusively for Nigerians and 25 were to be based on joint ownership 
between Nigerians and foreign investors insofar as there was 40% Nigerian equity 
participation in the enterprise. In 1977, the enterprises promotion decree was 
promulgated albeit with no lesser restriction than the previous in 1972 except for the 
categorization of the enterprise into three categories and the raising of Nigerian equity 
participation to 60% and 40% for the second and third schedule enterprises 
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respectively (Manyong et al., 2005).  In addition to the aforementioned decrees, the 
government came up with the Land Used Act of 1979 that vested all land in the hand 
of the state. Statutory control was then bestowed to the state government and local 
government for urban and rural customary lands respectively.  
 
Macroeconomic policies were also implemented as a measure to improve agriculture 
in Nigerian during this phase. They included fiscal, monetary, and trade policies. The 
fiscal policies came through budgetary, tax, wages, and debt management policies. 
The budgetary allocation to agriculture at this period came with high capital and 
recurrent expenditure at both the federal and state level. Both levels of government 
were thus operating on a budget deficit, which mainly unaccounted for low investment 
in agriculture. This was blamed on the increasing oil revenue, high overhead cost on 
public sectors and government investment in state owned and managed enterprises 
(Manyong et al., 2005, pp. 44-5). The government equally eliminated the export tax 
and reduced taxable income and profits on the agricultural sector in order to 
incentivize producers of export crops and to relief new agricultural enterprises 
(Walkenhorst, 2007, p. 6). Wage policies introduced by the government by increasing 
minimum wage equally accelerated inflation and widened the gap between urban and 
rural dwellers, thereby accelerating the pace of rural-urban migration and the 
abandonment of the agricultural sector. Invariably, government policies constituted an 
antithesis to rural agricultural development.  Investing in rural agricultural was thus 
shrouded with disincentives, shortage of rural labour, high rural wage and of course 
high cost of production. In addition, poor infrastructure and the diversion of revenue 
generated through agricultural export into urban social services and government 
parastatals further accelerated the decline of the agricultural sector. Monetary policies 
such as tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and foreign exchange regulations, furthermore 
were detrimental to the interests of export-oriented smallholder farmers.   
            
Overall, it has been argued that the Nigerian government in this period of time took 
the wrong path to agricultural development (Manyong et al., 2005, Daramola et al., 
2008, Walkenhorst, 2007). The policies resulted in high fiscal spending and increased 
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the national debt. Economically, it was unsustainable and the government was going 
through incessant and somewhat import trial period during which import went from 
restriction to dumping especially around the boom period and back to restriction 
around 1982 (Daramola et al., 2008). The petro-dollar contradiction also shifted 
Nigeria’s attention on oil revenues rather than on the diversification of the economy, 
leading to import licensing and currency overvaluation, which cheapened import at the 
detriment of export. Moreover, while all of this was going on, the smallholder farmers 
were profoundly marginalised in agriculture revenue allocation (Watts and Lubeck, 
1983, p. 119).  
 
In the third development plan of 1975, of all the total allocated capital to agriculture 
(N3.1 billion in 1997) 30 percent was allocated to massive irrigation schemes, 14 
percent went to direct production schemes under state government management and 
10 percent went to extension services (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1975).  
Smallholder collective action also witnessed divisive policies in Nigeria at this period. 
However, the government sought to further exclude and demotivate the smallholders 
by favouring large scale and mechanised agriculture against smallholding.” Abdu and 
Marshall (1990, p. 319) strongly remarked that collective action through cooperatives 
not only failed the smallholders but also destroyed the collective spirit of Nigerian 
smallholders. It excluded them from the market they once dominated. Lawal (1985) 
added that the location of the primary financial institutions responsible for credit to 
smallholders constituted an obstacle to rural smallholders.  
The Nigerian Agricultural Cooperative Bank (NACB) was an exclusionary institution 
that permitted only registered farmers of government controlled cooperatives to have 
access to credit facilities. It also served as a way of government control over the 
smallholder products. Subsidies, inputs and seeds were supplied to smallholders who 
belonged to the government controlled cooperatives. This marginalisation crippled 
unregistered smallholder farmers and gave the cooperative members some 
advantages over market inputs. According to Abdu and Marshall (1990), informal 
sources of credit remained an important and the only source of credit for many 
smallholder producers who were not members of the government registered 
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cooperatives. To access credit, smallholders resorted to collective action through 
complex networks of social relations involving ties of kinship, friendship, clienteles 
and religion. In some cases, they used their harvest as a collateral to access credit 
(Abdu and Marshall, 1990, Clough, 1985).  One of the means through which 
smallholders who were not part of the formal government cooperatives survived were 
the “Isusu or Esusu system” which has been maintained and sustained by smallholder 
farmer from the pre-colonial period till date.  
 
The Federal Government of Nigeria also conceded to this marginalisation of the 
smallholders when it stated that: 
 
So far, the direct lending Schemes (by NACB) have tended to favour 
corporate, large-scale farms and farmers who possess adequate 
collaterals. The on-lending schemes through which credit was expected to 
reach the small-scale farmers via the cooperatives or other groups have 
not fared very well due to lack of the right institutional and/or 
organisational structures for agricultural credit administration 
   (Federal Republic Of Nigeria, 1981, p. 85) 
 
Besides, the stringent, discriminatory and inappropriate conditions attached to the 
credit were in no way accessible to rural smallholders and they also lacked the know-
how and capacity to fulfil the conditions. Overall assessment of the post-colonial 
collective action through cooperatives shows that it failed to reach the bulk of the 
smallholders and destroyed most of the existing informal and functioning smallholder 
collective action structures prior to colonialism.  
    4.4.3 Towards Structural Adjustment  
 
The third phase of the Nigeria agricultural policy direction coincided with the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) global wide policy on ‘less government more 
market’, otherwise known as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s. 
Under the IFIs prescribed policy framework, the governments of most developing 
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countries were asked to withdraw support from social services including subsidies 
and direct support to agriculture. The effect of the policies of the second phases has 
left Nigeria in a devastating economic situation. The country was submerged into a 
fiscal and currency deficit. The deficient was further exacerbated by the growing level 
of mismanagement of public funds, as well as ongoing corruption and political rent 
seeking that characterised the military era of the Babangida’s regime. The national 
debt of the country grew beyond bounds; hence, SAP was the condition upon which 
IFIs would grant Nigeria new credit. In July 1986, the Federal Government of Nigeria 
(FGN) accepted the IMF’s conditions and SAP formed the policy prescriptions against 
national public opinion in Nigeria.  At the centre of SAP were the market-determined 
exchange rate and the elimination of the import licensing system (World Bank, 1989, 
p. 6).  
 
As a result, the government withdrew funds and support from agriculture including its 
direct control of production activities. Subsidies were cut back, price control was 
withdrawn, input and output marketing activities were liberalized, and the currency 
was devalued in order to trigger competition (Walkenhorst, 2007), thus exposing 
smallholders to unhealthy competition in a liberalised agricultural market.  Moreover, 
the government abolished commodity marketing boards, removed special interest 
rates on rural loans and placed greater emphasis on availability of agricultural credit 
whilst banning importation of some food grains and crops like wheat, maize, rice, 
vegetable oil, poultry and animal feed (World Bank, 1989, p. 7). The policies initiated 
by the government were interpreted by many as corrective measures to pre SAP 
policies which were viewed as distortive and unsustainable. Manyong at al. (2005, p. 
47) highlighted four distinctive categories of Nigerian agricultural policies during SAP: 
a) expenditure reduction and demand management policies aimed at influencing the 
domestic absorption through fiscal and monetary corrections; b) expenditure 
switching policies aimed at altering domestic relative prices in favour of tradable and 
in improving price competiveness of export commodities and import competing goods, 
c) market liberalisation policy aimed at freeing the market and allowing market 
interaction to shape the economy while minimizing government administrative control 
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and interference in the market and finally d) institutional and structural policies 
designed to eliminate structural constrains such as the flow and exchange of 
technology and sharing of information.  
 
The philosophical underpinning of the SAP policies was rooted in the neoliberal 
economic framework that emphasises the withdrawal of the state and the entrusting 
of growth in the market forces whereby the private sector would drive the economy 
while the state merely played a facilitating role. Within the Nigerian agriculture, the 
SAP policies freed government from agricultural support to smallholder farmers based 
on the neoliberal assumption that Nigerian agriculture should focus inwardly on in 
deepening local resources to ensure food self-sufficiency whilst allowing the market to 
play the leading role. It was argued that the introduction of SAP signalled an increase 
in income for export oriented smallholder farmers because of the abolishment of 
marketing boards (World Bank, 1989). Price increases were therefore passed on to 
the smallholder farmers who can then keep 100% of the product sales provided these 
were kept in a domiciliary account (Daramola et al., 2008), as an incentive to 
encourage production and boost export.  The Export Incentive and Miscellaneous 
Provisions Decree was enacted in 1986, to support merchant and commercial banks 
in risk bearing towards exports.  This was followed by the establishment of the 
Nigerian Export Credit Guarantee and Insurance Corporation in 1988, which later 
transformed to Nigerian Export–Import Bank (NEXIM) and commenced operations in 
1991 to carry out the following functions11;  
 Provision of export credit guarantee and export credit insurance facilities to its 
clients. 
 Provision of credit in local currency to its clients in support of exports. 
 Establishment and management of funds connected with exports. 
 Maintenance of a foreign exchange revolving fund for lending to exporters who 
need to import foreign inputs to facilitate export production. 
 Maintenance of a trade information system in support of export business. 
 Provision of domestic credit insurance where such a facility is likely to assist 
exports. 
 
                                                        
11  Please read more on NEXIM at http://www.neximbank.com.ng/about_us.php 
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Like previous agricultural development policies in Nigeria, the SAP policy phase failed 
to live up to expectations and probably left Nigerian worse than it it was initially. 
Agriculture was gradually eroding from the map of economic activities, and national 
export of previous cash crops like groundnut, cocoa and palm oil was further going 
down the drain. However, the SAP policy was initially programmed to last until the 
year 2000 but with the political instability in Nigeria between 1993 to 1999, agriculture 
received little if not zero attention. The attention of the polity was more focused 
toward finding political solutions following the annulment of June 12, 1993 general 
elections. It was also the period of economic sanctions on Nigeria from major western 
allies including Canada, USA and its former colonizer UK which imported agricultural 
produce from Nigeria. Agriculture during that period was a forgone debate and the 
Nigerian food bill was growing from year to year while production and productivity 
stagnated. Moreover, the oil windfall from 1991 has withered away following 
successive military regimes known for embezzlement, corruption, mismanagement of 
public funds and political rent seeking. In fact, the only thriving business left was the 
government itself (Daramola et al. 2008). 
    4.4.4   The New Nigerian Agricultural Policy  
 
The next phase, the New Nigerian Agricultural Policy, started in 1999. After the 1999 
general elections in Nigeria that ushered in the current democratic dispensation, the 
FGN took two years (2001) to identify agricultural policy priorities for the country.  The 
policy was dubbed the New Nigerian Agricultural Policy (NNAP) divided policy 
functions between the three tries of government; federal, state and local government 
to avoid duplication and overlapping of functions (Walkenhorst, 2007). The policy 
direction articulated in the NNAP shared most of the characteristics of the pervious 
policies (especially the SAP policy) but underlined the imperativeness that the 
ministry of agriculture must provide implementation direction and better articulation in 
order for the overall objective of the policy to realised. The objectives of the NNAP 
retained the features of the old policies through scaling back and reforming the non-
fuel export subsidy regime, nonetheless with determination to rid the sector off 
corruption and fraud that undermined the success of the previous policies. However, 
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there was a lack of certainty around government agricultural initiatives during that 
period. The National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) established in 2000 
was very unsuccessful and clearly lacked an agricultural component in its 
implementation (Okoro and Ujah, 2009, p. 34). In 2004, Nigerian agricultural policies 
were largely embedded in three documents: The National Economic Empowerment 
Development Strategy (NEEDS), the National Agricultural Policy (NAP) and the Rural 
Sector Strategy (RSS). NEEDS and NAP were anchored on agricultural development 
as an alternative trajectory for income generation and diversification of the economy 
towards non-oil sectors rooted in local participation. Nevertheless, it was basically 
promoting market-oriented and private sector-driven agricultural development 
(Daramola et al., 2008). Like SAP, NEEDS was the handiwork of the IFIs (IMF and 
World) under the broad framework of Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and 
broadly functioned as the national framework for sector strategies and implementation 
plans.  
 
Under NEEDS, minimum annual growth rate of 6% per; $3 billion in agricultural 
exports; reduction in food imports from 14.5% of total imports to 5% by 2007 was 
benchmarked. A host of Presidential programmes including the Presidential Initiative 
on Rice Production, Processing and Export, Presidential Initiative on the Development 
of Vegetable Oil, and the Presidential Initiative on Cassava Production and Export 
was initiated (Okoro and Ujah, 2009). Moreover, the Federal Government of Nigeria 
equally adopted the ECOWAS common external tariff, which involved a substantial 
reduction in import duties (Walkenhorst, 2007, p. 7), with the view to boasting regional 
integration and the phasing out of special tariffs on sensitive products and quantitative 
import restrictions. Additionally, the Nigerian Agricultural, Cooperative and Rural 
Development Bank (NACRDB) was to be recapitalised and given full mandate to act 
as a financial intermediary to provide soft agricultural credit and rural finance to 
smallholder farmers as either individuals, groups, or through joint venture. National 
Agricultural Policy (NAP) on the other hand focused more on agriculture, and aimed 
at providing the foundation for sustainable growth in agricultural productivity. The 
Rural Sector Strategy (RSS) was viewed as the perfect road map for transformation 
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of rural agriculture aimed at boosting productivity and export.  These frameworks and 
initiatives were further replicated at the ministry of agriculture in various states.  
 
This period also coincided with another oil boom and allowed increased budgetary 
allocation to the agriculture. It was claimed that there was improvement in fertilizer 
support, seeds, credit and other inputs to the farmers (Daramola et al., 2008), and 
that Nigerian agriculture at this period recorded 7 per cent growth in 2003/04 
(ICAARD, 2006). There also were various ongoing initiatives and projects on 
agriculture from both government and international donor agencies. The World Bank-
assisted Fadama I and II; the FAO assisted the National Special Programme on Food 
Security (NSPFS) and the IFAD assisted Root and Tuber Expansion Project. Analysts 
(Daramola et al., 2008), argued that the combined projects raised Nigerian agriculture 
by 5.5 percent (CBN, 2005).  The agricultural growth indicators and government 
commitments led to foreign investment in Nigeria through bilateral agencies like the 
USAID, DFID, CIDA, JICA Chinese and Zimbabwean farmers. The inconsistency of 
policies continued, and in 2007, agriculture featured in the 7-point agenda of 
President Umar Musa Yar’Adua. The agricultural goal under the 7-point agenda was 
to diversify the sector, to ensure food security and to generate rural employment for 
the youth while ensuring linkage between production, export and poverty reduction. 
Greater emphasis was given to public- private collaboration; private sector-led input 
supply and distribution system; favourable monetary policy to ensure access to credit; 
irrigation project support; agribusiness development and improvement in post-harvest 
processing; agricultural research and international competition; diversification to 
alternative export crops for bio-fuel; alignment with international institutions and 
opportunities like World Trade Organization (WTO), African Growth and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA), the European Union-African-Caribbean and Pacific states agreement 
(EU-ACP),National Partnership for African Development (NEPAD); increase 
agricultural budgetary allocation and land reform policy (Federal Republic Of Nigeria 
Office Of The Presidency, 2007). The goals captured under the 7 points agenda went 
into the same direction as the previous policies, and Nigerian agriculture continues to 
live in perilous times. The government of Yaradua failed to accomplish the agricultural 
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goals set under the 7-point policy agenda. After the death of Yaradau, the overall 
economic development was suffering including agriculture because the polity was 
rather engulfed in political manoeuvring and preparation for the 2011 general 
elections. Therefore, attention towards economic activity was rather low.  
On assumption of office in May 2011, President Goodluck Jonathan highlighted that 
agriculture is one of the key strategic sectors for his administration.  On September, 
19 2011, the Ministry of Agriculture realised a presidential brief on agricultural 
development that highlighted the past mistakes of agricultural policies but above all 
the journey to the bottom from an export country to one of the highest food importers 
in the world. The goal is to focus on specific and targeted value chains and to 
promote private sector led agricultural development while ensuring agricultural 
financing and access to land for foregone investors (Federal Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development, 2011). Currently, Nigeria spends N2 trillion annually on food 
importation out of which 1 billion is spent every day to import rice, N240 billion on 
sugar and N1.2 trillion annually on fish (234Next, 2011). There has been no 
significant policy shift from the past administration by the new APC government that 
came into power in May 2015. The new government has largely retained the policy of 
the previous administration but strengthened support to smallholders and created 
agricultural finance opportunities for the farmers through several initiatives.  
    4.5 Nigerian Agricultural Policy and Rice Production  
 
The food sub-sector of Nigeria boasts of an array of food crops produced in different 
diverse ecological regions. Cereals like sorghum, maize, millet, and rice; roots and 
tubers like yam and cassava; legumes like groundnut and cowpeas and others fruits 
and vegetables are the earliest accessed food in Nigeria’s food economy. However, 
of all the food crops rice is by far the most dominant and important food in Nigeria. 
Although it has always been a traditional food in Nigeria, it was merely a festive food 
for occasions like Christmas (UNEP, 2005, p. 5). It dominance in the food sub sector 
of Nigeria began around 1970.  Around the 1960s, Nigerian has the lowest per capital 
consumption rate of rice in West Africa sub region of around 3 kg (Akpokodje et al., 
2003b, p. 1). After the period of 1960s, rice has continued to increase in importance 
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as the most popular staple food in Nigeria. The per capital consumption has recorded 
annual 7.3 percent growth, rising from 18kg in the 1980s to 22 kg in the 1990s (Ibid), 
and further to 32 kg per annum in 2008 estimate (Damola, 2010, p. v). 
 
The increase in demand and consumption of rice has been credited to the rise in 
urbanisation, easy preparation and the convenience of storage (Ekeleme et al., 2008, 
p. 1). The demand for rice in Nigeria thus puts Nigeria on the rice map regionally and 
globally.  In West Africa, Nigeria is the highest producer of rice (Daramola, 2005), the 
highest consuming country in Africa (Emodi and Madukwe, 2008) and the highest 
importer of rice in Africa with around 5 million tonnes annually, constituting25% of 
Africa’s import (Ekeleme et al., 2008, Damola, 2010, p. 2). Hence, rice is no longer a 
luxury food reserved to the rich in Nigeria, but an everyday staple for both the rich and 
the poor. A report from World Bank in 1991 indicates that the poorest third of urban 
households in Nigeria obtained 33 percent of their calories from rice and that 
expenditure on rice represents the highest on cereal in general (World Bank, 1991), 
while another report indicates that the rice demand in Nigeria is the highest in the 
entire African continent (Damola, 2010). Invariably, rice has become a major welfare 
determinant for the poorest segments of Nigerian households (Akande, 2001).    
 
Nigeria has arable and irrigable land for rice production and rice is produced in all its 
regions Since the 1970s, rice production has also expanded due to an increase in the 
areas under rice production as a result of the rising demand and also due incremental 
yield increase. The regions are classified according to their ecological conditions: The 
rain-fed lowland accounts for 47% of the total rice production area; the rain-fed upland 
for 30%, the irrigated lowland accounts for 16%; and the Deepwater (5%) and 
Mangrove swamp account for less than 1% of total rice area (Damola, 2010, p. 2). 
The production estimate is around 3.2 million tons of paddy rice or 2.0 million tons of 
milled rice per annum (Ibid). The table below show characteristic of Rice production 
system in Nigeria: 
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Source: (Ezedinma, 2005, p. 4) 
              
Source: (Ezedinma, 2005, p. 5) 
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The North Central zone is the highest producer of rice in Nigeria accounting for 47% 
of the total rice output in 2000. This is closely followed by the Northwest: 29%; 
Northeast: 14%; Southeast: 9% and last but not the least Southwest: 4% (Ibid).  
 
Despite the dominance of rice as a popular staple food in Nigeria and its’ consistent 
increase in demand, domestic production lag behind and was unable to meet the 
rising consumer demand. As a consequence, Nigeria is ranked one of the largest 
importer of rice worldwide. This is related to the fact that the majority of rice 
production comes from poor resourced smallholder farmers in the rural countryside 
with less than 5 hectares of land, who combine the production of rice with other crops 
(Daramola, 2005). Efforts by the Nigerian government to address the gap between 
rice production and consumption have been largely unsuccessful and not in favour of 
the majority of the smallholder producers across the country. Although the potentials 
to become self-sufficient in rice is evident in Nigeria, productivity increase has been 
thwarted by poor fiscal policies, lack of improved processing, quality assurance, poor 
branding unimproved seed varieties, poor agronomic and postharvest handling 
practices and above all unfavourable policy environment for the smallholders.  
Since evidence shows that smallholder farmers produce most of the domestic output 
in Nigeria, it would only be logical if not economically necessary to empower the 
smallholder to increase their productivity while researching on ways to ensure 
incremental increase and subsidisation of the shot fall from import until the farmers 
can sufficiently produce for the totality of the Nigerian market. A review of the 
government policies on rice production since pre 1974 to date would give a good 
picture of why despite the large pool of ready smallholder rice farmers the Nigerian 
rice industry has largely remained uncompetitive. The Nigerian rice sector has 
witnessed policy inconsistency since the early 1970s until now.  In some cases, the 
government levied high tariffs on importation of foreign rice, in other cases the 
government policy was fairly liberal to rice importation. However, one crosscutting fact 
about the rice policy in Nigeria is the scandalous manner of import and marketing of 
rice in Nigeria, which is principally based on access to political capital.   
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From a historical point of view, there are three indefinable policies phases in Nigeria’s 
rice development: The Pre-Ban, the Ban and the Post Ban periods (Akande, 2001). 
Before examining the phases of rice policies in Nigeria, the table below shows rice 
trends in Nigeria compared to other West African countries.  
 
 
Source: (Akpokodje et al., 2003, p. 2).  
4.5.1   Pre-Ban Period: 1971-1985  
 
The first phase of the Nigerian rice policy can be subdivided into two periods: the pre-
crisis period from1971-1980, and the crisis period from 1981-1985 (Emodi and 
Madukwe, 2008). This is the period that preceded the introduction of the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). One of the key features of this whole period was the 
introduction of absolute quantitative restrictions on rice imports. The first stage of this 
period was largely characterised by liberal agriculture policies on rice import. There 
was no ban on the importation of rice; rather the government was directly involved in 
filling the gap of rice shortage. The government policy on rice was not very strict but 
appeared very ad-hoc and reactionary and came at a time when there were emerging 
rice development policies in Nigeria.  Coincidentally, it was at the same point in time 
when oil was displacing agriculture in the national scale of preference and 
government attention.   
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However, during the second stage of this period, i.e. the crisis period from 1981-1985, 
more stringent measures were introduced, yet there was no outright ban. The 
government initiated input supply and distribution policy, agricultural input subsidy 
policy, water resources and irrigation policy, agricultural cooperatives Policy. Also, 
there was an artificial lowering of the domestic rice price relative to world price 
through massive importation of rice, which invariably shifts the negative effect to 
locally produced rice.  The effect inevitably was transferred to smallholder rice 
farmers that dominate domestic rice production in Nigeria. The government assumed 
the responsibility of importing, distributing and marketing rice, albeit with non-transfer 
of actual costs to consumers (Emodi and Madukwe, 2008, p. 78).  Generally, the 
government policy on rice at this period was elitist and unfriendly to smallholder rice 
farmers.  As rising food prices threw Nigeria into crisis around late 1970s, the import 
substitution became the only alternative for the government to meet up with the food 
demand of the country. The importation of rice which appeared to be under the 
control of the government was actually in the hands of few elites (cartel) with strong 
political connections to the government. Rice was growing in importance as the most 
“sought after” staple food in Nigeria. However, its import was saddled in scandalous 
activities which was deeply rooted in political associations and the elite settlement 
(Watts and Lubeck, 1983, p. 117). For instance, the landing cost of rice was N15 per 
bag but it fetched in excess of N100 due to speculative licensing and hoarding (Watts 
and Lubeck, 1983, p. 118). The policy during this period eroded the competiveness of 
smallholder rice farmers and served as a disincentive to the smallholder rice farmers 
in Nigeria (Emodi and Madukwe, 2008).  
    4.5.2   The Ban Period: 1986 -1995  
 
The second period coincided with the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), 
which was the period of massive government withdrawal from social services and 
agriculture. It was a period of deepening ostracization of agriculture in general and 
smallholder farmer in particular from policy considerations. During this period, rice 
imports were illegal with various trade policies restricting the importation of rice. Tariff, 
import restrictions, and outright ban on rice import were put in place. It was hoped that 
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the ban on import will stimulate domestic rice production and encourage the 
smallholders to increase their production and yield as a result of increased price. 
However, the twin policy of SAP and import ban without government real investment 
in smallholder rice production was never going to yield any result. Instead, rice 
importation thrived on illegality and cross boundary smuggling. Moreover, the 
overvaluation of the Naira also affected domestic smallholders because it served as 
an implicit tax on domestic smallholder producers as it made imported rice relatively 
cheaper (UNEP, 2005, p. 12).  
4.5.3   The Post Ban Period: 1995 – date  
 
The Nigerian rice sector is erratic and inconsistent at best. While the ban period era 
was based on quantitative import restrictions, the post ban era operated a different 
policy and the government allowed the importation of rice at a 100 percent tariff – it 
was reduced to 50 percent in 1996 and moved back to 100 percent in 2002 (UNEP, 
2005). Therefore, there was a reversal of the liberal policy. The reversion came as a 
result of IFIs pressure for the reversion of the Nigerian restrictive policy on rice, which 
was inconsistent with World Bank/IMF liberalisation policy framework. It was also at a 
period when trade liberation was very important to the rich countries that were looking 
for entry route into the market of developing countries with restriction without 
considering the effect such entry would have on millions of smallholder producers that 
might drop out of their domestic market. It was at the period of transition from General 
Agreement and Trade and Tariff (GATT) to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The 
erratic nature of rice policy in Nigerian reflects a clear failure in planning and 
understanding of what need to be done to stimulate incremental productive increase 
of rice production in Nigeria through millions of smallholder farmers across the 
country.  Although it has been noted that the basis of the inconsistency and erratic 
nature of the rice policy is because of the dilemma of securing cheap rice for 
consumers and ensuring a fair price for producers (UNEP, 2005, p. 13, Emodi and 
Madukwe, 2008, p. 79), however, the inconsistency was more political than economic 
and reflect the inability of the government to stand for the interests of the smallholder 
farmers against the business and political class. According to Ladebo (1999), the 
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erratic nature of the policy is based on elite pressure and vested interest in rice 
importation and the demand from the urban class.  The new government has 
expressed desire and optimism to end rice import by 2017, but the details of the 
policy and its implication on rice import is yet to clarified by the government. The 
erratic and inconsistent rice policy in Nigeria is captured in the Table below.  
 
Table Chronology of Nigeria’s trade policy on rice 
 
Sources: Sources: Sutcliffe and Ayomike, 1986; Federal Government Budgets, 1984-1986, 1995-
2003; SAP and the Nigerian Economy, 1987; http://oryza.com/africa/nigeria/index.shtml  
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    4.6 Conclusion   
 
This chapter examined the pre-colonial and post-colonial smallholder collective action 
in Nigeria. It examined the pre-colonial collective action based on community cultural 
practices, and those which emerged during the colonial period based on enforced 
system of collective action such as government designed, - controlled and -managed 
cooperatives. The dynamics reveal the role of colonial policies and colonial 
businesses in shaping the form of smallholder collective action during the colonial and 
immediate post-colonial period. This was followed by an exploration of the policies in 
the post-colonial period, which were diverse and inconsistent.  
 
I have examined the shift in policy- orientation based on compulsory collective action 
through cooperatives to a voluntary association orchestrated by the new reform 
agenda of structural adjustment.  
 
This chapter also reviewed the distorted policy trajectories of the Nigerian government 
from the colonial to recent time. Moreover, it reviewed how policy inconsistency 
disrupted smallholder farmers. The effect of civil war on smallholder Igbo farmers was 
equally examined. Particular attention was given to the rice policy trajectories and 
how they impacted the smallholder rice farmers in Nigeria.    
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    Chapter Five: 
    5.0 Livelihoods, Agency and Informal Smallholder Collective Action 
    5.1 Introduction  
Contemporary Ugbawka is the product of a mixed history shaped by the combined 
forces of colonialism, industrial imperialism, trade, globalisation and political 
development. An understanding of the history could be seen in the various forms of 
smallholder collective action (see chapter four) which underscored the interaction 
amongst the farmers in exercising their agency to collectively organise in the pre-
colonial period, as well as their relationship with the (pre)colonial administration 
through a mixture of both government and private sector-driven collective action. The 
overall aim of this thesis is to present an intensive micro-level analysis of processes 
of smallholder collective action with the aim of understanding how rice farmers 
individually and collectively shape their interaction and participation.  
 
This chapter presents a brief ethnography of development and multiple livelihood 
strategies in Ugbawka.  The chapter uses the term ‘development’ as used in the 
village sense by Ugbawka people as opposed to how it is used in the development 
literature and discourse.  In short, development in the Ugbawka sense relates mostly 
to the availability of and access to public and social services and the adaptation of 
people to changing ways of life including attending churches, political meetings and 
the frequency of visits by persons who are not from the community. It also relates to 
the level of infrastructural development including the construction of roads, the 
availability of pipe borne water and the rate of child education in the community. In 
most community meetings and discussions, members regularly discuss core issues 
they perceive as significant in their lives including availability or lack of social 
services. In fact, the village understanding of development is more nuanced and 
encompassing and offers a critique to mainstream development that is often reduced 
to economic development and ignores the social and religious dimension.  
   
This chapter thus focuses on examining two main areas of livelihoods pattern in 
Ugbawka and individual opportunity to exercise agency. The first section explores the 
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pattern of livelihood of smallholder farmers in Ugbawka. An understanding of the 
dynamic between people’s livelihoods is not only important in forming an 
understanding of how and why people participate in collective action but also in 
deepening the understanding of smallholder farmers’ level of participation, inclusion 
and exclusion in collective action.  
 
Secondly in relation to the shaping of individual opportunities to exercise agency 
(Toner, 2008a), this chapter provides an overview of the actors and factors which 
have shaped the development and evolution of Ugbawka. Besides, it provides the link 
to the broader development change in Nigeria and Igbo society as examined in 
chapter 4. This is followed by the empirical data that provides an overview of how 
changes were effected from pre-colonial through the post-colonial period. The 
process of tracing the changes provided a deeper understanding of how the transition 
and interaction between internal and external actors positively and/or negatively 
influenced the development of Ugbawka as a community. This chapter also examined 
three smallholders collective project in which smallholder rice farmers in Ugbawka 
participated. Analysis of the three projects reveals that smallholder collective action 
based on formalisation of rules does not necessarily provide access and participation.  
   5.2 The Profile of Ugbawka as a Community  
 
Ugbawka is a peri-urban community in the outskirt of Enugu, the capital city of Enugu 
State, South Eastern Nigeria. Ugbawka covers an approximate land size of fifty 
square kilometres. Agbani and Akpugo borders Ugbawka to the north, to the eastern 
axis by Ihuokpara and Nara and to the west by Amuri, Ogbaku and Nenwe and to the 
southern axis by Nomeh and Mburubu. For most part, Ugbawka is a low-lying, well-
watered area with three small perennial rivers. Land in Ugbawka is reasonably fertile 
and the eastern and western parts are mostly swampy during rainy seasons (Mbah, 
1997). 
 
Enugu State is one of the five (5) states found in the South Eastern Nigeria and 
located between latitude and longitude of 50 501N – 70 061 N and 60 531E – 7 55 
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E(Ezike, 1998). Enugu has boundary with Ebonyi in the East, Kogi and Benue in the 
north, Anambra in the west and Imo and Abia in the south. In Enugu, 59% of the 
population are rural residents (National Bureau of Statistics, 2006). Ugbawka is 
located in Nkanu East local government of Enugu State.  
 
 
 
         Figure 1: A Map of Enugu State showing the location of Ugbawka in Nkanu East 
Ugbawka has always been an important community in the history of Enugu State. Its 
proximity to the State capital made it an important community since the colonial era. 
The economy of the Ugbawka is heavily reliant on agriculture involving animal 
husbandry, cash and food crop production. In the 1990s, it was estimated that the 
entire rural population of Ugbawka was fully engaged in agriculture in different forms 
(Mbah, 1997). The development of Ugbawka community dates back to the pre-
colonial period. Its rich palm tree made it a nerve centre for production and 
commercialisation of palm wine used in the Igbo society for all forms of ceremonies 
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and rituals. The fertility of the soil made it a converging point for sales of farm produce 
and for exchange of farm goods.  
 
Its development expanded during the colonial period due to the high production of 
palm oil, an important cash crop for colonial administration and the construction of a 
railway line that linked the hinterland to various markets within Nigeria. During 
colonialism, Ugbawka was one of the train stops in the outskirts of Enugu; and the 
loading bay for export of palm produced in and around Enugu. Additionally, due to its 
close proximity with Enugu, migration from Ugbawka to Enugu was rather minimal. 
Ugbawka indigenes who worked as public servants commuted from their community 
to the city capital, a practice which has continued to-date. Its influence as a trade and 
export hub did not diminish but rather increased as the period evolved especially 
when it became one of the major rice farming communities in Enugu state years 
before the end of colonialism.  
 
The Ugbawka community are mostly smallholder farmers and owing to their skill in 
agriculture, their sources of livelihood are dependent on the availability of arable land 
and fertility of the soil. Land is at the core of all the activities in Ugbawka. They 
cultivate various crops including rice, yam, cassava, cocoyam, maize and vegetables. 
In addition, the smallholder farmers grow trees/crops of high economic value such as 
palm tree, oil bean, breadfruit, trees for timber, cashew, mango, orange and bananas. 
Cassava and rice are the prominent viable cash crop widely grown by the people. 
Mbah (1997) pointed that cassava emerged as the major crop and was closely 
followed by rice after the Nigerian-Biafra civil war (1967-1970) due to the growing 
demand for rice in Nigeria in the late 1960s to early 1970s. The people are also 
reputed for keeping livestock particularly goats, sheep, dogs and poultry (chicken and 
ducks), while fishing and hunting were also practiced.  
 
Since the pre-colonial era, smallholder farmers routinely disposed of surplus of their 
agricultural produce in Afor market day, a practice that persisted to-date.  The market 
at Afor continues to attract traders from far and near in search of cheap agricultural 
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supplies for the urban markets. Agricultural market is not a new phenomenon to 
Ugbawka farmers because their interaction with colonial traders exposed them to 
cash crops. Besides farming, Ugbawka people are also adept in traditional weaving, 
palm wine tapping, blacksmithing and other economic/business activities.  
 
Ugbawka benefitted from the early presence of transport infrastructure during the 
colonial period. As noted earlier, the construction of the railway line was a turning 
point for Ugbawka in terms of opening up space for trade with other communities and 
attracting different categories of people interested in various trading activities. Apart 
from having a significant effect on trade and becoming a hub for distribution of some 
agricultural produce, Ugbawka was a strong nucleus for migration and settlement of 
human population along the rail line– the by-product of this was the provision of 
modern social and economic amenities such as schools and churches (Chukwu, 
2014). Currently, Ugbawka remained a crossover community where people intending 
to stay closer to the city reside to enable them to access both city facilities and 
community life. However, as years of government neglect and corruption deepened in 
Nigeria, most of the social facilities that attracted migrants from other communities to 
Ugbawka began to decline including the railway, which was formerly a major factor 
that attracted people to the community. At the time of this research, the railway line 
was dilapidated and non-functional and most of the colonial buildings were 
unrecognizably damaged.   
    5.3 Land and Livelihoods of Smallholder Rice Farmers in Ugbawka 
 
This section considers the livelihood sources and its distribution in the community and 
how differentiated livelihoods sources by different actors determine power relations in 
smallholder collective action functioning. Before, examining how land is owned and 
allocated specifically in Ugbawka, it is expedient to first examine the Igbo customary 
and traditional land ownership.  
 
According to the Igbo’s belief and tradition, ala (land) is a gift from God (Chukwu) and 
from ancestors (Ifediora, 2014). Igbos see themselves as stewards of God’s 
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resources, which is demonstrated especially in communally owned land (Ifediora, 
2014). This is supported by Jones (1949) who opined that the Igbo system of land 
tenure is based on three cardinal principles: a) that the land ultimately belongs to the 
community and cannot be alienated from it without its consent; b) that within the 
community the individual shall have security of tenure for the land he requires for his 
compounds, his gardens, and his farms; and c) that no member of the community 
shall be without land. This resonates with the position of Dike (1983) who noted that 
in Igboland, land belongs to the community.  
 
However, one of the important features of the Igbo land tenure system is its 
continuous adaption to the changing times and circumstances based on contextual 
requirements at certain periods in time. Jones (1949) noted that in order to 
understand land tenure in Igbo society, it is crucial to understand the process of 
adapting to changes in society’s population density. However, the dominant right or 
absolute interest belongs to the community or the social group, which controls the 
land through ancestral lineage and transfer.  
  
Ugbawka, like other parts of Igbo society, professes a vague mythical charter to land 
ownership in which history is very crucial and often couched in custom and tradition in 
order to justify claims of land ownership (Mbah, 1997). Traditionally, in Ugbawka land 
tenure is based on patriarchy (male ancestral lineage) and is held in trust by the 
oldest member of the family who in theory has the responsibility of allotting parcels of 
land to family members (Dike, 1983, p. 856). Therefore, the traditional land tenure 
system in Ugbawka expects women to cultivate the land entrusted to her husband. 
Traditionally, it debars women from absolute ownership of land and should any 
woman leave her husband, the expectation is that such a woman would forfeit the 
land under her control (Jones, 1949). However, in so far as she remains in her late 
husband’s household, she is entitled to the land and can continue to make use of the 
land until her death, in which case the ownership of the land is transferred to her sons 
as the next trust holder. 
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Land in many Igbo societies was considered to belong to the living and the dead and 
any idea of deposing land from the ancestral line was considered sacrilegious. 
Moreover, for the Ugbawka people, land must be preserved for the coming 
generations. In general, there are four categories of land that exist in Ugbawka based 
on the individual and community needs for land. The first is what is generally called 
the compound land, which is primarily for residents and it is based on need for 
occupation. This category of land covers the households where people weave their 
routine existence – it could form small gardens, which are primarily for women for the 
cultivation of vegetables, corn, pepper and other farm product that solve immediate 
food needs for the family (Huth, 1969).  
 
The second category is the farmland, which is where people farm but do not have 
permanent residency. It is completely outside the compound and is strictly for farming. 
However, during farming season, people and families can set up temporary living 
spaces in order to concentrate on farm demands. Thirdly is the sacred land, which is 
reserved and exclusively dedicated to the community deities or oracle and is not 
meant for farming. Then there is the common land, which is what is called in Igbo land 
“Ajo Ofia” meaning deadly bush. This is commonly reserved for burying people who 
committed atrocities while alive or people who died of deadly diseases. Generally, 
people keep away from Ajo Ofia for fear of catching deadly diseases or getting in 
contact with evil spirits, which are believed to live with the dead in Igbo traditional 
societies (Dike, 1983).   
 
However, over the years, as ancestral lineage began to dissolve in different family 
units and due to population density and settlement, new forms of family union in the 
form of extended family emerged and land conflict regarding its access and usage 
rights begins to occur. Land user rights, which were formerly based on trust, began to 
disappear and transform into ownership rights as people and families from the same 
ancestral lineage shared land in order to avoid extended family land conflict and to 
ensure balanced ownership rights within the extended families that make up the 
ancestral lineage. However, there was still retention of some parts of the land for the 
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lineage in a way that land ownership rights could be traced back to ancestral lineage 
based on inheritance.  
 
There was no traditional landless class or group in Ugbawka. Even though conflict 
overtime has resulted in the distribution of land within ancestral lineages and 
extended family lines, ownership is largely communal rather than individualistic. As 
the community keeps expanding, claims to land ownership in Ugbawka lie on the 
extent to which the land was inherited or bequeathed to a man by his father (Mbah, 
1997). However, such ownership hardly connotes the exact relationship between 
such an occupier and the land. Even though he has full right to its produce and 
appropriates the land for agricultural or other productive purposes, he nonetheless 
sees himself more as a right holder for the next generation of male heirs (Chubb, 
1961).  
 
Traditionally, ownership and means of acquisition of land in Ugbawka can be 
classified under different types and categories. The first is the communal land. This is 
the type of land that no one can lay claim to but is seen as owned and controlled by 
the community. This type of land emerges out of some highly existential belief in 
spirits. The community through the community elders and/or chiefs does the 
allocation of this type of land after consultation with the village council. Land like the 
communal land can also be used for community projects like the establishment of 
community clinic, community school, the digging of pipe borne water and other type of 
community development project (Mbah, 1997). This land is rarely allocated for family 
but could also be used for the construction of a new village or community square 
(Dike, 1983, p. 858).  
 
The next type of ownership is family land. According to Chubb (1961), family land 
appears less loose than communal land and refers to land owned by small kin group 
or extended family in which every adult male member possesses the right to farm and 
use portion of the land every farming season in accordance with the rotational cycle. 
Within the bracket of family land in Ugbawka is what is described as personal land, 
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which broadly connotes landlord rights over land and refers to land in which an 
individual has inherited or acquired which is at his disposal without being subjected to 
family or common sanction (Mbah, 1997). Personal land becomes possible in 
Ugbawka due to intergenerational demands and adaptation to changing demands for 
land use. The introduction of the money economy also resulted in the opening up of 
the Igbo rigid land tenure system and made it possible for unlimited range of choices 
for individuals including the choice of owning a land privately. Land is no longer 
sacred and can be exchanged for money and can also be used for different purposes 
beyond cultivation (Dike, 1983). Although the influence of money on land is still 
vaguely viewed as unacceptable, Ugbawka has accepted this generational transition 
and private interests are now allowed to buy and own land. However, it is expected 
that the purchase of the land passes through some known traditional processes of 
approval (Green, 1941). Such process of approval required explaining to the elders by 
the buyer what the land will be used for and to assure the elders that the land will be 
well taken care of by the buyer. The type of land ownership also dissolves the 
patriarchal nature of land ownership in Ugbawka because the personalisation and 
commodification of land means that any individual who can afford land could buy and 
apply the land for his/her private use. 
 
Farmlands can also be acquired in Ugbawka through pledge. This form of land 
acquisition became possible with the introduction of the money economy and the 
commodification of land in Igbo societies. This is a derivative form of acquiring some 
rights in land – the method of land acquisition by which an owner of a piece of land 
gives usufructuary right to another person by borrowing money from the person. The 
value attached to land means that people can use land as collateral to borrow money 
from others and this has become acceptable in Igbo societies. In some instances, 
families borrow money to send a member of the family to study abroad while using 
the land as collateral for certain number of years. However, this can be done with 
family land or with personal land. It should be noted that pledged land varies from 
parties to parties depending on the agreement. However, in most cases, land is not 
lost permanently to the pledgee but can be redeemed even when the time frame 
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expires based on agreed terms and conditions for the pledge. Also the children of the 
pledger can also redeem the pledged land in future based on certain understanding 
that existed during the pledge. There are also occasions when the pledger concedes 
that the pledgee could take responsibility of selling proceeds from economic trees like 
palm oil, cashew etc. in order to begin the process of recouping the money back 
(Mbah, 1997, Dike, 1983).  
 
Temporal borrowing is another form of acquiring land in Ugbawka. As population 
growth continues to rise, the need for land increased and there is considerable 
pressure on people who have less land but expanded family. Land access, retention 
and use also became a matter of survival because access for land became limited. 
However, community members that have such problems of limited land for farming 
adapt to land shortage through different forms of temporal land and borrowing or land 
showing. A grant of an interest in land maybe made for a short duration of time, which 
may be as short as one-year to enable the grantee to put the land to a particular use, 
usually farming (Jones, 1949, Dike, 1983). In Ugbawka, people with surplus lands 
often allow for temporal and flexible management of their land by others in need of 
land for farming. Whilst the temporal tenant is expected to meet the immediate needs 
of the land, there is often certain protective measure to deter wanton and unexpected 
removal from the land. This offers an alternative to outright alienation from land use. 
Both family and private lands are often pledged to temporal tenants according to 
custom and native law of Ugbawka and the tenant is expected to comply and vacate 
the land as per the agreement, which is normally after the harvest of farm crops. 
However, land pledged can be renewed and redeemed depending on agreed terms 
and conditions between the parties and also depending on satisfactory assessment of 
the use of the land by the owner (Mbah, 1997).  
 
Lease as a mean of land acquisition differs from pledge. It differs markedly from the 
conventional lease and the commonest in Ugbawka is what is called Ngosi Ana, 
which literally translates to showing of land. This has been necessitated by dearth of 
fertile land for farming. In this case, the lessor is expected to charge rent 
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commensurate with the size of the land and the lessee is expected to carry keg(s) of 
palm wine and kola nut and other traditional requirements as an expression of 
gratitude to the leasor at the end of the farming season especially during bountiful 
harvest (Mbah, 1997, p. 42). Another marked distinction is that the leasehold is not 
terminated at the grantor’s whim.   
 
There is also Kola tenancy, which is temporal right to land. It is transferred for a gift of 
kola from the tenant to the grantor. The kola is not a purchase price and the grantor 
reserves the right to reversion on the death of the kola tenant for cultivating the land. 
However with the value attached to land in the contemporary Ugbawka and Igbo 
society, Kola tenant now take the form of showing of land because Kola tenant would 
be required to farm on the land until death (Mbah, 1997, Dike, 1983). In the 
proceeding section, I will explore specifically how smallholder rice farmers in 
Ugbawka acquire and access land for farming.   
   5.4  Method of Land Acquisition by Smallholder Rice Farmers in Ugbawka  
 
The method of land acquisition among smallholder rice farmers in Ugbawka varies 
between farmers, is gendered and reflects a combination of different means, which 
have been discussed above. According to the research participants, the means of 
land acquisition include inheritance, family land, borrowing and pledging and a 
combination of any of them. The participants further noted that men usually acquired 
ancestral land through inheritance and/or by borrowing and pledge, while women 
depended mostly on family land, but also on borrowing and pledging. The majority of 
the female respondents 40% (6) agree that they acquired land for farming through 
their marital ties and mostly directly from husband or through borrowing, while 33.3% 
(5) suggested that they acquired land solely through husbands’ family land. On the 
other hand, 13.3% (2) of the female respondents noted that their lands were acquired 
through borrowing and pledge while the same number of respondents - 13.3% (2) –
inherited and borrowed land for farming.  Among male respondents, the majority of 
them, 45% (9) acquired land through inheritance and borrowing, 40% (8) through 
direct inheritance, 10% (2) by a combination of family and pledged land and 5% (1) 
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borrowed and pledged. The table below shows the various methods of land 
acquisition among the respondents: 
Table 3: Sex of respondents and Land Cross tabulation 
 
As the above table illustrates, the concentration of inherited land on males and family 
and borrowed land on women is a reflection of the cultural practices that bestowed 
holders’ rights to men. The rural institutional arrangement still allowed the right of 
inheritance to be passed on to male members of the family as holders. Women’s 
access to land is therefore dependent on access to family land. In many cases 
women’s access to land for farming depends on their level of participation in their 
husbands’ farms. Women therefore access land for farming either through family land 
permissible by the male right holders or through borrowing/pledge from other 
members of the community. In most cases, women automatically access their 
husbands’ land by virtue of her marital privileges. Women farmers in some cases 
resort to accessing fragmented portions of land for farming when they are unable to 
Sex of respondents and Land Cross tabulation 
 
 
 
Land 
Total Inherited 
Family/ 
husband 
Borrowing/pled
ge 
Inherited 
and 
Borrowing/p
ledge 
Family and 
Borrowing/Pl
edge 
  Male Count  8 0 1 9 2 20 
% 
within   
40.0% .0% 5.0% 45.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
Female Count 0 5 2 2 6 15 
% 
within   
.0% 33.3% 13.3% 13.3% 40.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 8 5 3 11 8 35 
% 
within   
22.9% 14.3% 8.6% 31.4% 22.9% 100.0% 
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secure large potion within a particular place. This in effect does not allow for long-
term planning for the majority of women respondents because of uncertainty. 
According to Acati (1983), lack of access to land by women limits their power as 
small-scale farmers because land is a vital resource not only for their subsistence but 
also as a form of security for credit and means of access to other opportunities. It also 
limits women opportunities for diversification to other cash and food crops as a 
multiple strategy for livelihoods sustenance.  
 
Farmers in Ugbawka are mostly mixed farmers and cultivate various crops but also 
involve in livestock farming. The major crops are rice, yam, cassava, cocoyam, maize, 
vegetable including economic trees like palm tree, oil bean, breadfruit, timber trees, 
cashew, mango, orange and banana. However, rice, cassava, yam, maize and 
vegetables are the dominant crops. The influence of rice is visibly higher than other 
crops although cassava is also as dominant as rice as a cash crop. The influence and 
importance of rice was underscored by the award of irrigation projects for rice 
production by the Federal Government of Nigeria to the tune of N50 million and N100 
million for 2009 and 2010 respectively under the federal government rice 
commercialisation scheme (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2009, Federal 
Government of Nigeria, 2010).  
 
Livestock production in the community consists rearing of goats, sheep but also 
poultry farming mainly chicken and ducks. There are also few small-scale pig farms in 
Ugbawka but goats and sheep remain the dominant livestock reared by farmers in the 
community. The Ugbawka community are predominantly Christians and traditionalists 
and thus rarely have any religious restrictions to eating any meat. Evidence suggests 
that although farmers in Ugbawka are rarely specialised farmers, they are involved in 
different types of farming as means of ensuring livelihood sustenance. At the time of 
conducting this research, livestock farming seemed to be on the decline compared to 
the period when farmers commanded large herds of livestock in the past.    
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    5.5 Afor Market: The Converging Trading Centre  
 
The market in Ugbawka is called Afor, which derives its name from the traditional 
days of the week in the Igbo calendar. There are four days in Igbo week; Eke is the 
first day, Orie the second day, Afor the third day and Nkwo the fourth day. Each of the 
days is a market day and in traditional Igbo societies, each day represents important 
event for a particular community. Afor in this case is the third day of the week and the 
market operates every four days; that is every Afor day. Afor market is not a 
specialised market for any merchandise therefore, every food crop, livestock and 
manufactured goods are available for sale in this market. However, each item has 
specific allocated space or stall where it is traded. The space allocated for rice 
coincidentally doubles as the milling centre and where rice grains can be sold and 
bought. The rice market structure is informal and allows individual decision making on 
the product and price. I observed that there were no rice market associations or 
traders’ union at the time of conducting this research except for a women’s group that 
specialises in buying paddies from farmers. However, within the informal structure in 
the rice market, there appeared some obvious structural diversity and hierarchy. 
Structurally, there were two different groups of persons dealing in rice and rice 
products. The first is the group of rice sellers comprising primarily of the farmers who 
brought their paddy rice to the mills and sell them to urban traders. The second 
structure, which is different from the first, was a group I refer to as local rice traders. 
The majority of the local rice dealers were women, who specialises in buying 
unprocessed paddies. This group parboils, mills, processes and sells the rice to the 
urban traders.  
 
The informal12 structure of both groups differs from one another. In the first group, the 
power hierarchy starts with the operators of the different mills, who assumes power 
informally and maintains order in and around the mills. The mill operators then 
ensured that market conflicts were avoided as much as possible and that urban 
traders respected the Ugbawka traders. Furthermore, the mill operators ensure that 
                                                        
12 Informality here is used to connote activities outside the control of the State.  
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informal rules were maintained in accordance with the local customs of the people. 
The researcher also observed that rice sellers reported emerging market issues to the 
mill operator to resolve and it was noted that he intervened occasionally in arguments 
that ensued among the rice traders. The customers who bought rice were mostly 
restaurant owners and hoteliers, middle merchants, school authorities and individual 
rice consumers. On the contrary, the second group, the rice traders, operated a flat 
and loose structure with none of them wielding preponderance of power over the 
others and interactions appeared mutual. Although both men and women conducted 
their commercial activities in the market, there was a slightly marked difference in the 
products men sell to that of women. Men sell yam, some livestock like goat, sheep, 
and game meat while women sell vegetables, oil and livestock like poultry. Both men 
and women also sell rice but the latter is dominated by women. Men also were the 
ones selling palm wine. Afor market is crucial for livelihood survival in Ugbawka 
because it is the point of interaction between smallholders who wanted to sell farm 
products and city residents who come to buy fresh farm produce at cheaper rates 
compared to the prices in the city.      
 
There is no price control system in Ugbawka market including in the sale of rice. Each 
seller sells according to particular need and based on the quality of the product. The 
price is also influenced by information on availability of ‘foreign’ rice in the urban 
markets. Therefore, there is no one common way of determining price in Ugbawka 
and it often based on the first sale of the day. Prices start high in the morning and 
gradually decrease in the course of the day. However, farmers sell based primarily on 
the market information from the cities, the quality and cleanliness of the product (rice 
was given special attention as the research crop) and most importantly the level of 
livelihood desperation. Some sellers were noticeably in desperate need to sell than 
others based on pressing livelihood needs.  Also, the mode of sales differs based on 
whether the farmer is selling non-parboiled rice or already milled and processed rice.  
 
Exchange is done in different ways. While cash is the primary means of exchange, it 
is not exclusive. Direct observation, which was later confirmed through informal 
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interview, revealed that, occasionally, farmers and traders engaged in different forms 
of barter. Some farmers exchanged what they wanted with what they had. As 
highlighted in the introduction, rice is also cultivated in the neighbouring communities 
but not at the same level and standard as in Ugbawka, which attracts more urban 
middlemen/retailers from around the country because of its reputation for producing 
good and high quality rice. Ugbawka rice is stone and sand free and that makes it the 
envy of others communities. Therefore, the attraction that Ugbawka brings to urban 
rice traders makes it the converging point for rice farmers and sellers in and around 
the community. Unfortunately, some of the rice produced from other communities are 
not of the same standards and quality as Ugbawka rice. The researcher’s direct 
observation was further corroborated by interviews and interactions with some of the 
urban rice buyers which revealed that all the rice dealers demanded to know whether 
the retailers were selling rice which were specifically produced from Ugbawka or not. 
In such a situation where there are no functional rice traders’ union or regulating 
authority for quality assurance in the rice market, there is a danger that competition 
between Ugbawka and its neighbours could jeopardise the smallholder farmers’ 
business and especially the trust that the rice dealers have inculcated in Ugbawka 
rice producers.  
 
However, rice farmers from other communities with low quality rice share a small-
designated corner in the market as a way of distinguishing their rice from Ugbawka 
rice. This informal control mechanism is very efficient. Moreover, Ugbawka rice 
farmers are also sceptical of the impact the low quality rice from other communities 
could have on their product. There were few complaints from buyers who were 
interviewed that there appeared to be confusion sometimes on the quality of rice they 
bought. According to one of the buyers: 
“Ugbawka rice farmer must ensure that farmers from neighbouring villages 
does not confuse us with their rice. We all know that the quality of 
Ugbawka rice is different from the rest. For us as buyers, it is important 
that our final buyers from other cities retain confidence in us to deliver 
good and quality rice to them. We have made this clear to Ugbawka rice 
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farmers and we are happy with their approach to ensure clear 
demarcation” 
 
In order to avoid compromising on the quality of the rice that they wanted to purchase, 
some buyers would constantly seek verification before they agree and pay for the 
rice. Moreover, some buyers also relied on informal trust and confidence they built in 
the farmers because of long history of trading relationships with the farmers. This trust 
and relationship also stretches to credit purchase and supply of rice. Some rice 
traders and the farmers had informal agreements that allowed the traders to buy the 
rice on credit and pay for them much later. Evidence from the interviews revealed that 
the trading practice has always been part of the Ugbawka smallholder farming with 
trust being an important element of their commercial interactions.  
 
 
Figure 2: Afor Market in Ugbawka on a typical market day. 
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    5.6 Demographic Characteristics  
 
Thirty-five respondents were interviewed out of which twenty (20) 57.1% respondents 
were male and fifteen (15) 42.9% female. The division in the percentage of 
respondents was purely random and based on the availability of more male 
respondents than female respondents. Other sources of data such as direct 
observation and informal interaction compensated for the lower number of women 
interviewed. Most female rice farmers combined farming and non-paid domestic 
chores, which rarely allowed them time for other activities. Both male and female 
respondents engaged in diversified farming and were not specialised farmers. While 
men were more engaged in cassava and yam production as second and third option 
crops, women were more involved in cassava, vegetable and maize farming. Notably, 
cassava is perceived as the most viable food crop that respondents considered staple 
irrespective of the quantity of harvest from other crops. Cassava serves different food 
purposes for the household and can be processed to fufu, garri and abacha.  
In Ugbawka, there is no modern farm equipment less for few tractors that are used for 
clearing of the land and hired from one of the milling centres. Rice farming process 
from land preparation to harvesting is laborious since it is done manually. It is labour 
intensive and all the process involved in the chain from landing clearing to 
broadcasting and/or nursery to harvesting relies upon the labour of the family or hired 
labour. The source of family labour comes from both men and women and there is an 
interchange of labour between farm and non-farm activities. A survey carried out early 
in 1970s in the South Eastern Nigeria showed similar trend in terms of labour 
participation among households (Lagemann, 1977, p. 81). In order to meet the labour 
demand, the respondents used family, hired and in some rare cases labour exchange 
based on reciprocity to meet their farm labour demands.  
Labour conditions and sources for smallholder farmers, which are primarily based on 
family labour, the labour sources for the respondents were obtained through a 
combination of hired and family labour and labour rotation and exchange based on 
reciprocity. This was observed among younger respondents between the ages of 20 - 
40 and women groups. However, hired labour appears to be on the increase in 
Ugbawka since the entrance of migrants’ labourers into the community and it 
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constituted the singular most frequent source of labour. Family labour among the 
smallholder rice farmers was also low because younger men continue to migrate to 
the capital city. The labour frequency shows that 45.7% of the respondents used a 
combination of hired and family labour - 37.1% of the respondents stick strictly to 
hired labour while 8.6% of the respondents use family labour and labour exchange 
based on reciprocity.  
 
The occurrence of hired labour as the predominant of labour source indicates the 
changing trend in labour sources in Ugbawka especially for rice farming with high 
labour demand. Older farmers beyond the age of 40 noted that they could no longer 
engage in reciprocity labour practice because of their old ages and remarked that it is 
meant for younger farmers and women. In general, hired labour was very pronounced 
among smallholder rice farmers in Ugbawka and farmers booked in advance prior to 
farm dates. There was an observed scarcity of labour in Ugbawka given that rural-
urban migration was very widespread among the young people. Consequently, the 
labour gap created by rural urban migration created space and demand for migrant 
labourers, as well as allowed the take over and control labour by migrants in 
Ugbawka. It was noted that over 80% of farm labourers in the research context were 
migrant labourers. Although the phenomenon of labour migration into Ugbawka is a 
not entirely new, migrants’ control of the labour sources became very prominent 
around 1980s at the peak of rural-urban migration from Ugbawka to the capital city, 
Enugu (Mbah, 1997). In what follows, I shift my critical attention to how migrant 
labourers’ control labour in the subsequent part of this thesis in Chapter seven.  
   5.7 Income Sources and Livelihood Diversification  
 
Rice has become the most important staple food in Nigeria (Akpokodje et al., 2001, 
Akpokodje et al., 2003a) and a cash crop for most farmers. In Ugbawka, the 
respondents’ sources of income ranged from farming, petty trading to other off-farm 
related activities like rice trading, selling of farm pesticides/herbicides and palm wine 
tapping. Among the respondents in Ugbawka 62.9% (22) derived their sources of 
income and livelihood from farming alone, 37.1% (13) derived their incomes and 
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sources of livelihoods from a combination of farming and other economic activities, 
some of which are farming related.  
 
Farm activity constituted the most important source of income to smallholder rice 
farmers in Ugbawka while other sources of income were also linked to farming and 
other off-farm related activities. The researcher observed that most men and women 
were involved in petty trade. Some of the respondents (men) also engaged in selling 
pesticides and herbicides to other farmers in their local markets and contract spraying 
of herbicides in proposed rice farms for others.  
 
Besides farming which constitutes the core of the source of income, female farmers 
engaged in off-farm activities like, petty trading of food items and other foreign 
groceries in the local market. All the female respondents attest that women control the 
processing and marketing of rice. Majority of the female rice farmers were also rice 
traders who brought in paddies, parboiled, milled and sold to middle merchants at 
Afor market. They also outsourced paddies, processed them, milled and sold them to 
buyers and retailers from other cities. Some female respondents also engage in 
labour work to other farmers especially during transplanting and weeding period of the 
rice season. This diversity in income sources shows clear livelihoods strategy by rural 
smallholder farmers and reinforces the argument that diversity of income sources is 
and continues to remain part of life of rural smallholder farmers (Ellis, 2000b, Ellis and 
Mdoe, 2003). 
   5.8   Livelihood Differentiation in Ugbawka  
 
This section analyses livelihood classification based on three categories:  rich, 
average and poor farmers. 
This classification was done only to the primary research participants; the smallholder 
rice farmers. This classification was also informed by various informal discussions I 
had with the smallholder rice farmers in collaboration with the research assistants 
who pointed to the differentiation based on the community classification of rice 
farmers. Therefore, I used these three classifications to represent how the community 
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views these farmers and translated it closely to match their classification. Also in the 
classification, the farmers were asked to classify themselves within these three 
categories. The categorisation focused on: 
a) Individual farmers’ production level;  
b) Annual income level; and  
c) Other sources of livelihoods outside rice farming.  
d) Social capital and networks is also an important classification.  
The data gathered for this classification revealed that among the 35 respondents 
62.9% (22) derived their sources of income and livelihood from farming alone, 37.1% 
(13) derived their income and source of livelihoods from a combination of farming and 
non-farming economic activities, such as palm wine tapping and petty trading. This 
shows that the farm activity constitutes the most important source of income to 
smallholder rice farmers in Ugbawka besides other sources of income linked to 
farming.  
 
Data on the categorisation reveals that 28% of the respondents are classified as the 
rich farmers, 52% are classified as average and 20% classified as poor farmers. The 
classification is also linked to their output from their rice farming, annual income. Farm 
size was also used to corroborate data for the categorisation of the rice farmers into 
the three categories. Although there is argument that farm size is not a good criterion 
for defining smallholders (Kirsten and Van Zyl, 1998), majority of the farmers (77.1%,) 
who are classified either as rich or average farmers cultivated between 5 or more 
hectares of land while 22.9% mainly those classified as poor smallholder cultivated 
below 5 hectares.  
   Table 4: Livelihood Classification of Farmers in Ugbawka 
 
Category  Factors  
Rich farmers  Diverse source of income beyond 
farming. These farmers’ income 
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sources outside Ugbawka such as 
remittance.  
 Wide access to support networks  
 More than 10 hectares of rice 
farm 
 Mills more than 100 bags (50kg) 
of rice per annum - Afford hybrid 
rice seeds for cultivation 
 
 Hire labour extensively  
 Access to all types of land for 
farming 
 Annual income turn over above of 
around 50,000 USD 
Average farmers  Diverse income source  
 Limited access to support 
networks  
 5 or more hectares of rice farm 
 Mills between 50 to 100 bags of 
rice per annum. Can afford hybrid 
rice seed 
 Occasionally hire labourers but 
also use reciprocal labour and 
family labour for farming 
 Access to family land and access 
to other farm lands-  
 Annul income turnover of around 
25,000 USD 
 
Poor farmers  Narrow income source mainly 
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from farming  
 Less than 5 hectares  
 Less than 50 bags of milled rice 
 Large dependency on family 
labour and labour reciprocity – in 
few instances hire labour 
strategically during farming peak 
period 
 Depend largely on family farm  
 Cannot afford large scale use of 
hybrid rice seeds  
 Annual income turnover of less 
than 15,000 USD 
 
It is recognised that categorisation such as this does not always reflect the entire 
diversity within the broad groups. However, this categorization provides us with the 
frame and indication of the different types of smallholder rice farmers in Ugbawka.   
The rich farmers are those who are expanding and graduating from smallholder rice 
farmers to become fully commercial rice farmers. This category of farmers annually 
harvests more than 100 (50kg) bags of processed rice. They cover most of the family 
expenses from the sales of their rice and also can afford the cost of basic needs of 
the family such as education and healthcare. In most cases, they hire labourers rather 
than rely on labour reciprocity. Excerpts from the interview with one of the rich 
farmers who is considered the richest rice farmer in Ugbawka read below:   
I prefer to source and hire labourers to do my work and how I want them. I 
don’t want to be tied to labours that I am not sure if I would have the time 
to return or sending one member of my family to return the labour when 
we have work to be done in the farm.  What I do is that sometimes I call 
young boys from this village to assist me in farm labour and I will pay 
them some money and also support some of them in starting small rice 
farm for them by giving them portions of hybrid rice seeds. I have up to 
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ten boys, whom I have helped in that manner, but most importantly, I use 
migrant labourers for my rice farming13 
This category of rice farmers also reinvests and focuses on expanding their rice farm 
towards full commercialisation. They also have other sources of livelihoods from 
livestock farming. One of the farmers confirmed that he has other sources of income 
in an interview.  
Apart from my rice farm, I also have sheep and goat, which I can 
sell, in the market to solve any family problem. I am also the 
manager of the milling centre and I make money from there and 
while I report to the owner of the mill. I also serve as the focal point 
for some traders from the cities that are looking for agents and 
middlemen for their farm products.  
The above category used both their social and financial assets creatively for 
improving their living conditions and in some cases draw from external influence to 
improve their farming conditions. They also had access to credit and most of them 
had established bank accounts with banks in the capital city. What emerged from the 
data is that this category of smallholder rice farmers had varied sources of incomes 
beyond the sale of rice and had developed strategy for individual access to farm 
support mechanisms like credit, access to farm input, supplies directly to users like 
hotels, schools and restaurants. Informal interaction with selected farmers in this 
category revealed that they identified themselves as rich. Their direct choice of word 
was “I am very comfortable”. One of the farmers outlined some of his achievement as 
a smallholder rice farmer as a way of confirming his richness and highlighted that all 
his children go through good schools to university level. It could be argued that the 
first category of small holder farmers had an advantage of all available avenues and 
possessed the capabilities to expand available economic opportunities and social 
capital to advance their livelihood (Bhandari, 2013).  
 
Linked to this group is how their livelihood status also supports the exercise of their 
agency. Most of the farmers in this category have participated in an external 
                                                        
13 The farmer cannot be named due to ethical consideration and the farmer’s request for anonymity  
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facilitated smallholder collective action. They often have voice in the community and 
use their social networks and political capital for individual advantage. They are able 
to draw on the political and strategic agency in their relationship with other farmers. 
Evidence also shows that their outward reception to externally facilitated smallholder 
collective action put them in most cases in contradiction to embedded cultural 
practices of smallholder collective action in Ugbawka. For instance, a particular 
farmer might be willing and ready to put up his house as collateral, which the other 
farmers are unable to accept as this as a conditionality. Acceptance of some of the 
conditions from external facilitators or banks puts him against group interest and 
resolution but guarantees access to needed credit for farming. Evidence also 
suggests that such disagreements amongst the farmers on what is and should be 
acceptable in their relationship with external facilitators and support are the reason for 
poor functioning (or lack thereof) of the farmers’ association. It has been argued that 
social capital can lead to voice and group accountability if properly channelled but 
could also lead to isolation or forcefully individualisation without regard for group 
interest when an individual ignores older social capital links in favour of individual 
benefits or opportunity (Hudson, 2009).     
 
The middle group identified in this research, as the “average farmers” is generally that 
category of smallholder rice farmers who coped and in some instances and strived to 
ensure that they stay at the level above the line. This category also possessed 
diverse income sources, cultivated more than 5 hectares of rice farm and milled 
around 50 to 100 bags of rice per annum. They also sourced for labour from family as 
well as from organised labourers but also engaged in labour reciprocity. In terms of 
land, they used mostly family land but also took land on lease for cultivation based on 
the farm harvest of the previous seasons. Like the first category, this group also 
attempted to diversify their income sources outside farm activities but also cultivated 
different types of cash crops as a means of spreading their chances of better harvest 
and incomes after sales. These also included working class families who were also 
involved in rice farming as an alternative source of income to the family. In terms of 
exercise of their agency, these farmers strive for duality in maintaining their link 
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between external and internal forms of collective action. They use both personal and 
everyday agency but also exhibit their political and strategic agency when necessary. 
They are not overtly confrontational to embedded social norms but ensure balance. 
However, they are very sceptical about externally facilitated form of smallholder 
collective action. In some cases, they balance the interaction between other farmers 
and external facilitators through their balanced voices and opinion of issues. They are 
not as individually focused as the rich farmers but ensure that there is a balance in 
their action while maintaining the trust with the community and other farmers. Trust 
and reciprocal relationship still embodies their action.     
 
At the lower echelon of the categorisation are the poor farmers. The poor group 
generally had access to land and also depended largely on farm produce as the core 
source of income. Interview with some of the farmers in this group revealed that they 
occasionally obtained support from one or two members of the family who lived in the 
city. Their source of labour for the rice farm was entirely on family labour and labour 
reciprocity. Access to hired migrant labourers is based on strategic decision during 
peak period. Most of them in this group rarely used hybrid seeds but occasionally got 
rice seeds on credit from sellers and agreed to pay from the output after harvest. 
They were not too inclined to risks like the other higher groups. The farmers in this 
group constitute a minority of the smallholder rice farmers.  Analysis from this group 
revealed that they use rice farming as a strategy for upward the social mobility. Some 
of them moved from cultivating other crops to rice as a cash crop. These farmers 
categorised themselves as poor. However, they hold that poverty is not permanent 
state but a transient one. This group of farmers depends largely on community 
networks and rely mainly on their everyday and personal agency. Their level of 
interaction with external forms of smallholder collective action is low because of their 
strong attachment to cultural and social embedded practices.    
 
The categorisation of the different groups of the smallholder rice farmers forms the 
baseline for understanding smallholder farmers and how they exercise their individual 
agency. What is clear from the groups is that while the ‘rich farmers had diversified 
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sources of income, they also possessed greater capability to access other livelihood 
options and choices. The ‘average farmers’ also attempted to strike a balance 
between evolving closer to the rich farmers and enduring signs of struggle, which 
could push them backwards towards the poor group. The poor farmers on the other 
hand focused their strategy and capacity towards lifting themselves from the lowest 
group to something much higher. They engaged in other economic activities within 
their reach that could generate means of household survival (Ellis, 2000a). However 
like many poor categories, they often struggled to substitute assets for another as a 
way of alternating livelihood strategy due to lack of diversity of sources and capacity 
(Reardon and Vosti, 1995).  
    5.9   Institutional Agents of Smallholder Collective Action in Ugbawka 
 
The start of what could be identified as major development changes in Ugbawka 
dates back to the colonial period and gradually evolved and stagnated from the early 
post-colonial period to the contemporary era. Within these periods, different 
institutions shaped and more often continues to shape smallholder collective action in 
Ugbawka.  Some of these are discussed below.  
   5.9.1 The Family System 
 
The family system is an important institution of smallholder collective action in 
Ugbawka.  Ugbawka has a close-knit family system that respects the communal way 
of life and derives from immediate and extended family system. The noticeable forms 
of collective action, which take the family system route during all the periods, are 
labour cooperation and reciprocity, collective farming system whereby different 
farmers establish rice farms in a particular settlement for collective security and for 
fending off birds. Extended families are set up to establish farming settlements where 
different nuclear families organise their farming cooperatively and collectively. Family 
farm settlement system is also based on trust because there are from the same 
extended family system. In addition, collective action was also shaped and based on 
the level of respect and trust a particular family command in the community. The 
community open family system ensures that information about any particular family 
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traits and behaviour are known across the community and one could simple assert 
and trust another based on family lineage (Mbah, 1997).  
 
The significance of family in smallholder collective action is particularly visible in 
labour cooperation and reciprocity. Empirical data reveals that some families 
cooperate and act collectively in labour based on family history, while others avoid 
collective action for the same reason. Therefore, family as an institution forms one of 
the major arenas of smallholder collective action in Ugbawka, but could alter 
collective action. Family feuds of past years are capable of obstructing smallholder 
collective action structured around family system and can potentially pose problems 
of mistrust among farmers who are part of the collective action platform (Mbah, 1997). 
This claim is supported by one of the farmers who did not join a particular group 
remarks:  
I am not going to join that group. Mr A (name withheld) is part of that 
group and that makes it impossible for me to join. My father advised me to 
avoid his family. His father cheated my farmer in the past and his family 
cannot be trusted. Those joining his group are taking a big risk but I 
cannot stop them. All I can do it to avoid his group and form my own 
group14.  
5.9.2 Religious Institutions 
   
One of the forerunners of colonialism was the deconstruction of Igbo traditional religion 
and its replacement with Christianity. The proximity of Ugbawka to the capital city 
Enugu makes it an offshoot of many churches and Christian denominations. In short, 
different churches and denominations constitute different identities for different peoples 
in Ugbawka. Smallholder rice farmers also identify and organise collectively along 
denominational lines. Smallholder collective action along this line of identity mainly 
focuses their efforts on using the church and their denominations as a link to external 
sources of support. This is because most of the missionary churches are believed to 
                                                        
14
 I avoided the use of names in this quote on research ethics based on anonymity.  
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have ties to charity or not-for-profit organisations, which could attract both financial and 
non-financial input for the benefit of the farmers. The churches are also socially 
embedded as part of the community and play an important role in shaping behaviours of 
the people. Within the churches, there are different intra-denominational groups like 
bible study, women’s league, Legion of Mary etc. through which collective action are 
constructed and nurtured.       
 
Membership of any of the churches is open to everyone in the community. The 
researcher noted that the influence of the church on the community is strong and their 
preaching reinforces the farmers’ main objective of prosperity. The churches and 
denominations attract different set of people from the community including farmers. 
Ironically, some of the farmers who were also members of the different church and 
denominational groups were also very much tied to their cultural beliefs and repertories, 
which was what the churches preached as the bane of their poor state of affairs. This 
duality of identity in the churches and cultural norms could be explained by the fact that 
smallholder farmers viewed the churches as alternative sources of livelihoods and not a 
place for spiritual awakening. Thus organising collectively along denominational lines 
was almost, if not entirely, motivated by the search for support including financial and 
technical input through religious capital as an alternative source of livelihood asset. One 
of the farmers remarked that: 
I was told that there is opportunity for me to join the group and have 
access to fertilizer and I joined. I contributed small amount and received 
fertilizer, which helped my rice grow better in return. So I am happy.  
 
Therefore, the brief analysis reveals that the religious groups in Ugbawka paid attention 
to the social needs of the people albeit based on membership and commitment to the 
programme of the church especially when there was no standard yardstick for 
measuring acceptance of the preaching by the members. However, the churches 
offered more than a congregational place for believers but also offered access to capital 
and other assets required by farmers. As Toner’s research in Uchira, Tanzania 
revealed, churches offer access to networks of influence that reach far beyond the 
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village (Toner, 2008a, p. 144). Green (2006), equally argued that religion functions in 
fluidity and adapt to context in which individual needs are served, while Heilman and 
Kaiser (2002) pointed to the influence of religion in the mobilisation of individuals and 
groups to serve both individual interest and religious interest. This interaction between 
individual and religion serves and provides platform for development of the society 
(Haynes, 2007).  
5.9.3 Village Council and Associations  
 
Another key institution of collective action in Ugbawka is the village council. The pre-
colonial Igbo political system has the village council as the highest decision making 
body in the community and, to this date, has evolved and played different roles while 
adapting flexibly to the changing government and governance systems of the post–
colonial Nigeria. The Igbo village council is akin to an open democratic system whereby 
interested members of the community come to submit their views without restriction and 
votes on specific issues are collected generally from attendance. Although the 
contemporary assemblage of the village council differs significantly from the pre-colonial 
period, the Ugbawka village council still retains the democratic structure of the pre-
colonial period. The council of elders continues to be the highest alternative although 
there are checks and balances from the age grades and the Umu Adas.  Umu Ada is 
the council of the first female born of all the families in the community. In Ugbawka, this 
group still meets to discuss societal development issues in the community. Another set 
of group that complements and acts, as check on the council of elders, is the August 
Women Association. August women association in Ugbawka and many Igbo society is a 
group of women from a particular community, who return to the village from the urban 
centres to assess, evaluate and deliberate on development programme in the 
community. They make annual contribution to any new project and in many cases start 
up development projects like water project or education project in the community. 
 
The village council holds the responsibility of making binding decisions for the village 
and can reward and sanction a member of the village accordingly. They play multiple 
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roles from interceding on behalf of the village to initiating community projects and in 
maintaining law and order in the community. The village council in many instances acts 
as the bridge between the village and the local government.  
 
The local government is the authorized government that supposedly should act to 
enforce general law and order in the local council area but the village council in most 
cases perform that role. However, in some instances there are conflicts between the 
local government and the village council especially on local tax system and on market 
fee rates. As in other villages in Tanzania (Ellis and Mdoe, 2003), local taxes are viewed 
as burdensome in Ugbawka due to the perceived lack of transparency by the local 
government. The empirical data obtained from informal interview reveals that since the 
local government were unable to improve market conditions with the taxes, the village 
did not feel obliged to hand over the taxes to the local government rather, they attested 
that taxes managed by the village council had in the past become more effective in 
improving market and rural conditions than the taxes paid to local government. Most 
cases of conflict over market taxes were resolved between the village council and the 
local government through an agreement that ensured that the village council retained 
certain percentage of the taxes for market improvement and security of the market. The 
village council leaders are not paid for their services but take on this responsibility on a 
voluntary basis and also based on the Igbo belief in altruism and development 
(Onyeiwu, 1997).  
 
The village council also functioned with the support of the women associations and 
groups, which included the UmuAdas, age grade and other women associations like 
religious or transitional groups. Historically, Igbo women are known to play active role in 
socio-economic arena of the community as well as participate in political decision-
making processes including decisions on the processes and procedures of allocating 
resources and developing and building new initiatives (Chuku, 2005, Falola and 
Paddock, 2011, Matera et al., 2013). The various women groups played active role in 
the village governance as council members, by offering advice and provision of checks 
and balances to the council and in some cases by providing alternative paths to some 
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major village projects. It is perceived that the women’s organizations’ collective action 
function very effectively and the village council always consulted them for advice on 
development projects. Interviews with selected members of the Ugbawka council 
revealed that decisions that were made with the involvement of women always fared 
better than decisions made without the involvement of women. Also, projects initiated 
and ran by women groups have shown to have very high completion rates.   
 
Women groups and associations have always been an important part of collective 
action in the Igbo society. During the pre-colonial Igbo society, women asserted their 
considerable social agency by frequently organising themselves collectively and making 
useful contributions to community development and discourse. The women associations 
also resorted to different tactics and methods whenever the community often controlled 
by men encroached into their terrain. Such tactics can be in the form of exposing their 
naked body in what is traditionally referred to in Igbo society as women’s war or use of 
the feminine power solely by virtue of being women (Carwile, 2007). The power of 
organisation of Igbo women in the colonial period was demonstrated against the 
colonial administrators in 1929 in what is historically and erroneously called the Aba 
women riot (Chuku, 2005). However what transpired in 1929 was a form of collective 
action through social resistance when Igbo women in South Eastern Nigeria discovered 
the colonial administration attempts to impose tax on women and their livestock; a 
practice which was culturally abominable and abhorrent at that period (Falola and 
Paddock, 2011). 
 
Overtime, the consistent unity and associational benefits of women institutions in 
Ugbawka has made women associations’ viable avenue for formulating and engaging 
in collective action. Evidence from the fieldwork reveals that one of such associations 
through which collective action can function is the women rice farmers and the Isusu 
group, which is discussed in Chapter six. Although they are not formally registered as 
associations of women rice farmers, the activities of the women groups support the 
functioning of smallholder collective action. As highlighted in the previous section on 
labour, hired labour constituted the major source of labour for rice farms in Ugbawka, 
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however in order to meet their labour requirement especially within a restricted 
system where women had limited capital to pay for the cost of migrant labourers, the 
women farmers provided support to each other through reciprocal labour exchange in 
a rotatory manner. Evidence from data showed that labour reciprocity was higher 
among younger farmers and women smallholder rice farmers than among men of 
older age. This is because the women farmers’ assemblage provided the space for 
women to access and engage in labour reciprocity, as well as other forms of labour 
exchange based on rotation. 
 
Women also carved out opportunities for collective action through other means and 
avenues created by their groups. There were pockets of women meeting groups in 
the community through which women smallholder rice farmers could access credit 
facilities for their farm activities like the Isusu group. These meeting groups were not 
specific and restricted to smallholder rice farmers but to all other women farmers. 
Within these groups, each woman contributed a certain amount of money weekly or 
monthly that is given to each member on rotatory basis but also could be lent to any 
member of the group as a soft loan for general use. The functioning of this system is 
based on rules of honesty, trust and need. According to the members of the women 
groups, access to the group contribution was rotational although there were 
exceptional cases where some members could be provided with credit facilities on 
emergencies 
 
Asides from village governance and local government, there was active presence and 
agency of other powerful actors (with vested interests) in the research space with 
significant socio-economic and political influence in the community. This is what is 
generally refer to as “politically exposed persons”. I use this term to mean anyone 
who holds and has held any political position at the local government but is also a 
member of the community. There are a number of such people in Ugbawka who see 
themselves as wielding more influence than the village council although they 
unsuccessfully attempted to constitute an alternative and influential voice to the 
village council. The research findings revealed that a few of these groups were also 
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rice farmers that wield political capital in Ugbawka. More on this will be examined 
further in chapter seven on the Politicization of Collective Action.    
 
Through these various channels and structures discussed above, the village council 
acts and receives major support from members of the community and performs 
various functions, some of which support collective action for the entire village and 
specifically for the rice farmers. For smallholder rice farmers, the village council plays 
a crucial role in mediating between the farmers and migrant labourers. A detailed 
examination of how labour gangsterism functions in creating collective action in the 
research has been given due consideration in Chapter seven.  
 
Thus it can be argued that institutions through which smallholder collective action 
function in Ugbawka differs in form and role. However, what is clear is that institutions 
that shaped smallholder collective action in Ugbawka evolved and remained part of 
current institutional arrangement in one way or the other. These institutions allow for 
modification and/or reformation of its usage in serving the interest of the smallholders. 
It has been argued that smallholder relationship with the market is that which allows 
for maximum flexibility, fluidity and autonomy where external relations are ordered to 
allow for contraction and expansion at moments deemed appropriate – entrapment is 
avoided as much as possible (Van Der Plog, 2008). Therefore for smallholders in 
Ugbawka, their relations with the market, market agencies, institutions, political 
authorities and other external orders are constructed, maintained and changes 
according to local cultural repertoires that centres on issues of (dis) trust and often 
translated into the construction of autonomy (Perez, 2005). 
 
The age grade is another group in Ugbawka through which smallholder collective 
action is reflected. Age grades are informal groups formed by people within the same 
age brackets, usually from three to five years from each other. It is important in Igbo 
society for one to know his or her age mates because that is whom he or she will be 
measured against and they are also living samples of self-evaluation in Igbo 
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societies15. For the males, it is a confirmation that you have acquired the status of 
manhood and, as such, you are expected to participate and contribute to community 
development especially in collective labour (Okodo, 2012). 
 
In Ugbawka, the age grade is an important institution for collective action. It was 
observed that various age grades met in the community square to share drink as a 
form of social bonding and to discuss community progress and development. They 
also organised for collective farming and in some instances the younger grades 
constituted bulk of the labour sources. It has been argued that age grade is that 
institution through which the Igbos decide to co-operated for work, to war and to 
govern their society (Ifemesia, 1979). Evidence from the field through direct 
observation, informal interview and semi structured interviews reveals that age grade 
is still an important institution in Ugbawka. Different grades still organized among 
themselves for different activities and the younger grades form themselves into labour 
group for interested farmers. Furthermore, the empirical data revealed that labour 
cooperation based on reciprocity is high among the younger smallholder rice farmers 
were structured around the various age grades. Each age grade bracket organised 
and agreed on how to support each other including the process and terms of 
exchange. A further interrogation of the institution of age grade and smallholder 
collective action revealed that some grade also organised as temporary labour groups 
and worked for the older and ‘rich’ rice farmers in the community. It is through the age 
grade system that women often challenge masculinity in the Igbo society by taking 
upon responsibilities that are considered manly and excelling in those tasks and 
responsibilities (Amadiume, 1987, Ọgbalụ, 1979, Akhter, 2002, Reynolds, 2001).  
 
                                                        
15
 The age grade system as a socio-cultural institution emerged in recent times to facilitate 
development in the community. Communities are segmented in different age grades, and with time, the 
younger groups ascend the ladder and take over leadership role from the older grades or generations. 
Thus age grade is a process of preparation and grooming young men and women to community 
leadership in a collective manner. Age grades of opposite sexes often compete in community 
development and achievement. It is through the age grade system that women often challenge 
masculinity in the Igbo society by taking upon responsibilities that are considered manly and excelling 
in those tasks and responsibilities 
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    5.10 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has attempted to explore the profile of Ugbawka as a community and the 
different institutions that provide governance through which collective action take 
place. Those institutions also constitute the agents of change in Ugbawka through 
which different individuals exercise their agency in their daily struggles for survival 
and social becoming. Along the way, the role of the church, village governance, and 
family system were examined.      
 
This chapter also examined the profile and characteristics of the rice farmer, with 
particular focus on their differential income sources, labour and access to land. It 
further looked at the livelihood levels in Ugbawka and the capacity of the different 
groups to activate their livelihood choices through multiple strategies. The chapter 
revealed that although livelihood choices exist, individual capabilities to access those 
choices differs based on availability of different livelihood assets but also ability to 
access the assets.  
 
This chapter shows the role of social factors and realities in collective action and the 
nested nature of institutions of collective action, smallholders are capable of 
organizing and mobilising for acceptance and resistance depending on the course of 
action. It is important to note that the analysis underlines that changes and 
development is shaped at the village level through the interaction between the actors 
and the environment as captured by critical scholars (Arce and Long, 2003, Arce, 
2003, Cleaver, 2007). 
 
One of the main aims of this thesis is to deepen an understanding that smallholder 
collective action can be shaped and motivated economically and non-economically 
and that both formal and informal institutions can co-exist and play important roles in 
shaping smallholder collective action at various levels and forms in the community. 
This complicates any simplistic formal/informal dichotomy in the literature. The 
mainstream institutional theory on collective action argues for the formalisation and 
designed institutionalisation of collective action to avert free riding (Olson, 2009), 
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while the critical theorists reminded us of the need for a more nuanced perspective 
that takes into account the socio-cultural and political context that recognises 
economic imperatives (Ostrom, 1990, Cleaver, 2007).  The next chapter of this thesis, 
explores informal and formal collective action practices in Ugbawka while examining 
the success and otherwise of their different forms of smallholder collective action.   
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   Chapter Six: 
   6.0 Formal Versus Informal Smallholder Collective Action in Ugbawka 
   6.1 Introduction  
 
Mainstream policy and practice on smallholder collective action has recently focused 
on creating a formal system where institutions are designed to control individual 
members’ behaviour in order to ensure accountability, respect for the rules, 
understanding of roles, but importantly to ensure that rewards and sanction which 
follow each end of the behavioural and responsibility pattern are symmetrically 
applied. The tendency to design smallholder collective action along this line is high 
with many international development projects on smallholder collective action 
currently designed along this line with case studies depicting success stories.  For 
instance, Oxfam international’s market system approach to value chain development 
shows case studies of successful mainstream smallholder collective action projects in 
different developing countries (King et al., 2012, Wilson et al., 2011a, Jochnick, 2012, 
Gayathri, 2011, Baden, 2013a, Gavin, 2013, Baden, 2013b)16. However most of these 
projects on smallholder collective action by Oxfam are funded by the private sectors 
with vested interest in particular line of products.  
 
The data from this ethnographic research suggests that smallholder collective action 
cannot be realized only through the design elements. More often than not, formal and 
informal institutions complement and challenge each other. The primary data from the 
field also showed that, practically, both formal and informal forces shape the 
outcomes of smallholder collective action in Ugbawka.   
 
The chapter explores the interaction and the functioning of informal smallholder 
collective action in Ugbawka. It borrows and aligns itself closely with the critical 
institutionalism thinking to show the powerful nature of informal institution in 
lubricating smallholder collective action through successful informal collective action 
                                                        
16
 More on Oxfam smallholder collective action programme can be read on EDP at http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/our-
work/private-sector-markets/enterprise-development  
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cases. Critical Institutionalists (CI) argue that institutions normally elude design that 
evolves in the dynamic process of social life (Franks and Cleaver, 2007, Cleaver, 
2007, Cleaver, 2012). Critical Institutionalists also contend that mechanisms for local 
governance that facilitate collective action at the local level are enacted through 
complex mixes of bureaucratic and socially embedded institutions (Benjaminsen and 
Lund, 2002, Lund, 2006). Rules, boundaries and processes are fuzzy and peoples’ 
complex identities and unequal power relationships are unlikely to be subjected to 
institutional design.  
 
After exploring the evolution of collective action in Ugbawka, the chapter proceeds to 
examine some informal collective action cases in Ugbawka. Within this section, the 
Chapter briefly examines the mix between formal institutions and informal systems. I 
argue that what is perceived as informal and abnormal by mainstream view might 
actually be the means through which smallholders survive in the local community. 
Moreover, it is in the realm of the informal that local power and political interplay are 
embedded and enacted.  
 
This chapter demonstrates further that smallholder collective action is not rigidly 
implied to formal institutional design and that their motivation for organising is not only 
economic but also involves non-economic incentives. In examining the cases of 
formal and informal collective action, the chapter explores how social embedded 
forces confront established formal structures through the routine exercise of agency. 
6.2 Origin of Smallholder Collective Action in Ugbawka 
 
In his novel Things Fall Apart, Achebe articulates how individuals in Igbo society 
strive for the development of the community and how the community also emboldens 
individuals for greater advancement (Achebe, 1958). Such a society was 
democratically communal as individuals are allowed basic freedom for the good of the 
community and where individual success translates to community success.  It 
portrays the role of the different structures of the Igbo traditional system in society. 
The political structure of the precolonial Igbo was very democratic and akin to the 
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Greek city-state where power derived directly from the people. The sense of political 
community in Igbo allows direct and indirect representation through the village 
council, council of elders, women groups and the age grade. Socially, the Igbos are 
communally interlinked in the extended family system that promotes and advocates 
for support and cooperation. Achebe also highlights how colonialism distorted social 
coherence between the individual and their society (Kenalemang, 2013). The 
community cherished the core elements of communal living through forms of 
reciprocity, trust and communal living, which defined the Igbo society. Nowhere are 
these elements of Igbo society more visible than in farming and related communal 
activities.    
 
Smallholder collective action in Ugbawka originated from a long tradition in farming. 
Farmers worked as collectives in different ways during farming seasons to support 
each other and to contribute to development initiatives. In order to trace the origin of 
collective action in Ugbawka among smallholder rice farmers, I asked selected 
farmers questions about the origin of collective and how collective action has evolved 
in Ugbawka. The responses from the farmers triggered further interviews with elders 
in the community who are viewed as repository of knowledge and wisdom in the 
community. The responses were also triangulated with scarce documented evidence 
on the origin of smallholder collective action in Ugbawka. The responses from four 
farmers and an elder are captured in the box below.    
 Box:  Responses on the Origin of Smallholder Collective Action in Ugbawka 
 
Origin of Smallholder Collective Action in Ugbawka17 
 
SHF1: I am not sure I would be able to trace how collective action started in this 
community. I guess it has always been part of this society.  
 
SHF2:  I guess this is a difficult question that I cannot answer- I think you should 
talk to one of the elders- one of them should be able to assist. However, I think it is 
how we live in this community. 
                                                        
17 SHF used to abbreviate Smallholder farmer. 
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SHF3: You might have to look back hundreds of years to know how it started. 
Some of us grew up and continued this cooperation way. Our ancestors pass this 
down.  
  
SHF4: This is as old as any of us here in the community. Collective action was 
passed down from our forefathers. This is how they supported each other during 
farming seasons and survived before white people came to Nigeria. It used to be 
much better but government involvement in our life as well as farming has made 
things a bit difficult. You don’t know whom to trust anymore but we still manage to 
work with each other but I work only with people I can trust.  
 
Elder18: You will have to trace collective action in this community to hundreds of 
years back. When I was small my father used to prepare us for farming and my 
uncles and my cousins used to come to our farm as well as to also help us during 
any of the farming activities. We work together and eat together during and after 
the farm. My father and my uncles and extended family always plan how to work 
together in the farm, whose farm will be cultivated on which day and how each of 
the farm will be cultivated until all the farms for my uncles are all done. We also 
cooperate in other off farm activities like clearing of village square and common 
areas and support each other during funeral planning. We also join other members 
of the community in clearing the market and also in community road construction 
and clearing of the pathway. Everyone is aware of the days for market clearing, 
road construction and other things. Also in the evening before the workday, the 
town crier will go around with the gong to announce the activity and encourage 
everyone to come and on time.   
Box 1:  Responses from farmers and elder.  
Evidence suggests that smallholder collective action in Ugbawka is embedded in the 
culture of Ugbawka people.  Moreover, the Igbo society derives collective action from 
its social cultural practices embodied in the community daily activities and reflected in 
farming. There is also a consensus that collective action is an important aspect of 
Ugbawka farming that is passed on from one generation to the other. All respondents 
did not view smallholder collective action as something new but as an inherent and 
embedded part of Ugbawka. Evidence also indicates that collective action in 
Ugbawka predates colonialism, and transcends economic motives. The community is 
motivated by desire to cooperate with others as a way of life rather than to gain 
economic benefit.  
 
                                                        
18 Elder name withheld is 89 years.  
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Despite the disparity in the conceptual assumptions of the factors that motivate 
collective action (from economic to social and political), the smallholder farmers had a 
clear understanding of collective action and suggested that its origin could be traced 
to the pre-colonial period. Further discussion with the farmers revealed that while they 
accepted that some smallholder collective action is triggered by the desire to access 
economic opportunities and benefits, they also observed that viability of social factors 
are important motivational factors that trigger collective action amongst the farmers. A 
comprehensive life history interview with elders also confirmed the understanding and 
origin of smallholder collective action in Ugbawka. The elders presented examples of 
smallholder collective action in the precolonial period and articulated how it has been 
sustained and adapted through history. In his book, the History of Ugbawka: Pre-
colonial Times to the Present, Mbah (1997) argues, rightly so, that collective action 
and communal living are engrained in Ugbawka and most visible in farming.  
 
On the position of the farmers on the dual nature of motivation for smallholder 
collective action, Cleaver (2007) contends that while it is important to recognise the 
theoretical viewpoint that espouses economic factors as the trigger for collective 
action, such theories are limited in their modelling of the social, historical and political 
formation in drawing the link between individual agency and collective action.  As one 
farmer noted: 
Many things could motivate me to participate in collective action and my 
participation is dependent on certain factors. Potential economic gains are 
possible to motivate me to part of collective action but that must be with 
people that I can trust and these people who I can trust are people that I 
can easily identify with and know their character and what they are 
capable of doing based on previous history of engagement with them or 
their family19.  
 
                                                        
19 Interview with a male smallholder farmer, on 19 June 2010 
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    6.3 Successful Smallholder Collective Action in Ugbawka  
 
Smallholder collective action in Ugbawka is mediated through different social 
institutions such as village councils, council of elders, age grade, family and Umu Ada 
(women group). These social institutions are mechanisms through which individual 
smallholders access their social capital and also tap into functional and reliable 
collective action (Rahman et al., 2015).  
Informal smallholder collective action in Ugbawka functions through embedded social 
interactions and institutions. Institutions such as the women farmers and women rice 
traders are examples of collective action that operate within the informal spaces, 
while maintaining a functional effectiveness for the interest of the members in 
Ugbawka. This research found examples of such informal smallholder collective 
action in Ugbawka.  
    6.3.1 Women Collective Action Associations  
 
Women groups and associations have always been an important part of collective 
action in the Igbo society. As highlighted and argued in Chapter five, during the pre-
colonial Igbo society, women popularly organised themselves collectively and 
contributed to the community development and discourse. Several studies are 
available on how women’s institutions form the basis for collective action in 
communities (Baden, 2013a, Abdulwahid, 2006). A number of factors related to 
poverty, gender inequality, and poor implementation of legislation and public policy 
can limit women’s ability to engage in and benefit from trade. Poor access to 
resources, lack of skills and market knowledge and poor connection to the buyers 
equally limit women’s ability to properly access the market (Jones et al., 2012). Local 
context and complexities, negative attitude towards women, gender relation in 
communities and associated customs/practices are some of the factors that inhibit 
women’s participation in activities outside homes (Elson, 1999, Moser, 1989).  
 
Despite the restrictions that women face in accessing and utilizing market 
opportunities, the changing family and responsibility landscape that demands more 
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from women has created new space for women to participate in the new market 
opportunities through collective action. Overtime, the consistent unity and 
associational benefits of women’s institutions in Ugbawka has made women’s 
associations’ viable avenue for formulating and engaging in collective action. 
Evidence from the fieldwork reveals that one such association through which 
collective action can function is the Isusu group and women rice farmers and paddy 
trader group. 
   6.3.2 The Isusu Group 
  
In Chapter four, I highlighted the practice of Isusu in the pre-colonial Igbo societies 
and the way in which it has adapted and advanced from the pre-currency period to 
the modern period. Isusu or Osusu as the Igbo calls is a savings and credit union, 
insurance scheme or a saving group, or club. It is a fund to which a group of 
individuals make fixed contributions at fixed intervals; the total amount contributed by 
the entire group is assigned to each of the members in rotation (Bascom, 1952). This 
practice was well advanced prior to colonialism and was recognised by the colonial 
administration as an effective means of building credit unions and cooperatives in the 
then Eastern Region20. In recognition of Isusu system the Eastern Region 
Cooperative Department (1954) stated in its annual report in 1954 that: 
“The Isusu (Esusu, Susu, Osusu) is a widespread indigenous 
system of thrift and credit… On the whole, the Esusu seems to 
be fairly well managed; although in some areas… the Isusu has 
degenerated into a notorious money-lender-controlled ‘racket’. 
There are vast numbers of Isusu Clubs in the region and the 
total amount of money involved must be very large. Some local 
Government Bodies have recently instituted a system of 
registration of Isusu Clubs" (Eastern Region of Nigeria, 1954). 
 
                                                        
20 The Eastern Region during the colonial period represent the present South East and South-South Region which is where 
we have the Igbos.  
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Isusu is much more prevalent among women for financial support for members who 
ordinarily could not afford the amount they receive from the group. Membership is 
usually among 20 to 30 people from the same social background with a shared 
cultural bond. Members make weekly contributions that will accumulate into a lump 
sum, which will be given to one member at every point in time in a pre-agreed 
continuous sequence. A small committee usually manages the group, which in most 
cases include a president and a secretary who keep the records. The group also 
engages in labour reciprocity and support to members during burial and funeral. Apart 
from the rotational sharing of contributions, any member who is in need can also 
request for his/her turn to be brought forward within the understanding of the other 
members based on the spirit of trust and reciprocity (Ben-Yami, 2000). The codes and 
agreement binding the group are usually informal, verbal, unwritten but in most cases 
respected.    
 
In Ugbawka, the Women Isusu groups are one of the successful smallholder 
collective action group which I examined in this research. Members of these groups 
are also rice farmers but also greatly involved in rice trading and marketing. This 
group comprised of 22 members and all 15 of the female rice farmers interviewed are 
members. These meeting groups were not specific and restricted to smallholder rice 
farmers but to all other women farmers. Membership is based on common 
understanding and on the need for mutual financial and social support. There is no 
formal registration process whereby forms are filled, vetted and reference demanded 
before membership is granted. However, membership for this group of women is 
based on informal connections and social ties. Discussions with individual members 
revealed that, when a new person wants to join the group, it is done through informal 
process where any old member introduces a new member. This is followed by the 
presentation of kola and palm wine by the new entrant to the group for initiation as 
symbolic gesture of respect, integrity and openness. Therefore, acceptance to this 
group is not based on fulfilment of formally laid down procedures and process or by 
agreeing to a formal code and guiding principle but based on tacit understanding and 
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knowledge of the new member’s character through informal structures and historical 
association within the community.      
 
Contribution for the Isusu group is biweekly and very minimal. This was to ensure that 
members are able and capable of making their individual contribution without putting 
too much strain on other family responsibilities. Members are allowed but not bound 
to make one off monthly contribution. Informal discussions with selected members 
revealed that collection of contribution follows agreed process and are given to 
members turn by turn. However, there were instances of deviation from the agreed 
chain of the collective whereby certain members requested for special contribution 
and for their collective to be brought forward. One of such instance was the case of 
bereavement in the household of one of the members and the second of such case 
was request by a widow for her collective to be brought forward to enable her to pay 
for school fees of her children.  In both instances, members agreed to both requests 
and allowed both women to get their wish as a show of support to the predicament. I 
also conducted further interview into why such request was accepted despite pre-
agreed collection sequence. Few members of the group explained that the group’s 
core principles are rooted on support to each other and that if they cannot help each 
other in terms of needs, then the core objective of the group is defeated. Although, 
their time has not come, their condition and situation deserved urgent attention. 
Denying the two women their request would have sent a message of individualism 
and selfishness which belies the core vision of the group.  
 
These two examples explain the Critical Institutionalist argument that decision making 
and negotiations in smallholder collective action are embedded in everyday life, 
shaped by history and politics (Cleaver, 2007). The decision to allow for early 
collection for the two women was based on role social structures and power dynamics 
play in shaping relationships. The community norms and the recognition of the overall 
objective of the group above and beyond individual selfish needs allowed for the 
recognition of informal trust within the group. Under the Mainstream Institutionalist 
perspective, the two women would have been asked to wait until their next turn or be 
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asked to look for other loan agencies. However, the Isusu system recognised that 
rules and regulations are made for human beings and that individual members must 
feel a sense of group support.   In other words, collection is not necessarily ‘turn by 
turn’ (a sequential western logic of justice), but based on the urgency of needs – more 
like a fraternity. This highlights the African philosophy of ‘Ubuntu’ where the logic is “I 
am in community, therefore I exist” rather than the Western Individualistic Cartesian 
logic of “I think, therefore I am.” So in this case, the “we” is given pride of place over 
the “I.” 
 
Members also favour the group against the external NGO-led formal smallholder 
collective action. Respondents noted that such system could support NGOs and 
government agents facilitating smallholder collective action rather than attempting to 
create a new system that people would find hard to trust. There are three other Isusu 
groups in the community between different smallholder farmers that perform well and 
strengthen bonds based on informal ties, trust and a sense of reciprocity. She 
continued by hinting that the Isusu system has been practiced in the community for 
years and that the smallholders have faith and trust in the system. However, if a 
member defaulted out of greed, it will be left for the community to determine, but so 
far there have not been any case to take to community level.  
 
In Igbo society, such default will normally be settled within the group unless the 
defaulter refuses to oblige to the group conditions.  Cases like this are not taken as 
criminal but civil and the community expect the group to resolve it. If the case persists 
without resolution, the umunna (extended family) of the group members are expected 
to prevail on the defaulter to find a way of abiding by the rules of the group. If the 
disputant continues to ignore the decision, the case expands to community level and 
the higher in level it goes the risk of ostracization becomes increasingly likely for the 
disputant (Okereafoezeke, 2003). Although the female respondent noted that chances 
of a member defaulting is low due to the support mechanism that discourages default, 
it also shows the strength of cultural practices and how it can support and discourage 
free-riding. According to most of the members, the membership of the Ugbawka Isusu 
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group has facilitated an avenue to seek both financial and social support. All 
members interviewed agree that they share a common understanding, which reduces 
risk of default and that the effective functioning of the group is rooted in trust and the 
fact that there is a social and cultural connection shared among members.  
 
One of the additional benefits which members expressed is that through the Isusu 
group, information and opportunities that come to one person automatically comes to 
the rest. One of the members provided an example of how farm inputs were bought 
collectively for all members using contribution from the group at a cheaper rate than it 
would have costed them individually.  
   6.3.3 Women Rice Farmers and Paddy Traders Group 
 
The second successful smallholder collective action group examined in this research 
is the women rice farmers and paddy trader group. This is a group of women who 
combines rice farming with rice paddy trading. These women organise themselves 
under the association of women rice traders and have made collective action work for 
the group. The idea for coming together as a group was to share common benefits 
and negotiate risks together. This idea aligns with the principles of both formal and 
informal smallholder collective action as argued by both mainstream and critical 
institutionalists (Penrose-Buckley, 2007a, Olivier de Sardan, 2005).  
 
Membership is voluntary, unrestricted and open to all women rice farmers and paddy 
traders in Ugbawka. New membership is also based on recommendation from an old 
member although one key requirement is that the prospective member must be a rice 
farmer and paddy trader. The underlying rationale for the group is both economic and 
social. Data from interview with members of the group reveals that the initial rationale 
was to collectively share decision making on their relationship with middle traders 
from the city, to seek collective avenue to secure rice seed, to access input 
collectively at a reduced rate, to guard against exploitation from paddy seller as well 
as city buyers and to socially support each other. Information exchange was also 
identified as an important factor in the formation of the group. A certain member 
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asserted that some of the members have access to information on input, seeds and 
even other sources of support that could help others. Hence, “in joining forces, we are 
able to share this information as well use our collective spirit to achieve better living 
condition for our family”21. She also argued that it has increased their visibility in the 
market and that through their group, they have gain more recognition and respect 
from men. This rationale and underlying motive identified by this group is closely 
related to case studies of other female smallholder collective action group across 
many developing countries. Oxfam documented cases of how Women-only groups 
enable effective participation and collective benefit in Ethiopia and Mali (Oxfam, 2013, 
Baden, 2013b, Gavin, 2013).     
 
Some of the members of the group noted that their membership in the group serves 
them better than a formal smallholder collective action facilitated by external actors. A 
number of reasons were adduced. Firstly, it was indicated that, most of the members 
are not involved in too much competition with each other because of the sense of 
collective spirit and unity. Although each member sold their rice and controlled their 
chain of customers from the city, there is nonetheless group support to members who 
are unable to sell their product quickly. One of the members gave example of how 
one member who sells to a secondary school in the city supports the other members 
to sell their product to her chains. In her word, “each time the school come to buy rice 
from Mrs Agu, she will inform all us and ask if we would like to bring our rice when the 
school arrive because she will not have enough rice for the school. This makes it easy 
for all of us because beside selling it to one school and quickly, we do not engage in 
price bargain individually with the school, once the price is agreed on the quality and 
quality of the rice, all members who brought their rice for the school will receive the 
same price, which is normally higher than what an individual member sells to an 
individual buyer”22. 
 
                                                        
21
 Interview with a member of women rice farmers and paddy trader group in Ugbawka. Interview conducted in June 2010 at Afor 
market Ugbawka.  
22
 Interview conducted with a member of the women rice and paddy traders in Ugbawka in June 2010 at Afor Market.  
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Unlike the mainstream formal form of smallholder collective action, trust as a human 
element is an important factor in the success of the women group. This is particularly 
so because of years of government neglect and failure to follow up on its agricultural 
development polices. According to Lyon and Porter (2009), trust is central to trading 
networks both locally and around the world, more so in areas such as Ugbawka 
where there is a limited history of reliable state regulation, which is the case 
throughout much of West Africa where informal trading and collective action is still 
very prevalent (Lyon, 2000; Holtzman et al., 1988). In Ugbawka, trust plays 
substantial role in engendering the participation of members of the group in 
participating fully and reciprocating to each other. Evidence through interview and 
informal focus group meetings revealed that the success of the group can be put 
down to their ability of the groups to build trust and respect each other. It was also 
recorded that the collectiveness of the women group has increased their leadership 
roles in the community.  
 
Another important benefit associated with the group according to member is the 
sense of shared power and responsibility. The operational structure of the group is 
loose and flat with no leader that commands and dictates how the group is or should 
be run. The running of the group is structured around all members based on equal 
power and contribution. Such flat structure according members foster strong and 
positive group dynamics which allowed the collective objective to flourish. One of the 
members expressed a sense of power and confirmed that the group dynamic is such 
that it allows all members to feel a sense of belonging and also allows them the space 
to contribute to the group. She further noted that the structure equally empowers all 
members to reach out and seek support that will be beneficial to all members knowing 
fully that any idea and/or support emanating from each member will be discussed and 
analysed to ensure that it will benefit all members. This freedom to express oneself 
and to feel a sense of power and belonging is one of the key sustaining factor of the 
women group. According to Sen (2001) denial of power and access to power restrict 
ones capacity and capability to function fully and effectively in a manner that allows 
for full expression of one’s agency.  
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Rules governing the association are unwritten but are well known and understood by 
members. These rules are common rules that apply to everyday life of the Ugbawka 
people and which became transferred into the women group. It hinges mainly on trust 
and collective support anchored on the spirit of reciprocity. The protection of the 
interest of the group is also paramount to the members as a way of showing 
commitment. Another important benefit identified by the group, which unlike the 
formal designed smallholder collective action, is the less pressure on adherence to 
rules and the complications associated with the formal process. For the women, the 
rules are part of their everyday life and not based on imported or invented actions. 
Most of the dos and don’ts derive from what is culturally accepted as code of 
behaviour in the society without any extra effort to obey. This is also based on the 
understanding that each member knows and is expected to obey the rule without any 
form of reminder.  
 
Some of the common unwritten rules include cooperation and participation in activities 
of the group, adherence to the group paddy trading rules, which stipulates that 
members cannot engage in bidding war at the same time with each other. Members 
must allow each other to conclude negotiation with potential paddy seller before 
beginning negotiation on the same. Members are also not allowed to undercut each 
other with customers from the city. Once it is established that a particular buyer from 
the city is interested in a member, the others must respect such allegiance and must 
not attempt to sway the customer away toward them.  
 
The two examples of successful informal smallholder collective action were 
necessitated because of the deep rooted level of trust among the members and the 
fact that power was diffused allowing members to feel a sense of belonging. Trust 
interacts with power and conditions of domination and subordination do not lend 
themselves readily to trust. However, in some cases where the formal structures of a 
relationship, for example a commission-agent or broker dealing with a smallholder 
farmer indicate a disparity of power, nonetheless, institutional power is mediated by 
170 
 
the web of social relationships that are rooted in traditions and norms (Lyon and 
Porter, 2009). The currency of these relationships is the trust that is gained through 
shared understandings. Behaviour on the part of the formal institution that disrupted 
or damaged the informal system would be detrimental to both (Lyon and Porter, 
2009). Chapter four stated clearly the role of trust in Igbo society and how Ofo 
mediates and brings about trust among members of a community. It has been argued 
that personal trust is the key to making markets work at the lower end of the trade 
hierarchy (Clark, 1994, pp. 228-34; Chalfin, 2004, pp. 225-52).  
 
In societies like Ugbawka that lack comprehensive market structures and weak 
government institutions, markets are inherently uncertain and personal relationships 
anchored on trust help to reduce the uncertainty. These relationships encourage 
reliable behaviour on both sides by creating a desire to reciprocate and by offering the 
threat of the sanctions controlled by the other party. For example, malfeasance in a 
transaction with one party might lead to a loss of business with that person’s entire 
network of kin and neighbours.   
 
Trust is also an important factor in determining participation and engagement in 
collective action projects, as the lack of faith in an institution will make it difficult for 
individuals to participate (Lyon and Porter, 2009). For example, the regulatory 
agencies in Nigeria, particularly in the food sector, are generally perceived as corrupt 
and untrustworthy - these institutions are also seen as lacking the ability to enforce 
agreements with any reliability (Mustapha and Meagher, 2000). As a result, 
smallholder farmers would instead pursue other, non-state forms of collective action 
that are regulated through personal relations and other institutions like trade 
associations. According to Bandiera et al. (2005b),  lack of trust could lead to non-
participation and resistance to the institution by the individuals. 
 
A female respondent who is part of an Isusu group noted that such system could 
support NGOs and government agents facilitating smallholder collective action rather 
than attempting to create a new system that people would find hard to trust. She 
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informed me that, there are other Isusu groups in the community between different 
smallholder farmers and further investigation revealed additional three groups that 
perform well and are bonded in their way of managing the group23. The same level of 
trust and confidence cannot be said of the formal smallholder collective action 
initiated and managed by government institutions or agencies. Below, I examined two 
projects; the SONGHAI Enugu Initiations and the FADAMA project to demonstrate 
how formal smallholder collective action with all forms and element of mainstream 
design principles could fail to achieve desired result due to the non-recognition of the 
social embedded factors.  
    6.4 The SONGHAI Enugu Initiative  
 
The SONGHAI Enugu Initiative (SEI) is an initiative of the state government aimed at 
building young entrepreneur farmers in Enugu state through collective action by 
forming farmers’ cooperatives and unions to facilitate the process of linking them up 
to market opportunities, and accessing credit, inputs and other incentives that could 
boost productivity as well as create market space for the SONGHAI farmers.   
 
The SEI is a borrowed framework from the SONGHAI centre of the Benin Republic 
and was designed as a partnership between FAO, the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD), International Labour Organization (ILO), United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO), working in partnership with the Songhai Centre, 
an International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO) based in Benin(Ife, 2013, 
Ife, 2010). SONGHAI was designed an integrated farming approach with a zero waste 
policy where all farm inputs and other logistics are organized in such a way that 
farmers have one primary delivery-point for all farming facilities. This particular model 
adopts a holistic approach to agribusiness and entrepreneurship development, which 
involves training its graduates, provision of support services and linkage to credit and 
markets through networking (Ife, 2013, p. 15). It is a sustainable model with integrated 
                                                        
23 Interview with a member of the women group in June 2010 
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development of primary, secondary and tertiary production of food crops, horticultural 
crops, aqua-culture and animal husbandry (Ife, 2010). In an effort to reposition the 
state as an agricultural export state, Enugu state adopted the SONGHAI model as a 
way of empowering and encouraging youth into farming and broadly into agriculture. 
While the SONGHAI in the Republic of Benin is purely an agribusiness centre, the 
Enugu prototype was designed in principle to generate greater agricultural 
productivity for the state.   
 
The state through the Ministry of Agriculture created twenty-one (21) SONGHAI 
prototype centres in Enugu state otherwise known as the “green cities” that consisted 
of 1 state level farm centre, 3 senatorial farm centres (one for each senatorial zone) 
and 17 local centres for each local government area in the state. Each of the local 
government had a local coordinating office. Also, three local governments out of the 
17 had two farmers because their local council was selected to host the farm for the 
senatorial zone (see figure below). The State SONGHAI Centre was proposed to be 
located at Heneke Lake in Obinofia, Ezeagu local government area (Ife, 2013, p. 16). 
Each local government was to have a local coordinating office that will be responsible 
for manager the farmers and ensure a function smallholder collective action through 
the SONGHAI structure.   
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Lifted from the Enugu State SONGHAI Programme Design Document  
 
The initiative based on the project design was expected to achieve an annual turnover 
of N10million and a return on investment for the private sector at 20 percent annually 
(Ibid). The rationale for the state was that agriculture through young people would 
increase state productivity and diversity revenue from one based on oil to one based 
on agriculture. In an interview with a senior member of the state government 
executive on their rationale for the project and the choice of farmer across the state in 
all the local government councils, viability of their decisions and sustainability plan 
from the government, he noted that: 
The government felt the need to bring back its agricultural base, which 
was the corner stone of Enugu since the Okpala regime. We carried out a 
study and SONGHAI initiative appealed to us. We think it is an innovative 
way of combining business and agriculture but also a way of empowering 
smallholder farmers in the state… the reason why we are establishing 
centres across the 17 Local Councils is to ensure inclusivity and give all 
the local councils the same opportunity to re-establish them as agricultural 
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base of the state. In term of sustainability, it is assumed that, these 
farmers are going to be self-sufficient; we are approaching this from a 
business angle and not from state social service angle24.  
Structurally, the SEI was design to function through collective action in a way that 
would support the sharing of cost, risk and opportunities by the farmers based on 
agreed rules and procedures. On paper SEI was viewed as a model for agricultural 
development through smallholder collective action in Nigeria. The original plan was 
for the state through the SEI train 170 smallholder farmers and graduates who are 
working or interested in small-scale commercialised agriculture. The 170 farmers and 
graduates was to be selected from the 17 local governments on equal basis for the 
initial start off of the initiative and upon return from training from the Republic of Benin 
settle in this various local communities as farmers within the SONGHAI structure. In 
collaboration with the World Bank, the State Government was to provide soft loans 
and grants to the farmers as well as build the infrastructure required for the full 
functioning of the farms(Ife, 2013). It was expected that private sector will partner the 
State government and other partners like the World Bank in the initial start-up cost. 
The proposition was private sector investment will be recouped through access to the 
collective product of all the farmers in a consistent and formal manner. Different roles 
were earmarked for different stakeholders. For example, the SONGHAI Centre, which 
is a private enterprise was to facilitate and during the data collection period facilitated 
training of 170 farmers. The Centre was also to provide support for the establishment 
and running of the Enugu State Centre of excellence that was to provide technical 
assistance, development of agribusiness and entrepreneurship skills, capacity for 
young farmers and women. The role of the Enugu State Government as the public 
sector partner was to implement the agribusiness enterprise development programme 
based on the SONGHAI model; offer lands, assets to the farmers, create the 
smallholder collective action group, create incentive for further private sector 
investment and stimulate capital investment through other off-farm projects.   Despite 
the comprehensive formal design of the SONGHAI project and the consideration it 
gave to both public and private sector involvement as well as linkage with rural 
                                                        
24 Interview with a senior state government official from Enugu State, held on 17 May 2010. 
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smallholder farmers through collective action, the real implementation tells a different 
story. As part of my research data collection methodology and immersion process to 
gain entry access to institutional data within the Ministry of Agriculture of the State, I 
volunteered as an intern to the state government and was seconded to the ministry of 
agriculture to support the operationalisation of the SONGHAI project as well as in the 
implementation of the Commercial Agricultural Development Programme (CADP)25. I 
had the opportunity to informally interview most of the selected farmers and the 
empirical data revealed that the formalisation of smallholder collective action through 
design does not automatically result to effective functioning of the collective action 
group. 
 
The selection of the farmers from the different local government to become part of the 
SONGHAI structure was conducted to satisfy political interests. Some of the 
participating trainees who are supposed to be farmers are merely political supporters 
of different political elites. These trainees have no interest whatsoever in farming but 
agreed to join the training in order to receive financial benefits from travelling and 
participating in the training that was conducted in Republic of Benin. The trainees also 
barely know each other and most of them have never and planned not to engage in 
any form of farming. One of the factors that facilitate smallholder collective action is 
the group character and uniqueness (Gyau et al., 2014), but the selection of trainees 
who were never farmers does not appear to foster an atmosphere of collective action.     
 
As the structure demanded, each local government will host a local coordinating office 
close to the farmers to be able to coordinate collective action functioning for the 
farmers. However, the decision on the location of the local coordinating office was 
again not based on proximity to the farmers but based on interest from the local 
government chairperson whose interest was to locate the office in order to benefit his 
political accessories. The interest of the farmers was not considered in the decision to 
locate the local coordinating offices.  In an interview with one of the top executives of 
                                                        
25 For more on CADP please visit http://www.cadpnigeria.org/ 
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the government whose name and position remained anonymous26, it was revealed 
that, focusing “merely” on agricultural potential of a community as the condition for the 
SONGHAI site would be politically incorrect and suicidal for the governor who will be 
seeking re-election27. He further revealed that, it was important to ensure that the 
various political interest holders in the state were in agreement on where the sites 
would be located irrespective of whether the community had agricultural potential or 
not.  
In essence, the SONGHAI structure was created in line with mainstream design 
principles whereby formal processes and institutions were respected and consulted, 
but the actual implementation was hijacked from the rural smallholders and deviated 
entirely from the plan. 
In terms of membership of the collective action group, the few farmers who received 
training as part of the group retreated to their original caucuses in the rural areas 
because the association functionality of the SONGHAI group was non-existent. This 
example reinforces the critical viewpoint that designing rules and regulations for a 
formalised smallholder collective action is not the panacea but the understanding of 
the actors and the context in which the collective action takes place (Cleaver, 2007). 
The expert design of the SEI project based on institutional thinking was not enough to 
adequately deal with the political interests and determination of the project.  
 
The Ministry of Agriculture whose primary responsibility is agricultural development 
had little to do with the selection and the identification of the farmers. The political 
determinism overshadowed project implementation and the application of the design 
principles. The young trainees whose interest lie away from agriculture could not 
continue with the project upon their return from Republic of Benin. As the time of the 
data collection, the state government was struggling and had side stepped the 
project. The outcome of such politicisation of agricultural project in favour of political 
interest was the eventual marginalisation of the smallholders in favour of political 
elites. Responses from the prospective farmers interviewed confirmed that most of 
                                                        
26 Due to anonymity, I would not be able to reveal the exact position of the top government official but this person 
ranks 1-4 in the hierarchy of the state government.   
27 Data was collected in 2010, one year before the Nigerian general elections in 2011 
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them were never interested in becoming farmers but were only selected to join the 
farmers training as an avenue to gain some temporal income as unemployed 
youths28. The participants also revealed that, their selection through the local 
politicians was in response of their support during elections. According to one 
participant: 
There was no formal selection process of finding out whether we had 
interest in agriculture or not nor was there specific criteria to ascertain our 
farming credential. The cooperatives and the unions were already part of 
the ministry of agriculture structure and we were mainly selected to fill the 
spot. No single member of the opposition party was selected to be part of 
the SONGHAI initiative29. 
 
The second formal smallholder collective action project examined in this research is 
the FADAMA project. The development of the third National FADAMA Development 
(FADAMA III) Project for Nigeria was to sustainably increase the incomes of FADAMA 
users. This followed the acclaimed success of FADAMA I from 1992 to 1999 aimed at 
improving infrastructure services for private sector development; rural services, 
infrastructure and administrative and civil service reform (World Bank, 2000) and 
FADAMA II from 2003 to 2009 that set its objective to ensure the participation and 
empowerment of rural smallholders as well as to ensure progressive rural policies,  
institutional stability  services and infrastructure at the rural level (World Bank, 2010a). 
The FADAMA III project was tailored along FADAMA II and focused on achieving 
smallholder participation and civic engagement in agricultural development; improve 
rural service and infrastructure30. A key component of the FADAMA III project was its 
loan and credit scheme to rural smallholder farmers through cooperative societies and 
rural farmers’ union. Cooperative societies and union are examples of formal 
smallholder collective action structure and have been touted by mainstream thinkers 
                                                        
28
 I met up with 70 participants when they returned from Benin Republic in May 2010 and also in August 2010 during a workshop 
on smallholder collective action. I had the opportunity of interacting with majority of them informally in a three days’ workshop 
specifically to find out if they intended to be farmers or if they saw it as an alternative opportunity to make quick money as 
unemployed youths. 
29
 Interview with a respondent from a smallholder group from Ugbawka, on 23 May 2010. 
30
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Proje
ctid=P096572 
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as ways to ensure successful collective action for smallholder producers of cash and 
exportable crops (Penrose-Buckley, 2007a) 
 
The administrative structure of FADAMA moves chronologically from the federal to 
the state and to the rural level through the local government councils. At the state 
level are the State FADAMA Development Office (SFDO); State FADAMA Technical 
Committee (SFTC); Local FADAMA Desk (LFD); and the FADAMA Community 
Association (FCA)(World Bank, 2010a). The status of FADAMA as a collaborative 
project between the government and the World Bank entitled the government as the 
key decision-maker on the day-to-day basis including the recruitment of project staff 
at the state and local level (World Bank, 2008, World Bank, 2010b). This research 
investigated the recruitment of the Local FADAMA Desk Officers and the decision-
making at the local government level and further examined the functional operations 
of the cooperative system under FADAMA 
 
Evidence reveals that both the recruitment of the Local FADAMA Desk Officer and the 
decision making on project support was not in line with the FADAMA project design 
which recommended the deep consultation with smallholder farmers groups in the 
decision making process to ensure participation and complete buy in. Enugu State 
has seventeen (17) Local Government Areas (LGAs), which in effect means that 17 
Local Desk Officer were to be selected for each LGA in consultation with the 
smallholder farmers who are members of the FADAMA project group.  
 
Rather than consult with the smallholder groups, the 17 local desk officers were 
appointed through consultation with the Commissioner for Agriculture and the local 
government chairpersons. Their appointment was a reward to local political support 
during the electioneering period and consultations were never held with the 
smallholder and neither was the vacancies advertised for interested and qualified 
individuals to apply.  
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In an informal interview, twelve (12) out of the seventeen (17) local desk officers 
confirmed that the local government chairperson appointed them as desk officers and 
they acknowledged that they had no previous experience in facilitating smallholder 
collective action on managing or working with cooperatives or union.  They also 
confirmed that they played a significant role for the party at the various local areas 
during the last election. The desk offices also confirmed that in order to keep their job, 
their continued allegiance to the chairperson is imperative. 
In term of the operations of the loan scheme, which is a key component of the 
FADAMA 111, the research examined further how the loan schemes were determined 
and the ease of access for the farmers. The local desk officers further that the 
decisions to grant individual farmers credit facility was rarely based on the smallholder 
farmer’s potential to expand and develop progressively but purely on political and 
party allegiance. In short, the majority of the beneficiaries were not full time 
smallholder farmers but other persons that exploited their political capital to access 
credit and invest them mainly in other non-farm related businesses.  
 
Despite the design approach which conformed to the mainstream perspective of 
whereby decision making are negotiations and agreed, the FADAMA decision making 
is hijacked with no consultation with the smallholder farmers. Decision on the 
management of the project was taken by government whereby political interest is put 
before the interest of the smallholders. There was no sense of collective action and 
the farmers hold no form of trust on the project. In some instances, most of the 
support also went to ward councillors that used their political positions to attract 
support for themselves individually. Many Ugbawka farmers interviewed were very 
sceptical of the FADAMA project and argued that they cannot participate in the project 
because of its political over-determination.     
 
Further interaction with smallholder rice farmers in Ugbawka about the viability and 
functionality of the government facilitated smallholder collective action through the 
SONGHAI initiative and FADAMA revealed a very distasteful narrative of how both 
projects were used as means of political rewards and not genuinely targeted at 
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smallholder farmers. All interview smallholder confirmed that initial attempt to group 
themselves into cooperatives during the early period of the start of FADAMA in 1999 
was not welcomed by the government. The government in turn constituted FADAMA 
group in Ugbawka based on political interest and more recently, the SONGHAI 
initiative also failed because it was also structured for political purposes. There were 
also claims by some farmers that their initial contribution toward FADAMA cooperative 
has not been returned. They accused the politicians of investing their contribution for 
private gains. At the early start of the project, farmers were encouraged to form 
contributory cooperatives that would collectively operate an account to qualify them 
for the FADAMA credit scheme. However, farmers became increasingly dissatisfied 
with the longer tenure of maturation of the credit and requested that their various 
contributions be returned. All farmer interviewed confirmed they are yet to receive 
their contributions back.   
 
Though all factors identified by mainstream institutional perspective on structuring 
smallholder collective action like rules, roles, characteristics of the smallholders, the 
type of crop were in place in both the SONGHAI and FADAMA projects, it still did not 
facilitate an effective and functional smallholder collective action. This implies that 
focusing on the formal and institutional structure of smallholder collective action 
without paying attention to the deeper socio-political and power interplay risk 
overlooking the important element of smallholder collective action in rural community. 
Factors such as trust, power sharing, participatory decision making, cultural codes are 
important in facilitating smallholder collective action (Cleaver, 2007). Despite the 
overwhelming data on ineffectiveness of smallholder collective action in both the 
SONGHAI and FADAMA, the project reports suggested otherwise. This is mainly due 
to the inability of the project evaluators to critically examine the functionality of the 
smallholder collective action under both projects and the over reliance on the 
technical and managerial details which place emphasis on ticking the box and not on 
real impact. For example, report shows that loans were given to smallholder farmers 
and that these loans yielded returns. However, this research found that smallholder 
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farmers were not able to access the loans, rather individual businesses in nonfarm 
related activities accessed and benefitted from the loans.  
 
The manifestations of the smallholder farmers’ action are linked to their social life 
including their interaction with non-local entities and/or government. As smallholder 
rice farmers attempt to function as a collective action unit, their actions manifest their 
strong belief in their social ways of life. Also, the proximity smallholder farmers in 
Ugbawka to the State Capital (Enugu) provides them with more advantages over 
other rural farmers in terms of access to externally facilitated smallholder collective 
action with NGOs and other donor funded smallholder initiatives. However, I observed 
that the motivation to participate in externally facilitated smallholder collective action is 
low compared to motivation for collective action initiated and nurtured within 
Ugbawka. I interviewed selected smallholder rice farmers (male and female) in order 
to identify the reasons for the low motivation in externally initiated and facilitated 
smallholder collective action projects. The key question sought to establish why there 
has been low participation of the smallholder farmers in externally funded smallholder 
collective action. The viewpoints of the smallholders were very critical of government, 
donors and few selected local smallholder farmers from Ugbawka whom they 
perceived to follow divisive project by donors against local initiatives.  Some of the 
farmers (whose names will remain anonymous) were also believed to wield better 
political capital than other farmers.  One of the respondents remarked that: 
Government is only interested in supporting externally driven smallholder 
collective action but not in supporting “us” within our means to organise 
ourselves very well and produce more. They [the government] are doing 
so, because they don’t have our interest at heart. The NGOs are not any 
better, they come here to tell us what to do rather than listen to 
understand our concerns and how we want things to work for us- anyway, 
they have succeeded in taking some of our few farmers with them- those 
are the people who are connected to government and you understand 
what it means to have government connection in our society. In short, we 
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think they only want to use us as a means to get more money from 
whoever is giving them money for these projects   
The respondent further noted that external development partners such as NGOs and 
the World Bank project usually come into the community with assumptions of how 
smallholders should organise themselves for collective action, the benefits of forming 
an association and the potential link to bigger market and more profits. But 
smallholder farmers in Ugbawka appear unconvincing with the prospects arguing that 
most of the externally facilitated or government donor partnership projects are very 
divisive, unsustainable and disruptive of systems which have worked for the 
community in Ugbawka for several years. One of the respondents cited FADAMA and 
SONGHAI as example of such mainstream smallholder collective project and initiative 
that lacked local buy in and hence failed to succeed.  Cases of financial contributions 
made to FADAMA project for loans and other assistance which they were yet to 
access for the past 5 years are part of such examples of erosion of trust. Many of the 
respondents noted that the majority of smallholders in Ugbawka were keen to ensure 
that community sense of belonging was maintained in a way that communal support, 
trust and mutual reciprocity was maintained. However, they expressed concerns that 
such cultural attributes that bind the community together might be eroding gradually 
due to the influence of government and other external NGOs who do not appreciate 
their way of life.  
  
The research also attempted to uncover the perceptions of NGOs based on the low 
motivation of smallholders from Ugbawka to participate in collective action projects 
facilitated by them. A respondent from one of the NGOs who pledged anonymity 
confirmed that they were aware of the concerns of the farmers which hinged of the 
inability of government and NGOs to include smallholders in the design of the project 
and the high expectations most development projects expect from smallholder 
farmers without due consideration to their technical knowhow, cultural background 
and most importantly their priorities. According the respondent,  
There are just too much standards, rules and regulations that “we” expect 
from the farmers. However, there is absolutely nothing we can do about it 
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because of the nature of the funding, which is streamlined and designed 
to achieve certain outcomes. We have to report in a way that would allow 
us secure further funding. But I can tell you that the farmers are also 
aware and they don’t take us serious any longer. Most attend our 
workshop and seminars just to get one or two-day’s per-diem31. 
The importance of the above summation and reference to social realities by the 
respondents indicate that informal form of smallholder collective is not a misnomer or 
an abnormality to the rule. However, it shows that smallholder collective action should 
be designed to serve the farmers and not the other way round.   This also limits the 
mainstream argument that reinforces designed formal structures, rules and regulation 
as the panacea to smallholder collective action, while recognising that informal 
realities must be respected in smallholder collective action. Social structures and 
power dynamics, relationships, norms, individual creativity are as much factors to 
facilitation smallholder collective action as information, incentives, rules, sanctions 
and repeated interactions (Cleaver, 2007). As discussed in chapter four, Trust and 
sense of reciprocity are important factors that stimulate and lubricate smallholder 
collective action in Ugbawka. That was lacking in the two case studies of SONGHAI 
and FADAMA 111 discussed above.  Some of the farmers also expressed their view 
on externally facilitated smallholder collective action.  
 
  Box 2: Responses on Externally facilitated Smallholder Collective Action 
Emmanuel Okechukwu – Male – 54 
Of course we very much like support if they come genuinely- right now, we are very 
careful about support from any agent of government or the NGOs. Last time, it was 
Fadama project that came here and fooled many of us. It has not done anything for 
us. The Catholic church is supporting their members with loan through Rev Fr. 
Mike Chukwuma but they not ask them to put down land or other things as 
collaterals.  After season, they pay back to the church and if you have bad harvest 
and unable to pay, everyone will know and you will be given more time in the next 
                                                        
31 Interview with an NGO respondent working in Ugbawka, on 24 May 2010 
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farming season or two to pay back. For the NGOs and the banks that support or 
work with them, they used to tell us that, they need collateral because that is the 
only way they can get their money back if we have bad harvest. This means they 
rejoice in our bad fortune and use us to make or save their money. Their interest 
was never to support us. 
Rita Nwoye – Female-50  
Every one of us is interested in support from government or NGOs but it has to be 
genuine support that does not attempt to create a complete new system for us. 
They have to recognise that, we have been cultivating this rice and supporting 
each other for several years. Any support or help coming from government or NGO 
should be to help us and not to help government or the NGOs. For now, that is 
what we think they are doing.    
Ani Emmanuel – Male – 40 
The past government (Chimaroke’s regime) promised to build a rice mill for us but 
up till now, we have not seen anything. They requested community collective 
support and effort and asked us to volunteer land for the mill, which we did. 
Government should be coming to ask us questions about our challenges. We have 
councillors, local government chairman and other representatives who are 
supposed to ask and know our plight but they don’t do so because they are now 
part of government. They have made several unkept promises and we are tired of 
people coming here to deceive us.  
Donatus Ogbu – Male – 60  
Government has neglected us completely. Although some people are posing and 
accepting some support, which we don’t know, where they are getting it. They 
know who they are in the community and one day their sins will find them out. 
People come here trying to make us think they know us better than we know 
ourselves- the NGOs.  
 
The responses indicate that, Ugbawka smallholder farmers are not averse to 
externally facilitated smallholder collective action. However, their concern hinges on 
the inability of external facilitators to recognise local realities and specificities. For 
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instance, one of the farmers remarked that, they are not asking to be given financial 
support for free. They only wanted the external facilitators to recognise that many 
farmers cannot afford the nature of the collaterals they are asking or hand over the 
sale of their rice to the external facilitators. When I asked why they couldn’t allow the 
external facilitators to sell their rice, in return for financial support or loan, he gestured 
a sign of lack of trust and the fact that, many farmers are used to their way and 
manner they sell their rice to meet their livelihood needs. They know the quantity to 
sell and the quantity to keep at different periods of the year in order to meet divergent 
family responsibilities which are also spread across the year. These are important 
dimensions that external agents cannot understand. Also, the issue of collateral is 
one, which many of the smallholder farmers found difficult. The reason is that they are 
scared that if they have bad harvest, they will have to forfeit their collateral.  
 
However, if it is through the church or through an “Isusu32”, the community or the 
church is able to know that a particular smallholder had bad harvest and these are 
clear because everyone would know. When such a situation occurs, farmers expect to 
be supported instead of being vindicated through taking their property away in order 
to recover money. There should be mitigation measures to support the farmer to be 
able to farm again and pay the money in next harvest period or two-harvest periods. 
There are provisions that the informal less designed smallholder collective action 
affords the Ugbawka rice farmers, which the formal system cannot afford them.    
 
Although, mainstream perspective on smallholder collective action often considers the 
realm of the informal as disorder and an exception to the rule, evidences suggest the 
contrary. Analysing local smallholder collective action especially in rural Africa is best 
placed within the realm of historical precedents of what have worked and what have 
not worked, how it has worked and what is required to strengthen what has worked 
rather than rejecting a system based on the presumption that they are informal. It 
requires accepting and analysing the informal systems and viewing their actions as an 
                                                        
32 Definition and discussions on Isusu are covered in Chapter four. 
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act of initiative and creativity, which could be adapted and utilised in shaping 
collective action future initiatives.  
 
Evidence from Ugbawka smallholder rice farmers suggest that it is in accepting the 
informal socio-cultural and political activities that we would be able to critically analyse 
and recommend a hybrid approach that would integrate formal requirements with 
informal imperatives. Critical thinking such as Nuijten (1992a) argues for a shift in the 
way of thinking towards what social scientists call informal, (dis) order in the analysis 
and discourse of local setting. Labelling blurs our understanding of the dynamics of 
organisational practices and the role of different actors involved in collective action at 
the rural setting such as Ugbawka. Attempts should be at understanding the meaning 
the actors acquire for different purposes and how meaning and actions could be 
configured to support smallholder collective action.  Schaffer (1986) argues that 
labelling people as “resourceless” and dependent says more about the discourse of 
morality used by the researcher than about the dynamic of the activities and as a 
result can stigmatise people and reduce their capacity to be more creative within their 
given and acceptable social setting. In her research on informal networks in Aba, in 
Abia State, Nigeria, Meagher argues for a blend of formal and informal structures in 
collective action especially in the era of globalisation where the weakening of the 
state has made the informal economy so pervasive and intertwined with formal 
economic structure (Meagher, 2010). Meagher’s viewpoint resonates with the views 
expressed by the smallholder rice farmers in Ugbawka that NGOs and Government 
agents that facilitate smallholder collective action should consider and utilise their 
experience as farmers and their understanding of the local context as community 
members when designing collective action projects. Importantly, the experiences and 
local knowledge of the smallholder farmers should be valued and not considered 
lower in sociological pecking order compared to the experience of external facilitators. 
In short, smallholders perceive that they are exercising legitimate agency within their 
environment when dealing with external actors(Chabal, 2009a). 
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A key argument of the Critical Institutionalism and specifically Cleaver (2012) on her 
analysis of Collective Action using the Institutional Bricolage framework which this 
thesis adopted is that  the formal and informal sectors need each other to survive 
(Chabal, 2009a). Informal institutions promote good governance in localities where 
formal democratic and bureaucratic institutions are weak (Xu and Yao, 2015). In other 
words, informal setting is not the preserve of those labelled as poor or marginalised 
but attracts people who are assumed to be deeply engrossed in the formal structure. 
Therefore, the functioning of formal collection action in Ugbawka requires prior 
recognition of the existing and functional informal structures that would support in the 
further examination of the micro informalities that transpire in the daily interaction by 
the smallholders. It is important to recognise that informal community structures are 
not static but adaptive and evolving with changing pattern of socio-economic and 
political alterations. According to Tria Kerkvliet (2009) rural smallholders do not 
accept the status quo but rather harbour alternative visions, value and beliefs on how 
resources should be produced, distributed and used. They continuously interact with 
systems; formal and informal to survive. As highlighted earlier in this Chapter 
smallholders in Nigeria and the area of study had for long been neglected and 
exploited by government and external alike.   This persistent complaint breed mistrust 
between the government. In several instances as discussed under FADAMA and 
SONGHAI smallholder farmers often suffer from agro-input sabotage, financial 
misappropriation and exclusion from their affairs by government and other external 
facilitators of smallholder collective action initiatives. In fact, most of the agro rural 
development policies from the federal government are implemented without the 
consultation of rural smallholders. Therefore, to understand the nature and type of 
relationship between the smallholders and the formal systems and structures I had to 
interview farmers as well as officials from the government Ministry of Agriculture and 
NGOs.  
 
Responses from both sides suggest that there is interest for the gap between the 
formal and informal systems and structures to be bridged. NGOs officer interviewed 
identified a number of issues which could assist them work with smallholder farmers 
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in Ugbawka better. Record book of association members, proof of togetherness 
(bonding) and other necessary documents would help NGOs and donor funded 
projects link up with smallholder groups. On the other side, the farmers remarked that 
recognition of already functional system; respect for cultural model of monitoring, 
evaluation and support as well as inclusive approach could engender collaboration 
and strengthen trust between the smallholders and external agents and facilitators. 
Farmers are always reluctant of NGOs and government supervisory visit, which they 
argue, take their reasonable time without commensurate result. They do not trust 
NGOs and government to be dedicated to the rigour of development a functional 
smallholder collective action that is sustainable and community driven. From the 
NGOs perspective, although they recognise the frustrations of the smallholder 
farmers especially in view of years of consistent failure by the government, they argue 
that smallholders are also not giving too much chance for an externally facilitated 
collective action. That also is the frustration of the NGOs, which to them hinders the 
opening of the space for collaborative approach to smallholder collective action in 
Ugbawka.  
  
In trying to substantiate the need for NGOs and government to recognise an already 
existing working system and structure, one of the female smallholder farmers who 
also engages in rice trading narrated the function of “Isusu” among selected women 
smallholder in Ugbawka as an important system which has served and continue to 
support the female group members from precolonial period to the present day 
Ugbawka.   
    6.5 Conclusion  
 
In this Chapter, I have discussed the origin and sources of smallholder collective 
action in Ugbawka as well as the theoretical framework for understanding the social 
and cultural aspects of collective action. A large part of smallholder collective action 
involves the workings of institutions, which contribute to or support this action, 
although in some circumstances, these institutions can be a focal point of resistance 
and contestation. As this chapter has shown, institutional collective action can have 
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the unintended consequence of actually limiting and de-motivating smallholders. This 
chapter reviewed how formal institutions interact with existing community and other 
informal systems. The analysis extended to the challenges of externally facilitated 
smallholder collective action and recognises that there can be a balance between 
what formal, structures expect and what informal systems expect.   
 
The Chapter begins with a look at the historical embeddedness of smallholder 
collective action in Ugbawka where it argues that smallholder collective action in 
Ugbawka is linked to the Igbo traditional way of life based on trust and reciprocity and 
anchored on the sense of community which prevailed in the pre-colonial period. This 
Chapter recognises that the role of informal systems and culture are a powerful force 
in shaping the understandings and behaviours of individuals and groups and offer 
significant insights into collective action because it does not view agency as a purely 
individual concept (Cleaver, 2007). This section emphasized the importance of 
understanding culture, including symbols and sense-making practices, and its role in 
shaping and being shaped by social organization and institutions. Using cultural 
theories to understand smallholder collective action in Ugbawka helps to balance 
against the assumption of rational choice that dominates the institutional approach. 
Drawing culture into the analysis brings in concepts like norms, relationships, and 
traditions and allows the researcher to gain a fuller understanding of the way that 
formal institutions could work in communities.  
 
The Chapter then moved on to discuss how individual agency is exercised in 
collective action through different institutions and examined which type of farmer 
participates in what form of smallholder collective action. It also explores some 
shades and spheres of smallholder collective action before dealing with how different 
institutions like family, religion and gender influences individual exercise of their 
agency.  
 
This Chapter also discussed the importance of trust in providing the framework for 
collective action and the role of informal sanctions rooted in the non-economic social 
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relationships that governed the behaviour of individuals engaged in collective 
projects. Smallholder acceptance of formal institutions like credit systems, trade 
associations or commission agents are often dependent upon trust and personal 
relationships rather than on a purely economic benefit analysis. The Chapter also 
emphasises that trust is important for collective action to function irrespective of 
whether it is a formal or informal form of smallholder collective action. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
191 
 
   Chapter Seven:  
   7.0 Smallholder Collective Action:  Complex Politicisation and Power Interplay  
   7.1    Introduction   
This chapter continues to provide a critique of the mainstream institutionalism 
perspective on smallholder collective action that emphasises the imperative of 
economic factors and the rationality of institutions in collective action functioning 
(Penrose-Buckley, 2007a). Chapter six provided empirical evidence to substantiate 
how crucial social factors are in smallholder collective action, while supporting the 
idea for a mixture of economic and non-economic factors in the considerations of 
smallholder collective action. It noted that the emphasis on economic factors often 
romanticises the benefits and gains of economic orientation. Chapter seven broadens 
the discussion on the need to recognise the influence of power in discussions 
apropos of smallholder collection action.  
 
Mainstream theoretical literature on smallholder collective action provides the 
normative discussions on the standard procedures for smallholder collective action, 
including its use as a means of access to market opportunities in developing countries 
(Mala et al., 2012, Bromwich and Saunders, 2012, Jones et al., 2012). I argue here 
that structuring smallholder collective action through a formal institutional process 
might not ensure participation and could lead to lack of interest in the system from the 
farmers. Power dynamics and moral question of trust are as important as other formal 
institutional structuring that occurs in smallholder collective action. There is also no 
concrete evidence that formal structuring of smallholder collective action guarantees 
to resolving the challenge of exclusion of some farmers. In fact, it could instead lead 
to high level of exclusion and disinterest when power dynamic is ignored.   
 
In this chapter, the complexity of institutions at play for smallholder collective action to 
function is illuminated. The factors shaping human behaviour in institutions are 
diverse, and, as such, social structures and power dynamics, relationships, norms, 
individual creativity must be considered. The considerable social agency of individuals 
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as relational, exercised consciously and non-consciously - individuals within complex 
social identities and emotions is examined in this chapter.   
 
The framework adopted for the research pivots on the Critical Institutionalism 
perspective, which recognises that Social structures and power dynamics, 
relationships, norms, individual creativity shapes human behaviour in institutions. 
From this perspective, power is an important factor in the determination of individual 
action toward a group and how individuals are able to creatively exercise their 
agency. In this view, a demonstration of the complex nature of institutions involved in 
smallholder collective action, many of which are socially embedded in Ugbawka, as 
well as the dynamics and often-contested nature is examined with practical examples.  
 
This Chapter therefore moves away from the narrow understanding that Information, 
incentives, rules, sanctions and repeated interactions are the only factors that shape 
human behaviour in institution. It recognises that social tradition and the management 
of power plays important role in the functioning of collective action. Importantly is the 
fact that power is relational and transient. It can move and change from one individual 
to the other but also depends on the ability of the individual to recognise the changing 
pendulum of power. Therefore, a recognition of growing importance by an individual 
or group could lead power shift and an emergence of a new power within spectrum. 
This chapter presents empirical analytical evidence of how such shift in power could 
occur and how such shift could alter the functioning of smallholder collective action.   
 
There is equally a recognition that decision making and negotiations embedded in 
everyday life are shaped by history and politics rather than merely by interaction 
conducted in public fora as opined by the mainstream institutionalists. Crucial is the 
fact that local everyday politics through which power is most exercised and contested 
at the local level cannot be delinked through crafting; design principles characterise 
robust institutions. Everyday life of smallholders is woven into the political fabric of 
survival (Birner and Resnick, 2010, Markelova and Mwangi, 2010, Tria Kerkvliet, 
2009).  The chapter attempts to address this lacuna and demonstrate how the local 
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space where smallholder collective action takes place is not as politically harmonious 
and devoid of politics. To be sure, the politics that occurs within smallholder collective 
action space are rooted in everyday interaction and ordinary forms of sociality, that 
are often about survival for livelihoods (Tria Kerkvliet, 2009).  
 
These local and everyday politics are often conceived as livelihood strategy through 
which smallholders at the rural communities express and exercise their agency in 
order to survive and sustain their social livelihoods (Ellis, 2000a). The legitimization of 
smallholder collective action in rural Nigeria is not only socially rooted but is also 
politically defined especially in view of the wave of liberal democracy that has 
permeated Nigeria since 1999 and the consistent contestation between political 
structures at the rural level and the installed governmental structure of power. The 
local arena for smallholder collective action is as political as every other arena of 
human interaction. This chapter therefore argues that smallholder collective action 
occurs in a political space through contestations, struggles and negotiations. Tria 
Kerkvliet (2009) argues that politics is part of everyday life of smallholders while 
Desmarais (2008) argues for the recognition of political struggle, informal alliance 
building and contestation as part of the everyday life of smallholders. Specifically, 
Nagel (1981) recalled the 25th of November 1968 farmers protest in Ibadan, Nigeria 
as an important element of smallholder collective action and struggle for freedom in 
the Nigeria agricultural trajectory. The chapter begins by exploring the importance of 
trust in smallholder collective action and how lack of it could set in motion intriguing 
politics of survival.   
    7.2 Collective Action and the Role of Trust  
 
Trust can be understood as an expectation of another’s behaviour supported by a 
confidence either in personal relationships or in institutions of enforcement 
(Gambetta, 1989, p. 217, Lyon and Porter, 2009). Trust is central to trading networks 
both locally and around the world (Lyon and Porter, 2009). In areas where there is a 
limited history of reliable state regulation and where communication is constrained, 
trust plays an even larger role in facilitating smallholder collective action. This is the 
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case in most of West Africa where informal trading and collective action is still very 
prevalent (Lyon, 2000, Holtzman et al., 1988). In a development context, trust plays a 
substantial role in engendering the participation of members of the community in a 
collective action project. Individuals who are respected and who, within the traditional 
social structure, are deemed trustworthy may have a large impact on leading other 
members of the community to participation and in overcoming resistance. Trust is an 
important factor of social bonding in Ugbawka through which social capital is nurtured 
and strengthened (Mbah, 1997).  
 
Trust also interacts with power. Conditions of domination and subordination do not 
lend themselves readily to trust. For example, in a situation where a commission-
agent or broker dealing with a smallholder farmer indicate a disparity of power, then 
institutional power is mediated by the web of social relationships that are rooted in 
traditions and norms (Lyon and Porter, 2009). The currency of these relationships is 
that trust is gained and sustained through shared understandings in lieu of 
enforcement of rules. Behaviour on the part of the formal institution that disrupts or 
damages the informal system would be detrimental to both formal and informal 
system (Lyon and Porter, 2009). Chapter four underscored the role of trust in Igbo 
society and how the occasion of Ofo mediate and foster trust among members of a 
community. It has also been argued that personal trust is the key to making markets 
work at the lower end of the trade hierarchy (Clark, 1994, pp. 228-34, Chalfin, 2004, 
pp. 225-52).  
 
In societies like Ugbawka that lack comprehensive market structures and weak 
governmental institutions, markets are inherently uncertain and personal relationships 
anchored on trust help to reduce the uncertainty. These relationships encourage 
reliable behaviour on both sides by creating a desire to reciprocate and by offering the 
threat of the sanctions controlled by the other party. For example, malfeasance in a 
transaction with one party might lead to a loss of business with that person’s entire 
network of kin and neighbours due to the extended consequences of lack of trust that 
transcends individual person to family    
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Trust is also an important factor in determining participation and engagement in 
collective action because the lack of faith in an institution will make it difficult for 
individuals to participate (Lyon and Porter, 2009). For example, the regulatory 
agencies in Nigeria, particularly in the food sector, are generally perceived as corrupt 
and lack trust (Meagher, 2010). These institutions are also seen as lacking the ability 
to enforce agreements with any reliability (Mustapha and Meagher, 2000). According 
to Bandiera et al. (2005b), lack of trust could lead to non-participation and resistance 
to the institution by the individuals. As a result, smallholder farmers would instead 
pursue other, non-state forms of collective action that are regulated through personal 
relations and other institutions like trade associations rather than congregate in a 
formal non-trusted form of smallholder collective. 
 
In Chapter six, four (two informal and two formal cases of collective action) were 
analysed. Both FADAMA and SONGHAI Enugu Initiatives followed the mainstream 
design and are supposed to function formally through established formal channels33.   
They are managed by the State Ministry of Agriculture and funded collaboratively by 
the World Bank and the Enugu State Government. The benefits for becoming a 
member of the association under the two projects appear very attractive from the 
project reports (World Bank, 2010a, World Bank, 2000). Members are supposedly 
guaranteed access to loan, access to fertilizer, use of state marketing channels and 
structure, access to Ministry’s agricultural equipment at subsidized rate and other 
state based incentives. Membership for both SONGHAI and FADAMA association is 
supposedly open and farmers from the local government or community where the 
projects are located can become members. However, despite the supposedly 
overwhelming benefits and the openness of the membership, evidence on the ground 
reveals that the motivation for membership of both FADAMA and SOGHAI is very low 
among Ugbawka smallholder rice farmers.  
                                                        
33
 The project structure was discussed and highlighted in Chapter six and showed structural 
arrangement from the central state coordination board through the senatorial zones to the 17 local 
government areas of the State.  
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This low interest and motivation towards the SONGHAI and FADAMA projects are 
based on two important socio-political factors. Historically, government relationship 
with farmers in Nigeria has been low since the discovery of oil and the neglect of 
agricultural sector, to which the smallholders belong. This is made worse by the 
pervasive corruption that has followed budget on agriculture since the early 1960s till 
date. For instance, annual budget of Nigeria in 2009 and 2010 has millions earmarked 
for Irrigation Dam in Ugbawka. This notwithstanding, in 2015, there are no signs of 
irrigation Dam commencement nor completion in Ugbawka (Federal Government of 
Nigeria, 2009, Federal Government of Nigeria, 2010).  
 
Related to the above is the challenging question of trust. Evidence suggests that 
smallholder farmers in Ugbawka view both projects as politically motivated and that 
government cannot be trusted. Historically, cases of failed commitment from the 
government consistently came up as the core reason for lack of motivation from the 
farmers and, based on those facts, the farmers’ perception of government collective 
action initiative is taken with a “pinch of salt”. Furthermore, evidence equally showed 
that there was no consultation with the farmers by the project coordination office 
despite project design. Decision and implementation plan were based on political 
imperatives. All the Ugbawka smallholder rice farmers interviewed on FADAMA and 
SONGHAI confirmed that no consultation took place, while the trainees confirmed that 
their selected were based on political recognition and that there were never farmers 
before their selection to become part of the project. 
 
The consistent failure of government to become accountable and responsible has led 
to some level of detachment of the farmers from the state. Farmers have therefore 
decided to rely on personalised relationships based on informal systems embedded in 
their culture. In this situation, informal personalized relationship is essential in order to 
reduce risk and uncertainty because for the farmers, cooperation is ensured through 
the process of trust anchored on the principle of reciprocity and fear of collective 
communal sanction. Such sanction typically stretches beyond immediate activities to 
other areas of community cooperation. The Ministry projects therefore demonstrate 
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that where trust is not assured, smallholder farmers are not interested in participating 
in collective action. Informal sources are vital for the farmers to identify whom they are 
likely to cooperate with.  Although they acknowledged the existence of formal rules 
based on state established authority, such rules hold no influence on the farmers’ 
motivation to work collectively with other farmers. This is in line with the view of 
Möllering (2005) on the duality of trust and control with each assuming the existence 
of the other. In the words of one of the farmers:     
 
I do not want to think that I could have made millions of Naira because I do not 
also want to regret any of my action if I join. Our relationship with the state for 
years has been based on lies and more lies. For me, I must trust the person or 
institution before working with the person of the institution. It is more important 
for me to protect what I have rather than joining up losing what I have worked all 
my life. So for me, I would rather join with my friends and family and other people 
I have connection with which I trust than joining because of the perceived 
economic advantage with joining the FADAMA. The government does not care 
about us and I do not want to increase my risk. If I join with friends and family, I 
am certain I will not be cheated and even if I am cheated there are trusted 
avenues for redress that are easy to access.34  
 
Another particular smallholder rice farmer remarked that participating in any of the 
project is a waste of time. In his words: 
 
Why should I waste my time knowing fully that in the end my membership will be 
hijacked and used for political purpose? Worst still how am I sure I will not also waste my 
money in becoming a member and my time in coming to wait for input or support that 
would have probably been shared behind all the members?
35
 
 
This assertion by the farmers represent the view of most of the smallholder rice 
farmers in Ugbawka and confirms the Critical Institutionalist theoretical position that 
                                                        
34
 Interview with one of the farmers on their relationship with the state and the nature of the 
participation in formal system of smallholder collective action managed by the state. 
35
 Interview with rice farmer in August 2010. 
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the agency is relational and can be exercised consciously and non-consciously within 
complex social identities and emotions. In some cases, trust as an emotional value 
added overrides any perceived economic benefit which might accrue from 
participation in either FADAMA or SONGHAI. The continuing lack of consultation by 
the project coordination office and the overriding political determinism that underpin 
decision making on the project equally validates the Critical institutional perspective 
that smallholder participation in collective action initiatives are formed and informed 
by history and politics and, for this reason, cannot be based on rigid decisions 
(Cleaver, 2007, Gyau et al., 2014, Lyon and Porter, 2009, Shiferaw et al., 2008).  
 
Since the early view of Olson Mancur that individual are naturally self-seeking and 
that collective action is rare expect through externally imposed incentives (Olson, 
1965), many other scholars have emerged to contradict that assertion arguing that 
individuals adopt not only a materially calculating posture but rather a richer, more 
emotionally nuanced reciprocal one, which are often rounded in socio-political context 
(Dasgupta, 1989, Gambetta, 1989). Trust is an important element in this perspective 
that played out as a core and underpinning factor that determined whether the 
Ugbawka smallholder rice farmers joined the projects. 
 
Trust is not straightforward, however. It requires the acceptance of certain level of 
vulnerability but also a confidence that the other actor will react and act responsibly. 
According to O'Neill (2002, p. 76), well placed trust is active through consistent and 
extended questioning and listening overtime rather than blind acceptance. Moore 
(1994) argues that personal trust is best fit in a complex social dynamic where law 
and rule are likely to fall short of expectation and formal systems are detached from 
the people. This resonates with the situation and lived realities of Ugbawka 
smallholder rice farmers. Although the farmers accepted that material and economic 
incentive are part of their motivation to engage in collective action, nonetheless they 
argued that rules are for individuals, who can decide to obey or disobey them. 
Furthermore, when engaged in collective action with people with which they were 
socially embedded, the farmers noted that collective action becomes much easier due 
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to the social linkages and the confidence that trust brings. Such linkages stretch 
beyond the immediate collective action initiative to other aspects of life within the 
community in a way that defaulters would be able to suffer reprimand in a socially 
constructed manner. Through observation and interview it was further revealed that 
the level of community grouping, extended family linkage, kindred, linage with the 
community crucial role in determining how different smallholder exercise their agency 
in participation in smallholder collective action initiative.   
 
Whilst the FADAMA and SOGHAI lacked the socially embedded factors to motivate 
Ugbawka smallholder rice farmers to participate in the initiative, the Isusu and the 
Women Rice Farmers and Paddy Traders Group did. The functioning of the Isusu and 
women rice farmers and paddy traders group relied mainly on social ties through 
anchored on trust. The processes of recruitment, contribution, access to group fund 
and support as well as fear of sanctions were based on two important values of trust 
and reciprocity. The women in both groups were able to tap into their social 
connections and cultural ties to ensure the solid function and stability of the groups. 
Their system of support which allowed for a member to access funds, even due to 
unforeseen personal and family challenges, recognises that individual circumstances 
are not always confined to standards and rules, and that the ultimate outcome and 
purpose of collective action is not simply to ensure efficient resources management 
outcomes but that collective action for the group is socially embedded and that non 
recognition of the social could lead to uneven access and exclusion from the group 36.  
 
Importantly, contrary to mainstream institutional arguments, motivation and outcome 
of smallholder collective action is beyond materialism and effective management of 
resources. They are linked to socio-cultural realties where trust, embedded in family 
lineage, kindred and other social units are crucial. Arguably, systems of social 
                                                        
36
 Mainstream perspective holds that outcome of smallholder collective action is to produce efficient 
resources management outcomes, while the Critical Intuitionalists are of the view that institutions evolve 
to “socially fit” and functionality may result in access to or exclusion from resources. See C CLEAVER, F. 
2012. Development Through Bricolage: Rethinking Institutions for Natural Resource Management, 
London, Routledge, CLEAVER, F. 2001. Institutional Bricolage, Conflict and Cooperation in Usangu, 
Tanzania. IDS Bulletin, 32, 26-35. 
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organisation based on culturally antidotes, determines to a large extent the 
engagement of individual in collective action. Imperatively, social ties are as important 
as economic benefits in smallholder collective action because it performs regulatory 
roles in informal collective action the same way formal institutional design perform in 
formal collective action initiative (Roberts, 1994, Mingione, 1994). This is certainly the 
case with Ugbawka smallholder rice farmers. As Roberts (1994, p. 8) puts it: 
  
All markets are regulated… so the issue is the balance between formal 
regulation by the state and informal regulation based on personal relations such 
as kinship, friendship or co-ethnicity. Personal relations that sustain them may 
under certain conditions prove more efficient in regulating economic activities 
than the formal structures giving those activities that are regulated socially a 
competitive edge over formally regulated ones. 
 
Similar evidences were also found in a research conducted in the Plateau, North 
Central Nigeria, where it was revealed that collective action among smallholder 
vegetable farmers are shaped and motivated by ethnicity and not economic incentives 
(Porter et al., 2003). Smallholder participation and acceptance of institutions like 
credit systems, traders’ associations and commission agents in Nigeria are based on 
trust and not potential economic benefits because moral question is an important 
element in determining collective action among smallholders in Nigeria (Lyon, 2000, 
Lyon and Porter, 2009).  
7.3 Smallholder Collective Action in Ugbawka: Everyday Politics and Power 
Dynamics  
 
“A system of collective action is a power system because power is a 
fundamental and inescapable ingredient of all social relationships”  
(Crozier and Friedberg, 1977, p. 27) 
 
“Power presupposes the existence of relatively autonomous actors 
endowed with unequal and unbalanced power resources, but who are 
never or rarely ever, totally destitute of power, since even the most 
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impoverished in this respect still have at least “the ability” in reality and not 
just in theory to refuse to do what is expected of them or to do it another 
way” (Friedberg, 1993, p. 251) 
 
This study accepts the above relational definition of power but also combines it with 
the more recognised institutionally embedded analysis of power. It touches on the 
relationship between the farmers on the one side as well as their relationship with 
constituted authorities vested with power. In the two relationships, power is at the 
centre of the everyday life of the Ugbawka smallholders in their routine efforts to eke 
out a living and sustain meaningful livelihoods.  
 
Inadequate attention has been paid to dynamics of politics and power in smallholder 
collective action and there are growing assumptions that when individual farmers 
organise together with others, they are often perceived as acting collectively. The 
issues of everyday politics that occur amongst smallholders is rarely the subject of 
scholarly interrogation. In most mainstream empirical case studies, power struggle is 
often presented to be between group of smallholder farmers and big corporations in 
an attempt to secure and negotiate better or higher profit margin. Mainstream views 
have described such power and negotiation relationship between smallholders and 
big companies as empowerment. The focus on output of relationship between 
smallholder farmers and big companies limits the space for a grounded understanding 
of the power dynamics within informal governance structure where smallholder 
collective action occurs. 
 
Attempts at analysing power only from the perspective of economic relationships and 
negotiations between smallholder and large companies limit power focus only on 
efficiency and output. It reduces the ability of mainstream participatory based 
approaches to facilitate any social change to the advantage of marginal groups due to 
the neglect of the underlying structural factors shaping individual interaction and 
participation in collective action (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). The dynamic of 
participation in collective action and the effects of power relations within defined 
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space for collective participation have consequences for who enters and departs from 
the space and has implication on shaping the discourse and in identifying who 
participates within that space (Cornwall, 2004, Gaventa, 2006, Cornwall, 2007).   
 
Scholars have pursued the complex relationships between culture, power and 
development in more rigorous and nuanced ways that point to how politics plays a 
significant role in shaping local development (Moore, 1999).  It should be noted that 
the term local is not used to mean ‘a site hermetically sealed off from relational, 
translocal linkages’ (Moore, 1999), nor homogeneous community (Leach et al., 1999), 
but rather an arena that engages in struggles over cultural practice that are 
embedded in social networks and governance institutions and whose nature and 
outcomes affect the nature of village-level power (Bebbington et al., 2004, p. 189). It 
is therefore important to pay attention to the local level tension, conflicts and politics 
because it is within these dynamics that initiatives can easily aggravate and expose 
potential complex situations.  
 
In Ugbawka, the political dimension of smallholder collective action relates to diverse 
interest, preferences, values and ideas that are both consciously sorted out through 
cooperation, conflict and negotiation and others that are impulsively taken. The day-
to-day accommodation, contestation and negotiation amongst smallholder farmers 
that take place within the arena of collective action in Ugbawka can be well 
understood within the space of power and politics, which are sometimes overlooked 
and sidestepped in analysis. The decisions to participate in smallholder collective 
action and the decision on whom to cooperate with are all influenced by everyday 
politics built within the power space. The example from Ugbawka illustrates how 
internal social structures are used to shape how people respond to different 
opportunities and aligns themselves to different forms of smallholder collective action. 
Evidence on how different smallholder farmers join farming settlement groups in 
Ugbawka reveals the politics of collective action.  
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Farm settlements are part of the family culture in Ugbawka (Mbah, 1997). In Chapter 
five, I highlighted how farmers often leave their homes and settle temporarily in a 
particular farm settlement during the farming peak period. This is done in order to 
keep the family focused on the farming task for a particular immediate period. 
However, decisions on which settlement group to join are easily made by individual 
families. It is also not entirely based on availability or ownership of land but also on 
other political factors. Evidence reveals that farmers lobby to join specific groups due 
to different socio political reasons such as the individual members of the group, 
proximity to the community, group leaders and even the desire to become a de-facto 
leader. Therefore, in joining a particular farm settlement group, individual farmers play 
different kinds of local politics.   
 
One of such politics is the politics of belonging. There is a general and community 
feeling of respect towards a de-facto leader of a settlement group because of his 
ability to command respect due to his level of uprightness. His command of the 
respect of others makes him the de-facto leader of the group. Therefore, in deciding a 
farming settlement group, individual smallholder first seeks to know the leader of the 
group if they are not part of the initial formation. Farmers thus play the politics of 
belonging, which revolves around identifying and attaching emotionally to a group in 
order to align their interest to the accepted norms (Yuval-Davis, 2006, Yuval-Davis, 
2011). In most cases, individual farmers after identifying the leader of the group 
embarks on a tactical mission to ensure that the leaders affirm of their character to 
become committed members of the farm settlement group.  For example, a farmer 
convinced his wife to become a close associate of the wife of the group leader so as 
to open a channel of lobbying for acceptance into the group.  
 
For example, a farmer convinced his wife to become a close associate of the wife of 
the group leader in order to ascertain the leader’s impression of him. The farmers 
noted in an interview: 
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For me to be sure that I will not be without any group for the settlement, I 
wanted to know and be sure that Ojiofo trusted me to be a good member 
of the group and that he does not see me as one who will create disunity 
when we get to the settlement. He is not elected a leader but everyone 
respects him because he has earned that respect in this community. So if 
he has a position against my joining the group, the others will follow him 
because of his role and how he commands respect. I also had to let my 
wife find out from one of his wives because I might end up stranded with 
any group37.  
 
Joining a farm settlement group by an individual farmer could also take exactly the 
opposite. Some farmers instead of attempting to please the de-facto leader rather 
sets out to vet the character of the de-facto leader in order to ascertain the level of 
respectability among the group especially if the de-facto leader does not command 
general respect within the community. They attempt to seek clarification on the 
personality of the de-facto leaders as well examining history of their relationship with 
others in farm settlement groups. According to Chabal (2009b), the politics that takes 
place before the formation of the groups occurs at the realm of the informal beyond 
the economic activity but also made up of socio-cultural and political facets of 
everyday life of rural smallholders whereby people through little action are constantly 
striving for survival be engaging in social politics that are culturally and emotionally 
rooted. Invariably, the power to influence their lives and engage in daily form of 
collective action as smallholders are not entirely tied to one actor (although an actor 
can contribute) but are embodied in a web of relationships and discourses which 
affect everyone but not in a zero sum game manner (Gaventa, 2006). 
 
Leadership and access to control of a group is also another important factor that 
emerged as a reason for choice of group or decision to join a group. During the 
research, I visited five rice farm settlements of different groups of smallholder rice 
farmers and interacted with the de-facto leaders of each of the group. I posed a 
                                                        
3737
 Interview with a farmer from Ugbawka conducted by Chika Charles Aniekwe in May 2010 in Ugbawka. 
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question to all the leaders to ascertain whether they will be comfortable to belong to 
another group where another person is leading the group. A leader of one of the 
settlements confirmed that the main reason he initiated a new settlement rather join 
an existing one was to ensure that he becomes the de-facto leader. He conceded that 
prior to this initiation and formation of a settlement group, the leader of his previous 
group accepted and allowed his ideas and initiatives. However, he was keen to lead a 
new group and be responsible for others. Another leader of the group attested 
identified opportunities to represent people in community decision-making processes 
as an important motivation to lead a group. It means that he will be recognised by the 
group if the group functions effectively and in unity. There is also the opportunity to be 
responsible for establishing trading partnership. This leader confirmed that, it was 
also an opportunity to establish trading partnership and relationship with specific 
buyers that motivated him to organise a new settlement group.  
 
The decision to start up a settlement with other farmers is for him to be 
able to use his social capital with some buyers in the city. It also provides 
you with the opportunity to influence other farmers’ decision but also to 
build trust and loyalty with both the farmers in the group and the traders 
who can trust you in supplying rice in bulk through the group.  
 
Another important political dimension is the deliberate avoidance between families in 
the formation of the settlement groups based on historical family feuds. Although the 
objective of the settlement is for collective action to enable the different farmers 
function as a group, protect each other, enjoy labour reciprocity and partake in group 
benefit through collective bargaining and trading, some farmers lobbied to join 
different groups to avoid other farmers due to historical family differences that date 
back to decades. As one of the farmers who cannot be named here (for ethical 
reasons) remarked: 
  
I will not join the other group because, I can never forget how his father 
tricked my father and used my father and the others to achieve his 
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objective. He is the same as his father and I rather spare myself of the 
agony than belonging to the same settlement group with him38.  
An important dimension to this is that the families who are not able to work collectively 
with each other go through different political schemes to create favourable divisions. 
Data from informal interview reveal that families spent time outside normal working 
hours to narrate their family’s version of the issue between the two families in attempt 
to consciously lure other farmers in their favour. Beside the family difference, power 
and political contestation manifest in attempts by smallholder farmers in Ugbawka to 
secure and control hired labourers from migrant groups of labourers. Some of the 
leaders of each of the farm settlements host migrant labourers from neighbouring 
village in order to exert control and indirectly determine who gets access to the 
migrant labourers, when and how. Historical details revealed that such attempt to 
usurp migrant labourers labour power led to labour gangsterism, which I examine 
later in this chapter.   
 
Examples from the formation of the farm settlement group shows that understanding 
rural smallholder collective action requires an analysis of the politics of belonging and 
partaking, which are closely connected to elements of proximity, reciprocity and trust 
within a network of people (Chabal, 2009b). The influences of family as discussed 
equally confirms that networking in local informal economy draws from family, kin and 
clan and there is often strong connection and struggle to protect what is perceived as 
belonging to “us”. Survival also depends on the extent to which individuals draw from 
collectives (family, kin or clan) and are able to protect their interest and as well draw 
substantially from other external opportunities without necessarily upsetting 
immediate networks of kin, family or clan. However, when there is an upset of the 
network, it could substantially lead to power play and collective action politicking. 
Therefore, survival depends on the extent to which people are able to draw on 
different networks without necessarily disregarding existing links through embedded 
relationship of solidarity and trust (Meagher, 2010).  
 
                                                        
38
 Interview with a smallholder farmer in Ugbawka, on 4 June 2010 
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Surviving and maintaining the networks and social ties in local community require 
great deal and exercise of agency in a creative way in order to not only sustain 
existing structure and solidarity but to also create and link up to new networks. The 
examples of farm settlement groups demonstrate the creative politicking amongst 
smallholder farmers in Ugbawka in a way that ensure the sustenance and survival of 
networks. It also demonstrates that people do not consent to power because they are 
not aware of it but rather because they are socially tied or socialised not to challenge 
them (Eyben et al., 2006). The action of some farmers through resorting to forming 
settlement groups in order to push their ideas forward also demonstrates that 
although people may consent to power due to attachment to socially embedded 
practices, they could as well exercise their agency by using power invisibly to resist 
existing unfavourable space in order to create and dominate new space (Gaventa, 
2006).  
 
While the mainstream institutional perspective might view this type of consistent local 
politicking and power as distortion and/or corruption to the formal arrangement, 
informal scholars, and other socio-anthropologists accept such local politicking as part 
of individual exercise of agency. In short, Meagher (2010)  argues that this is part and 
parcel of politics of survival in a disruptive setting occasioned by rapid liberalisation 
and weakness of the state. She pointed that in Nigeria, government abandonment of 
its roles and responsibilities has created opportunity for informal sector arrangement 
through collective action to thrive in a politically nuanced manner (Ibid). Chabal 
(2009b) argues that the important element of African social relation lies in the 
individual’s perception of who they are in a multiple and multifaceted relations, which 
links them to as many members of the community as possible within an ever 
expanding and overlapping concentric spheres of identities.  
 
The farmers attempt secure group membership through lobbying and by using their 
wife as channels or by building social ties to confirm their acceptance were all part of 
local politics design not to hurt another person but solely to ensure that there is space 
and opportunity to draw on different identities and survive.  This also goes to show 
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that Ugbawka people value and cherish communal sense of belonging and identity 
and are indeed using it as means of collective action. Borrowing from Chabal (2009b) 
an individual in Ugbawka is viewed as belonging to a community, but  defined by 
multiple identities, that shapes his/her social position within the community. In the 
next section, I will turn to examine how local politics manifests itself in labour sources 
through the dynamics of power and control. 
   7.4 Internal Politicking and Labour “Gangsterism” in Ugbawka 
 
In this section, I explore how internal politicking among smallholder farmers in 
Ugbawka provided migrant labourers from neighbouring communities the space to 
gradually structure and form a collective action groups in order to protect themselves 
and control “who gets what labour, when and how”. In this section, I bring the 
perspective of organising against status quo as a form of collective action and argue 
that the politics of small collective action can in fact disrupt and create further space 
for a new form of collection action. In this section, I use the case of migrant labourers 
to demonstrate how attempt to control migrant labourers by different farmers in 
Ugbawka led to labour gangsterism39. In this thesis, I use labour gangsterism to mean 
the organization of migrant labourers into groups to be able to respond to pressure for 
control from the farmers but also to be able to determine their wage labour, time of 
work as well as other labour incentives as a way of retaining power over labour 
supply.  
  
Many rural poor households see migration as a route out of poverty (Murrugarra et al., 
2010). Over the past five decades, the rate of internal rural to urban migration has 
been on the increase with an estimate of 800 million rural population trans-migrating 
from rural to urban areas (De Villard et al., 2010). The impact of rural-urban migration 
could be both positive and negative depending on who migrates, reasons for 
migration, duration and destination. Rural-urban migration could also change and/or 
                                                        
39
 In this thesis, I use labour gangsterism to mean the organization of migrant labourers into groups to be able to respond to 
pressure for control from the farmers but also to be able to determine their wage labour, time of work as well as other labour 
incentives.  
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have gender dimensions and implication on rural household (Goodburn, 2014, Davin, 
1996).  
 
Migrants also are becoming increasingly cohesive within a particular location and 
have used collective action as a tool for protecting themselves in any given society or 
community against exploitation. Migrant collective action and organising is often a 
bottom-up political engagement that allows migrants to undergo deskilling and 
‘complex’ class repositioning in order to become active agents and build class-
solidarity (Però, 2014).      
 
As a peri-urban community, Ugbawka is close to the state capital of Enugu and 
therefore provides multiple access for many rural migrants from other neighbouring 
communities. Its’ proximity to the State Capital equally means that young men from 
Ugbawka migrate in their numbers to the Capital in search of greener pasture, thus 
creating farm labour scarcity in Ugbawka and making is attractive for migrant 
labourers and expensive for smallholder farmers. Therefore, some of the rural 
migrants from other communities who could not make it to the capital eventually 
settled in Ugbawka as one of the closest community to the State capital. Some also 
set out at the onset to settle in Ugbawka because of the opportunity to become 
economic labour migrant in Ugbawka.  
 
Majority of the rice farmers in Ugbawka depend on hired labour. This dependence on 
hired labour made the migrant labourers an attractive proposition in Ugbawka 
especially for farmers who are transiting into mid-scale commercial rice farming.   
Although labour exchange based on reciprocity continued to exist, it has diminished 
considerably following the advancement in technology and persistent rural-urban 
migration of Ugbawka young men. The development occurred at the time when there 
was an increased demand in the labour force required for rice farming coupled with 
high dependency on hired labour due to expansion in rice farming in Ugbawka. 
Therefore, the gap created by the out-migration of Ugbawka young men created 
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another opportunity for in-migration of youth from neighbouring rural communities in 
search of wage labour.   
 
This migration trend eventually created a dependency syndrome whereby smallholder 
rice farmers depend on migrant labourers to meet their farm labour demands. It also 
created room for inward migration into Ugbawka from other neighbouring 
communities in continuous search of wage labour. In some cases, the older migrant 
labourers acted as masters and were taking new migrants as apprentice under their 
care. As the need for migrant labour was expanding, migrant labourers were gaining 
ground and solidifying their base as an important group in farming in Ugbawka. At the 
same time, some smallholder rice farmers who are mostly dependent on hired labour 
were also finding ways to tap into the migrant labour boom and were brining young 
labourers from neighbouring communities under their care. Evidence from the field 
data suggests that the unchecked migration of labourers into Ugbawka eventually 
resulted in the struggle for control of the migrant labourers by some of the rice 
farmers on the one side and the older migrant labourers on the other side. As a result, 
older migrant labourers began organising all migrant labourers into one group and 
started a collective action unit.  
 
As the labour was becoming increasingly scarce, migrant labourers exploited the 
increase in the demand for labour in their favour while rice farmers were individually 
scheming for the control of the labourers in order to be assured of steady labour 
supply. There was no cohesive approach by the Ugbawka rice farmers to engage the 
migrant labourers collectively as a group. Individual rice farmers rather engaged in 
invisible intra politics and power struggle to gain control of the source of labour.  
 
However, the struggle by the rice farmers to control the migrant labourers became a 
signal and triggered the political and strategic agency of the labourers who rather than 
succumb to the schemes of the different individual farmers organised as a collective 
and ganged up against the smallholder rice farmers in Ugbawka in what I described 
as labour gangsterism. Navarro (2006) argues that the process of mystification by 
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which the powerful use their symbolic capital to prevent individuals from recognising 
that their subordination is culturally constructed rather than ‘natural’ is temporal. He 
remarks that sociology transforms power because of its potential to reveal this 
process and thus liberates people from their misconceptions (Navarro, 2006, Eyben 
et al., 2006). Migrant labourers eventually recognised that, their continued existence 
in Ugbawka depended on their ability to organise collectively and wrestle power away 
from the rice farmers and determine their mode of operation, labour hours, wage and 
other conditions. They realised that their liberation and integration into the community 
depended on their ability to use their power at the time of intra-farmers’ politics and 
power play amongst the rice farmers in Ugbawka.    
   
Interviews with selected migrant labourers suggested that, as the individual farmers 
attempted to exert control over the migrant labourers, the migrant labourers created 
and organised themselves as a counter measure to the growing pressure from 
selected smallholder rice farmers who were keen on controlling the migrant labourers. 
Therefore, the migrant labourers formed a membership association and created rules 
that governed their interaction and engagement with rice farmers in Ugbawka. 
Structurally, they appeared loosely created, albeit the group rule was strong and 
commanded respect from all the members. Additionally, the labourers built their 
association on cultural affinity principally because the members were predominantly 
from two communities with strong ancestral lineage and also because of the system 
of apprenticeship in which older labourers recruited and trained the newer labourers 
to ensure their understanding of the rules and mode of engaging with the Ugbawka 
smallholder rice farmers. This case aligns to the argument of Però (2014) who noted  
that attempts to constantly control migrant labourers could engineer a feeling of 
togetherness and trigger collective action especially when the migrants are closely 
linked by ethnicity or nationality. This is equally supported by the views of Moody 
(1997) and Wills (2008) that opined  that labour and class-based disputes often lead 
to re-energised form of collective action among migrant workers against oppressors.  
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Therefore, through the association of migrant labourers, labour wage became higher 
and there was also artificial rotation of labour. Migrant labourers began to exert 
control over labour availability, cost of wage per hour as well as land size to be 
cultivated and also demanded additional incentives that scarce local labourers from 
Ugbawka are not entitled to. For instance, if a farmer hires migrant labourers, the 
household provides the meals for the labourers for the day; that is breakfast, lunch 
and dinner (dinner is served after working hour), but if a farmer hires local labourers, 
they are only entitled to lunch, which is served during the farm period. In separate 
interviews with the Chairperson of the migrant labourers, he revealed that, it was 
important to organise collectively as a unit in order to offer protection to each other 
from the Ugbawka rice farmers in Ugbawka who were politicking and trying to control 
them. He also confirmed that organising themselves allowed them gain control of the 
rural farm labour market in Ugbawka primarily because they are migrants and could 
easily be taken for granted if they fail to assert control. In his exact words: 
 
Coming into another community where you have no previous friends and 
where your only source of livelihood is dependent on wage labour, it was 
important that we come together at some point as a group in order to 
protect ourselves. So some of us who came into this community initially 
took it upon ourselves to bring our kinsmen and brothers in order to form a 
bond among us and determine who and how we engage with the famers.  
Right now we set the wage, ensure the there is no oversupply of labour 
and also ensure that farmers take responsibility for our feeding.  In short, 
in some cases we declare free days and on such day, no migrant labourer 
is allowed to work on the farm else the labourer would get reprimanded 
through sanctions. We are equally aware that, there is high demand for 
labour for rice farming in Ugbawka and many rice farmers are in dire need 
for labour for variety of work in the farm40. 
 
                                                        
40 Interview with the Chairperson migrant labourers, Ugbawka, on 12 June 2010 
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Interviewed smallholder rice farmers in Ugbawka corroborated the above quote and 
ruled out the impact of migrant labour gangsterism on their farm success including 
their profitability and productivity. However, most of the smallholder rice farmers 
interviewed in this regard conceded that, the problem of labour gangsterism was as a 
result of their inability to move beyond internal politics and power struggle, which in 
their view allowed the migrant labourers to unite for their own success. The farmers 
also cited the non-existence of a cohesive farmers’ association and how it could have 
helped to check the powers of the migrant labourers. In the words of one of the rice 
farmers: 
 
The migrant labourers are in control of the farm labour market here. They 
determine how and when labour is supplied and as well control the 
supply. They demand some outrageous incentives, which our local 
labours don’t demand but at the end we cannot do anything because they 
have organised themselves very well and can, unite as a group. I would 
not blame them because we allowed it to happen by not organising 
collectively enough. We have opportunity to work collectively, but politics 
and power are standing in the way. 
 
This implies that while smallholder collective action could become an important 
strategy for the farmers, internal politics and power struggle could negate their 
internal strength and expose their weakness to other external actors. This is not 
particularly surprising because, according to Tria Kerkvliet (2009), the lives of 
smallholder farmers are full of intrigues and politics that can rarely fit into or be 
interpreted using the conventional meaning of politics. It revolves around everyday life 
and struggle for existence within competing needs, limited opportunities and 
competing social and legal order orchestrated by new wave of development. 
According to Ellis (2000a) those struggles and politics are part of rural livelihood 
strategy and survival tactics in a context where opportunities are limited.   
 
214 
 
    7.5 Political Over-Determination of Smallholder Collective Action 
 
In this section, I intend to examine the influence of party politics and the politicisation 
of smallholder collective in Enugu State and how those influences affects 
communities like Ugbawka. This is to further justify the inherent politics that are part 
of smallholder collective action. This section further sheds some light on Cleaver 
(2012) framework on the nature of institution, form of institution, processes of decision 
making, model of agency, factors sharing behaviour and the outcome of collective 
action, which is much more complex and blurred and allows a mixture of politics, 
individual creativity as well embedded in history.  It is also to bring home an argument 
in this thesis which is that smallholder access to market transcends institutional and 
formal arrangement designed to get farmers to organise as cooperative, access 
market opportunities and lobby for high return on their products. This will be done 
through an analysis of how agricultural support to rice farmers flows from the Enugu 
State government to the rural smallholder rice farmers and how the unions and 
cooperatives that emerged in the state are products of political alliances and cronies.   
My view is that with such focus on rules, roles, institutions, formality, sanctions and 
rewards, we miss the opportunity to understand the deeper socio-political ties, and 
how power dynamics manifests itself. In making my point, I will adduce the cases of 
some government smallholder programmes in Enugu state to illustrate how externally 
facilitated smallholder collective action, with rules, roles and institutional formulations 
are prone to manipulation and politicisation. I have already examined and discussed 
the FADAMA III and SONGHAI Enugu Initiative.  
 
The political and institutional determinism within the Nigerian political landscape 
changed dramatically after the 1999 return to democracy. During the military regime 
that proceeded the 1999 democratic dawn, Nigerian society lived in fear without much 
freedom. There was no sense of accountability, transparency or rule of law. The very 
concept of government and governance was totally non-existence as the constitution 
was suspended by successive military regimes who ruled by decrees (Omotoso, 
2013). The repressive military regimes were not concerned about the plight of the 
poor rural dwellers but rather focused on the maintenance of the corrupt institutions 
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and illegality that sustained them in power. However, during the transition to civilian 
rule in the lead up to the 1999 return to democratic rule, political elites began to 
create party structures at all levels of government including at the ward levels, which 
is the lowest level of party structure in Nigeria and primarily located in various rural 
communities. The creation, and in some cases political proliferation of party structures 
at the rural level, triggered the emergence of rural political elites as political party 
representatives at the rural level. These new rural political elites assumed new level 
of political power at the rural level and their newfound power often contradicted with 
the role of the already existing village governance structures.  While the new rural 
elites derived their power and authority from outside the community through the 
various parties, the existing village governance structure derived their power and 
authority legitimately from the community. The power of the new political elites 
representing various parties from artificially decentralised power came from the 
political parties in the capital. However, the rural representatives of the party in power 
derived their power from the party and indirectly from the government through the 
local government. 
 
Rather than using their newfound power and political capital to attract development to 
the community, the rural political elite in Ugbawka viewed their political capital as a 
means of exerting power and disrupting an already functional governance system in 
the community. In Chapter Four, I highlighted how the colonial influences through 
warrant chief wrestled power from village governance structures. Here, I will show 
how the new rural political elites that emerged used the political power and capital to 
influence smallholder collective action.  From the perspective of the tiny rural political 
elites who held positions as ward councillor, chairpersons, or youth leaders, it was an 
avenue for vertical political integration and an opportunity for accessing input and 
other government support intended for all smallholders in Ugbawka. It was an avenue 
for class movement, an opportunity to join a different class and participate in the 
control and allocation of state agricultural resources as well as a platform to exert 
control and gain recognition from the rural population. Through the creation of rural 
party structures, the rural power dynamics transformed and shifted the power 
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pendulum and interplay in Ugbawka as the village governance structure; the council 
responsible for governing and making decision for the community struggled to assert 
and wield complete control of the village affairs due to interference and counter forces 
from the new political elite with support from the local government. In some cases, the 
new political elites used political links to the state party structure where the 
democratic support at the state level emanated to exert control over the village 
council. However, this did not always result in the outcome the new political elite at 
the village level desired. Such political grandstanding caused both intra and inter 
political conflicts in Nigeria since the onset of new democracy in 1999 (Ukiwo, 2003). 
One of the new political elites, a Ward Councillor at the time of the research, 
remarked that: 
 
As a Ward Councillor, I am elected to represent my people at the local 
government assembly and to put forward the views of my people. I cannot be 
held back by village council leadership who thinks I have to come through them 
in order to reach the people. I have the mandate to represent the people41. 
 
When pressed further on why he could not consult with the village council leadership 
on issues affecting the community, the Ward Councillor stated that it was his choice to 
decide whether to consult the village council or not and not for the village council 
members to make decisions. The Ward Councillor’s tone, response and demeanour 
during this interview clearly showed an expression of power tussle between him and 
the village councils. On the other hand, the village council leadership accused most of 
the rural political elites (including the ward councillors) of selfishness and lack of 
respect for the community. They argued that the election of ward councillors should 
be for the interest of the community and not to divide and rule the community. 
Besides, they noted that the role of the ward councillors was confined to 
representation and that the aggregation of views in the community must remain 
through the village council. Those views can then be channelled to the local 
government through the various ward councillors. The village council leadership gave 
                                                        
41 Interview with a Ward Councillor of Ward 10 Ugbawka, on 4 July 2010. 
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an example of how the rural political elites used their political capital to their 
advantage on State agricultural projects without allowing other farmers to benefit from 
it.    
   7.5.1 The Politics of Membership of Rice Farmers Association of Nigeria 
 
Some of the State agricultural project are the Agricultural Development Programmes 
(ADP), the Commercial Agricultural Development Project (CADP), the FADAMA 
project and the SONGHAI Enugu Initiative (SEI). The World Bank and the Nigerian 
Ministry of Agriculture funded the first three projects, while the SONGHAI Enugu 
initiative was a state government initiative with support from the World Bank. Rice 
was one of the value chain products under these project and Ugbawka is one of the 
foremost rice farming community in Enugu State. I examined the structure of the state 
chapter of Rice Farmers Association of Nigeria (RIFAN) and how information and 
support move around within the state chapter of RIFAN to the rural areas. In 
particular, I examined the participation of rice farmers from Ugbawka in the RIFAN. 
The field data reveals a clear politicization, membership and access to agricultural 
support and incentives in the state along political line. There was clear evidence, 
which illustrated that access to agricultural support services were tied to membership 
of the political party in power. The ward councillors from the various communities in 
the State including Ugbawka controlled who joined RIFAN from their communities.    
 
The provision of agricultural support services was also rendered in favour of three 
particular groups, including those at the state capital who were never farmers but 
primarily joined RIFAN to divert agricultural supports and incentives to political 
supporters, friends and families. These were the group I refer to as masquerading 
farmers with political link to the ruling party and with vested interest in benefitting from 
the project earmarked for smallholder farmer groups. The second group are those 
rural political elites whose newfound political power and class migration gave them 
unexpected rise in power hierarchy. Therefore, access to any form of agricultural 
support became another form of political incentives. Most of the people in this 
category were farmers in their various communities but suddenly became elected as 
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ward councillors. For them, it was an opportunity to showcase new power but more 
importantly to have access to government support for their farming without sharing 
information to other farming in Ugbawka. The councillors from Ugbawka belong to this 
group. The last group are the rice farmers whose membership of the ruling party 
became a means to accessing information and agricultural support. This last group 
were not councillors but members of the ruling party who were farmers in their various 
communities but politically linked to the ruling party at the community level. For them, 
their membership was a form of democracy dividend for their support to the party in 
power during the previous elections.  
 
The projects were designed in line with the mainstream design institutional 
prescriptions and strictly through an institutionalised collective action with formal 
rules, roles, characteristics of membership as well as rewards and sanctions that 
were to apply to all members. In contrast, political capital became a means through 
which agricultural support and input were shared and the support completely evaded 
the targeted recipients. This cases are in line with the arguments of Baumann and 
Sinha (2001) and (Xu, 2012) that suggested that when smallholder collective initiative 
is strictly designed to follow formal institutional structures and channels without 
consideration to political, cultural and social imperative, in most cases the support 
completely evaded the targeted recipients. Additionally, the FADAMA III and 
SONGHAI as discussed in Chapter six demonstrated how party and politics overrides 
smallholder needs and how the selection of the trainees, access to credit for 
SONGHAI farmers were based on political patronage.  
   7.5.2 The Politics of Access to Hybrid Rice Seeds 
 
Policies supporting smallholder farmers’ development in Nigeria since the colonial 
time till date has been inconsistent at best. The Nigerian government has attempted 
several smallholder development policies that were aimed at addressing the 
inadequacies and shortcomings that have hinder the improvement of smallholder but 
the result of these policies have been often been the same and ineffective. One main 
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areas that the smallholders have endured for a long time is in the area of access to 
rice seeds.  
 
There is neglect for traditional and indigenous seeds banks in some Africa countries 
even though it has the potential for sustainability especially with family seed 
institutions with capacity for collaborative links with each other to store, replenish and 
ensure long term conservation (Misiko, 2010). There is also reliance on new improved 
seeds through local seed dealers linked to extension services, NGOs and a new class 
of contract seed producers that abide by rules and regulations set by the formal seed 
system (Okry et al., 2010). Traditional, non-hybrid seeds are very popular in Ugbawka 
and the rice farmers there have relied on them for years. Over the years, Ugbawka 
has become known for a particular form of rice known for its cleanliness and quality. 
The dominance of rice as the most popular staple food in Nigeria has trigged the 
attention of the Federal Government in setting up seed research centres such as the 
National Cereal Research Institute (NCRI) in 1974; National Seed Service (NSS) in 
1975; The National Grain Production Programme (NGPP) and the Seed Policy of 
1992 (Akpokodje et al., 2003a). Policy efforts by the Nigeria government have not 
translated into concrete action in term access to improved rice seeds for smallholder 
rice farmers. In Ugbawka, the use of traditional methods of seed storage and 
preservation was prevalent, nevertheless smallholder rice farmers were very open to 
adopting new seeds and always keen to accessing hybrid seeds. This is contrary to 
some argument that smallholder rice farmers are averse to innovation and use of 
improved seeds (Collier and Dercon, 2009).  
 
Although, hybrid rice seeds gained root in Sub-Saharan African countries in 2004, 
access to them have become increasing manipulative, politicised and often based on 
farmer’s ability to either use his/her existing social capital or pay for use of social or 
political capital. In collaborative donor funded projects, participation in collective 
action aimed at providing access to hybrid rice seeds is highly politicised and corrupt 
and does not reflect proper representation smallholder rice farmers in the state 
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In order to understand the politics of access to hybrid seeds, selected smallholders 
were interviewed on how they negotiated access to hybrid rice seeds. The research 
revealed that at least 30% of the farmers used hybrid rice seeds at one point during 
the course of the rice-farming season depending on availability, access as well as the 
cost. However, the bulk of the rice farmers in Ugbawka including the 30% that used 
hybrid seeds relied on locally stored seeds. Farmers adopted hybrid rice for many 
reasons including the perception of its superiority over the local breeds, high yields, 
resistance to crop diseases and pests, as a risk management strategy and for profit 
making. As one of the farmers noted: 
 
I am very happy to use foreign42 rice seeds but I will not abandon our local 
seeds entirely. So I combine both of them because some of the foreign 
seeds tend to germinate and ripe early than our local breed but some of 
them also are not strong on the ground. So while I cultivate the foreign 
seeds, I also make sure that, I cultivate our local brand of seeds. So what 
I do is to cultivate the local seeds early before April and then foreign 
seeds around June/July. I also cultivate them separately at different 
parcels of land so that I don’t lose my entire yield in case of fungal or pest 
attack43.     
 
Despite the optimal level of acceptance and usage of hybrid rice in Ugbawka, the 
farmers accepted that they lacked the requisite knowledge and skills about the 
ecological and fertiliser requirements of hybrid rice seeds. Therefore, most farmers 
that used hybrid rice first carried out an experiment or trial before going into bigger -
scale cultivation.  
 
Hybrid seed users cultivated mostly for commercial purposes and explored means of 
accessing the hybrid seeds beyond the community. Evidence from interview revealed 
that farmers that used hybrid rice seeds in Ugbawka accessed them through various 
means including donor-funded projects, workshops and project seminars. Access to 
                                                        
42
 They refer to hybrid rice seeds as foreign  
43
 Interview with a local farmer in Ugbawka, on 27 May 2010. 
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these seeds suppled through government initiatives were based on the level of 
political connectedness and the capacity of the farmer to navigate difficult political and 
contested terrain that required assured resources and capability from the interested 
rice farmers. In order to access the hybrid rice seeds, a farmer needed in the first 
instance to be connected to one of the formal structures of government i.e., ward 
councillors, local government officials, political elites, civil servant in the ministry and 
importantly ministry of agriculture. The seeds were distributed to the farmers through 
governmental channels and access to it based on level of political capital and in some 
cases level of support to the government in the previous election. These seeds 
therefore flowed through different political channels and structures from donor-funded 
projects to connected rice farmers in Ugbawka.  
 
Farmers revealed that most hybrid rice seeds came from collaborative donor funded 
projects, which are mostly supported by government Ministry of Agriculture and 
international development partners such as the World Bank, IFAD or FAO and also 
from NGOs promoting the use of improved technology and agro-chemicals. I attended 
a few workshops organised by the Commercial Agricultural Development Project 
(CADP), FADAMA and other projects that target smallholder farmers. I also had 
informal interaction with participants who revealed cases of manipulative schemes 
designed to create artificial smallholder collectives in order to control seeds supply 
and distribution. In some cases, participants were hired to be part of the workshop by 
political cronies in order to gain access and control over participant’s benefits such as 
hybrid seeds and fertilizer. Evidence revealed that Personal Assistants, Special 
Assistants, or Commissioners submitted names of participants who were to attend 
planned workshops. The submitted names were mainly supported or hired 
participants who pre-agreed to participate in order to earn per-diem in return for the 
hybrid seeds. In most cases, there were no real farmers, but students, artisans and 
unemployed youths who masqueraded as farmers. The hired participants are pre-
informed of their roles by their political agents; as such their participation was 
schemed to increase their agents’ chances of securing more shares of the hybrid rice 
seeds. A few rice farmers who participated and took their seeds home confirmed that 
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they lobbied to be included in the workshop lists while others confirmed that their 
names appeared because of their political support at the community level. Further 
interviews revealed that the same politicians would later sell the collected hybrid 
seeds in open markets to the smallholder rice farmers at a very high price through 
their market agents. One of the beneficiaries noted that:   
 
As a member of the PDP ward executive, I get information on workshops 
organised in partnership with the government through the party structure 
and I also have the privilege of representing my community in some other 
workshops by my close association to the government in the capital.  So, 
what I normally do is to get as many seeds as possible and then sell some 
to other farmers in the community. When I asked further on access to 
sources he responded… No I keep information on where and how I 
accessed the seeds to myself otherwise the opportunity might not come to 
me anymore44. 
 
Portraying resource access and control as purely a matter of economic power ignore 
a number of significant aspects. The conflicts that inevitably arise over resource 
access and control are mediated through social relationships, cultural understandings, 
and emotional responses (Barnes, 2000). There are political and non-economic 
forces that affect the everyday experiences of smallholder farmers and strongly 
influence the actions they take in response to their government, NGOs and 
businesses that collaborate with them. The struggle over resources is not just 
economic but also political and emotional especially when viewed from a more 
empathetic perspective.  It therefore makes sense that a farmer working barely above 
subsistence levels would respond to actions that impacted his access to hybrid seeds 
in an emotional manner and would draw upon the support of his social group or 
network to secure livelihoods. However, such denial of access could also constitute 
lasting impression on the farmers that could in future hinder future collaboration with 
the same farmer due to the negative historical lessons. According to Barnes (2000) 
                                                        
44
 Interview with a PDP ward executive in Ugbawka, on 23 May 2010. 
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control of access to resources are often related to and influenced by local customs, 
conventions, and relationships that are embedded in historical antecedents. 
 
As a result of the locally oriented nature of many of these access issues, there can be 
vast differences among different groups within one polity regarding how individuals 
can gain access to resources such as hybrid rice seeds and how the 
access/ownership relationships are managed. In some circumstances, the reality of 
control is far apart from the formality of ownership. Even within one community one 
individual may own the land or the well, but another may have responsibility of 
regulating how much is used or which outsiders are authorized to use it. As a result, 
the social bonds among people of the same community may be more important to the 
network of resource access than the formal systems of ownership regulated by the 
state. This is what was obtainable in accessing hybrid seeds in Enugu State. It is 
more important to have access to political capital than to have all the necessary 
requisite credential to be a progressive farmer.  
 
Moreover, the highly localized nature of resource control and access, especially in 
rural areas, sometimes leads political leaders to actively cede control to community 
leaders (Baland and Platteau, 2001)). Instead of seeking to continually maximize the 
control over resources, some politicians have drawn on the resurging power of 
traditional institutions and other new form of local powers to allocate resources and 
also grant access to (Barnes, 2000). While it might appear anachronistic, to the 
mainstream institutional perspective in light of the above discussion regarding the 
importance of social relationships, emotion, and culture in resource access, we 
cannot ignore contextual realities and role of the socio-political forces mediating 
resource control and access. However, when the mediator is corrupt and politically 
motivated, the outcomes are less likely to be the desired outcome for the smallholder 
farmers. In a sense, there is less devolution of power from the government to the local 
governance structure but rather the government used political channels created 
through party structures to perform local governance responsibility. There is also a 
sense that the government’s actual ability to manage the resource at the rural level 
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was limited and that the web of power relationships in the local communities was too 
much to navigate. Hence it instead utilized the party rural structures to fill this gap 
without considerate analysis on the implications of decentralizing such power of 
management of access and control of resources on the primary target; the 
smallholder farmers.   
    7.6 Conclusion  
 
The analysis in this chapter explored how politics and power intermingle with the 
functioning of smallholder collective action in Ugbawka. It examined the social 
encounters and political manoeuvres in the (re-)structuring and management of 
smallholder collective action project. Field evidence was provided from three different 
projects that were implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture in Enugu State. 
Smallholder collective action from the mainstream institutional perspective clearly 
gives special attention to the formality and the rigidity of the rule (Devaux et al., 2009, 
Kruijssen et al., 2009, Markelova and Mwangi, 2010, Barham and Chitemi, 2009). 
However, institutions that shape interactions in smallholder collective action in a 
particular locality are complex, complicated and not amenable to technical and 
managerial rules and roles at all time. Contextual understanding is, therefore, very 
crucial and the projects used as examples demonstrated the weakness of focusing on 
design without paying attention to the individual and social actors. An actor-oriented 
approach is important to understanding rural development and the participation of 
different actors in collective action (Nyamu-Musembi, 2005, Long, 1990, Long, 2004) 
 
Smallholder collective action in Ugbawka was not always very clear-cut and simple. 
The complex interactions involved in the functioning of smallholder collective action in 
Ugbawka cut across internal politics and everyday power struggles, historical family 
connections and disconnections, labour gangsterism and political meddling. The 
practical interactions occurring among all the actors determine to a large extent the 
functioning of smallholder collective action and less on the rules and roles. Depending 
on the platform and context, smallholder farmers knew whom to act with, when to act 
and under what condition to act without necessarily subscribing to formal rules and 
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regulations that govern formal smallholder collective action. In short, formal collective 
action is often frowned upon and experiences and practical day-to-day situation of 
collective action in Ugbawka is an important lesson for the farmers to rely upon in 
making decision and not formal rules.    
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    Chapter 8:  
    8.0 Conclusion, Research Contributions and Recommendations  
    8.1 Introduction 
  
The purpose of this chapter is to build on the theoretical framework used in this 
research in interpreting the significance of the findings from the research as reported 
in the previous chapters. Whereas significant literature was accessed and reviewed 
during the research in relation to the findings, this chapter takes a broader scope and 
places the findings from the research within a global framework using the Cleaver 
(2012) Bricolage Critical Institutionalism Framework.  
 
In 2008, the World Development Report called for the institutionalisation and 
formalisation of smallholder collective action in order to facilitate the quick access of 
rural smallholders in the market space in a globalised market space (World Bank, 
2007). The WDR inspired new wave of smallholder collective action through formal 
cooperatives, unions and associations in line with individual rationality theory 
approach as introduced by Olson (1965)  and further developed by other scholars. 
Ostrom (1990) moved this thinking further and developed the institutional design 
principles, which is the foundation for the Mainstream Institutional perspectives on 
smallholder collective action.   
 
It is against this background that many Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), 
Oxfam among them, ventured into smallholder collective action projects using this 
Mainstream Institutional design approach in different developing countries. However, 
other critical scholars have questioned the rationality of confining smallholder 
collective action in rural setting within socio-political context into a design approach. 
Cleaver, for example, has devoted many of her writings questioning the Mainstream 
Institutional perspective and advancing an alternative approach to smallholder 
collective action (Cleaver, 2002, Cleaver, 2001, Cleaver, 2007, Cleaver, 2012). In line 
with Cleaver, this research questioned the prospect of qualitative transformation that 
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could be achieved through formal institutionalised smallholder collective action by 
focusing on the same six features namely: nature of institutions formation of 
institutions; nature of decision making, model of agency, factors shaping human 
behaviour and outcome of institutions in in order to understand how smallholder 
collective action, manifest itself at the community level.  
 
The intention of this research was to situate the practice of smallholder collective 
action within local context in order to understand the complex relationship between 
the smallholders and different institutional arrangements. In doing so, this research 
was positioned within a local rice farming community and interacted with smallholder 
rice farmers as primary research participants. The research interaction also stretched 
to other actors including government, NGOs, labourers, middlemen etc. who interacts 
in one way or the other with the smallholder rice farmers. In trying to understand 
institutional interactions with the smallholder rice farmers, the extent to which 
economic incentive and motivation supersedes other non-economic factors was 
examined. Through ethnographic data collection approach, the research examined 
the various institutional features  
8.2 Formal/Public institutions Vs Blurred Boundary of Institutions  
 
One of the key objective of this research is to examine and analyse the nature of 
institution at play in smallholder collective action. The main areas explored to gain 
deeper insight on the nature of institutions centred on the relationship between 
smallholder rice farmers and organisational structures and the farmers who interact 
with these structures in their daily lives to foster collective action. Cases of collective 
action which was examined showed that there is no clear dependent on either formal 
institution or inform structures. In other words, smallholder rice farmers in Ugbawka 
transcends both formal and informal structures. In some cases, some of these 
farmers tap into vertical and horizontal formal institutions such as the government but 
in other cases their interaction with institutional arraignment focuses on social 
organisations like women group, extended family group as well daily practices that 
cannot be confined into any institutional line.  
228 
 
The Isusu women group, which was a successful smallholder collective action and 
which served the member effectively is a good example of the blurry nature of 
collective action institution. The group operated based on socio-cultural principles and 
values. Their mode of membership, organisation association and method of reward 
take both formal and informal approach. For instance, while the group kept their fund 
with the treasurer, they also made us banks depending on the amount of funds. At the 
same time, while there was a clear understanding of how contribution will be shared, 
this rule was not inflexible; in fact, it frequently changed according to individual 
member’s social circumstances. In other words, the farmers are not confined to either 
formal or informal institutional arrangements but open to movement to either side 
based on circumstances. In some cases, formal institution has served the farmers 
while in other circumstances informal institution served even better even in impulsive 
situations where participation is based purely on trust and expectations of the other 
members without any design rules and regulations.    
8.3 Design Vs Daily Practices, Improvisation and Adaptation  
  
The second objective of this research was to explore how institutions of smallholder 
collective is conducted and formed- does the formation and construction of 
institutional of smallholder collective action go through crafting and design principles 
aimed to arriving at robust institutions that result in a blue print design that guides and 
conditions the behaviour of individual participants.     
 
The role of Ojo Ofors, respectable individuals, family, traditional governance 
structures, in the formation of collective action initiatives reveals that how existing 
social institutional arrangement continue to exist and endure despite the 
implementation of new institutional arrangement based on design. Throughout this 
thesis, I highlighted the inherent gap in institutional design principles and how efforts 
by governments, NGO and World Bank to lure smallholders into formal institutional 
form of smallholder collective action have failed to yield credible result in Ugbawka. I 
further demonstrated the gaps of institutional deign form of smallholder collective 
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action using the FADADA and SONGHAI Enugu initiatives. The thinking that 
designing a formalised form of smallholder collective action initiative will ensure 
enforcement of rules and reduce free ride only broaden the economic rationality 
thinking on human relationships. The concern here is that institutional design 
solutions based on the instrumental utilisation of social institutions to make 
smallholder collective action more effective, formal and functional seriously 
underplays, the messiness and complexity of institutional formation (Cleaver et al., 
2005, Wong, 2009). It sidesteps the process through which local smallholder farmers 
draw on history, cultural values, family and other political imperatives to craft and form 
collective action initiative (Mosse and Sivan, 2005). 
 
My main argument here is that, the World Bank and other mainstream pioneered 
approach to smallholder collective action based on clear and rigid line, rules, 
regulation and sanctions takes a rather more business approach and focused too 
much attention of the needs of the market rather than the needs of the smallholders. 
In other words, the underpinning objective was to ensure market survival and not the 
survival of smallholders as collectives. Focusing on the market imperatives and 
requirement while designing smallholder collective action initiative makes the socio-
cultural institutions at play at the local level opaque (Osei-Kufuor, 2010). It grossly 
neglected the uncertainties and complexities which are part of local realities in context 
such as Ugbawka.             
 
Drawing on Cleaver (2012) and other Critical and Post Institutionalist theorists such 
as Wong (2009), Franks and Cleaver (2007) and Benjamin (2008), I interrogated the 
formal institutional approach to smallholder collective action by exploring how official 
and socially embedded institutions shaped local collective action initiative. My claim 
was that official and socially embedded institutions interplayed to shape outcomes of 
community level interactions and smallholder collective action. I also found that within 
such interaction, there also exist conflict between the official and socially embedded 
institutions, and in most cases conflicts are resolved by individual farmers in their 
exercise of their agency.  
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We saw how the interaction between the local councillors and the village governance 
structure produced clashes and struggle for control of village authority and how such 
conflict produced outcomes that allowed Ugbawka smallholder rice farmers to align 
themselves in either side of the political divide. Institutions that operate and interact 
with other to facilitate smallholder collective action in Ugbawka are flexible. The 
governance arrangements that also operate within the community to shape outcomes 
of smallholder collective action were also not rigidly applied. They mingle with each 
other to produce outcomes that will address community-based problems. An example 
also was the use of several channels by the farmers to facilitate their entry and 
membership of farm settlement group.  
 
Therefore, the findings from this research has drawn attention to the blurry nature of 
institutions that facilitate smallholder collective action by arguing that they are 
interrelated and often overlaps in the function within the locality. They play 
complementary rather than disaggregate role. In Chapter five, attention was drawn to 
the existing solidarity in the village embedded in associational life through the family, 
religious institution, village council and associations such as the Umuadas, age grade 
and the way they support collective action initiatives. A clear example of the blurry 
nature of institutions and how smallholders rely on both formal and information 
system is also reflected in the way the farmers access collective action opportunities 
in the church without necessarily changing or adjusting their faith to reflect the 
teachings of the church.  
 
Chapter five also reveals how the community relies on local government council on 
some issues but on the village governance structure on others. There is no one rigid 
way but rather an acceptance of the ingredients that makes up each of the institution 
(formal and informal). For instance, the community relies on the village council to use 
the tax effectively but also relies on local government for attraction of development 
support through the councillors. There was also cases of how pre-existing institutions 
of smallholder collective action took new forms and new roles thereby blurring further 
the relationships between formal process and informal process for the farmers.  
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These examples illuminate the difficulty in the argument that the formation of 
institutions of smallholder collective action is or should be through crafting; design 
principles characterise robust formal institutions. These examples also point to the 
fact that existing social and informal institution were not just ad-hoc or spontaneous in 
nature as suggested by mainstream collective action theorists, they were and remains 
part existing social relationships upon which individual and collective action initiatives 
are shaped. The multiple function of institutions such as the family, religious groups, 
village council, age grade, Umuada, women groups are all clear demonstration of the 
differing roles of different institutions in community collective action. This also support 
institutional bricolage framework where old and new institutions could be combined 
and reinterpreted to solve community problems (Cleaver, 2002, Cleaver, 2012). 
   8.4 Nature of Decision Making and Model of Agency   
 
Mainstream institutional theorists argue that decision and negotiation is mainly 
through public fora whereby interactions and debates are conducted transparently.  
This research through a number of examples has demonstrated that the nature of 
decision making in smallholder collective is mixed. Decision making on collective 
action initiative are conducted both at group level as well as individual level. The 
diversity and multiplicity of actors interacting with different layers and channels occur 
at the community, family, age grade, union and individual farmers’ level. In Chapter 
seven, I discussed the process of the politics and everyday struggle for survival by the 
smallholder farmers. This struggle involves using different capitals to access 
opportunities and sustain their livelihoods. It also requires the smallholders to assess 
opportunity that occurs in their daily lives based on history and other socio-political 
considerations. For instance, decision on which farm settle to join is based on 
historical antecedents based on individual interaction with each as well as political 
considerations. Some farmer was able to navigate through the huddles of deciding 
which farm settle to join and which one to avoid by drawing on their individual 
relationships but also on their historical knowledge of the different families that make 
up each of the settlement group.   
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In the same line, the intriguing politicking to control migrant labourers and the 
eventual organisation of the labourers went through both individual and group 
negotiation process. Some labourers negotiated and decided on the nature of the 
relationship with smallholder rice farmers at individual level by engaging their various 
apprentices and persuaded them to join in organising for a united labourers’ union, 
other decided during labourers’ meetings. The Isusu group as well as the women 
trader group equal demonstrates that membership’s decision is negotiated and 
decided at individual level and accepted at group level. The vetting process involved 
shows that older members are entrusted with the responsibility to vet a new member.       
These examples demonstrate that decision making in smallholder collective action 
are not always conduced openly in full public glare. It involves complex rubrics of 
individual interactions which are often fuzzy, continuously negotiable and 
unpredictable (Cleaver, 2012, Cleaver, 2002). Focusing on the everyday interaction 
amongst the various smallholder rice farmers as well as with other actors within and 
beyond the community, this thesis has shown the messy and contested nature of 
collective action highlighting the consistent and constant process of negotiation 
among conflicting interest in Ugbawka and between the smallholder farmers and 
other actors (Mehta et al., 2001). The internal struggle and control over community 
decision making processes, the variation in outcome of decision among different 
farmers, the contestation and struggle over farm inputs, the individual scheming for 
control of migrant labourers and the protection of sources of information reveals the 
political nature of negotiation and decision making in smallholder collective action.  
 
My findings also illuminate the relational nature of agency in collective action. 
Attempts by mainstream institutional theorists to conceptualise agency as deliberate 
public participation in decision-making and collective action are unhelpfully narrow 
(Cleaver, 2007). The process of decision making by the smallholder rice farmers in 
Ugbawka are not always strategically designed for economic gains or to outwit 
another actor. The practice of smallholder collective action revealed through cases of 
everyday lives of the farmers that institutions shape the behaviour of individuals in 
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different ways.  Individuals agency can be exercised consciously & non-consciously 
involving an outpouring of complex social identities & emotions. The reality is that 
smallholder rice farmers in Ugbawka are influenced and motivated by different arrays 
and layers of factors. Economic benefits and incentives are much a good reason to 
engage in collective action as much as socio-cultural imperatives.  
 
Mainstream collective action policies that often tends to view individual as rational 
strategist and relies more on their idea of bonded rational individual who may exhibit 
behaviour on a spectrum from ‘‘saint’’ to ‘‘sinner’’, from ‘‘rational egoist’’ to 
‘‘conditional cooperator’’ (Ostrom, 2005).  Heavily reliant on institutions as the analytic 
lens through which smallholder farmers’ behaviour can be understood, ignore the 
social/historical/political formation and location of individuals (Agrawal, 2005, 
Mollinga, 2001). Categorising people either as rule makers or rule followers tends to 
equate agency with decision making thereby focusing more on the choices that 
people make rather than their ability to make those choices (Ostrom, 2005). The case 
of FADAMA and SONGHAI implementation and the level of participation of actual 
smallholders show that even in the face of economic incentives farmers could value 
socio incentive such as trust are more important that material benefit. The ability of 
the farmers to reject membership of collective action initiative based on perceived 
sense of mistrust, historical antecedents as well as other political factors suggest that 
agency is more than just choice we make. Throughout the thesis, the farmers have 
shown their capacity and power to be the originator of acts as purposive, reflective as 
well as intuitive actors.  
 
Data has shown that mainstream thinking on formal institutionalised form of collective 
action is overly optimistic and their expectation of agency based on individual actors 
as rational and strategic actors is unrealistic and ignore complex social realities of the 
society, the differences and social structures that shape human action. The 
discussion and interviews from respondents revealed a huge link between individual 
subjectivity, interactions and actions. This supported the argument that attempt to 
alter human behaviours through institutional and hierarchical organizations in not very 
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practical – individual actions depends on subjectivities of those undergoing regulation 
(Agrawal, 2005). 
 
In understating participation and non-participation in the formal collective action, the 
study equally explored the motivation for action, the effect of individual agency and 
factors that shape agency within a particular context in order to gain insight into how 
agency shape the actions of smallholder rice farmers in Ugbawka to participate and 
engage in collective action. The thesis argued that social actors operate in contextual 
identity and within a complex life in which they engage with diverse and multiple 
actors in plural spaces based on diverse motivations and the structural constraints 
that could shape their action in a purposive or impulsive manner (Giddens, 1984). The 
array of mixed interactions involving diverse actors and institutions makes for 
unpredictability and un-patterned behaviour from smallholders (Barkin, 2010).  
 
Therefore, in this thesis, I recognise that human agency is shaped by rationality 
consisting of self-consciousness, reflection, intention, purpose and meaning (Rapport 
and Overing, 2000). This is also why Cleaver (2007) contents that agency does not 
exist in a vacuum but is exercised in a social world in which structure shapes the 
opportunities and resources available to individuals, and where appropriate ways of 
being and behaving are not simply a matter of individual choice. Thus there is a 
duality of individuality and rationality that requires balancing between enablement and 
constraint due the variation resulting from the exercise of agency (Giddens, 1984, 
Long and Long, 1992). The daily processes of collective action among the 
smallholders involves dealing with structural constraints but also the non-reflexive 
everyday actions with intended and unintended outcomes. Furthermore, different 
motivation shapes the actions of the individual farmers and these motivations are 
derived both from the need to increase financial and economic opportunities as well 
the desire to hold and defend social values and virtues. 
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8.5 Human Behaviour and the Outcomes of Collective Action 
    
The last two objectives of the thesis questioned and examined factors shaping human 
behaviour and the overall outcome of institutions. The study sought to find out how 
the behaviour of the farmers are shaped in collective action initiatives.  Are the 
relationships between and amongst the farmers shaped by information, incentives, 
rules, sanctions and repeated interactions or are there embedded within social 
structures and power dynamics and shaped by relationships, norms and individual 
creativity?  
 
In Chapter two, the thesis showed how the mainstream conceptualisation of collective 
action and the factors that shape individual behaviour in collective is confined to rules, 
sanctions, rewards and other controlled factors aimed at getting particular designed 
outcomes. However, as this study has shown, such a conceptualisation of human 
behaviour in line with designed principles based on rules and sanction failed to 
recognise the power play associated with collective action functioning. In Chapter four 
the study illustrated the importance of social factors in Igbo society in general and 
collective action in particular. The study showed how trust and reciprocity are valued 
as well as forms the social rubrics of the Igbos and Ugbawka community. The 
analysis extended to the value attached to Ofor in Igbo society and the sense of 
responsibility on the shoulder of an Ofor title holder in Igbo society. The respect and 
reverence attached to the title holder reveals the social embedded nature of collective 
action and how rule and sanctions can play secondary role in bringing individuals to 
obedience. It also illustrates the conscious attempts made by community people to 
sustain their social values and draw inferences and rules from them. The 
perseverance of such social values becomes important for smallholder farmer in 
Ugbawka in their interaction with one another more than any formal rules backed by 
sanctions. 
 
The argument in Chapters Six and Seven further questioned the technocratic and 
formal approach to smallholder collective action by arguing that individual behaviour 
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is informed by a variety of factors that cannot easily be controlled by rules. The study 
reveals that individual smallholder farmers followed certain pattern of behaviour that 
favours and ensure livelihood sustainability, while at the time open to change in the 
face of fluid circumstances. The SONGHAI Enugu Initiative demonstrated that even in 
the face of rules and sanctioned politics somethings override rules and sanctions. 
Chapter seven also showed how the politics of access to hybrid rice seeds defied the 
design principles rules but was rather based on political capital. On the other side the 
grouping by the migrant labourers equally showed how rules can be used to control 
and govern certain homogenous groups of persons. Individual behaviour and reaction 
depends on their expectations and the belief that the individual has in that particular 
system or authority. The study has also shown that people consciously or non-
reflexively relied on diverse authority structures to solve their problems and participate 
in collective action. From engaging in inter family negotiation to reaching out to 
leaders, there are many cases of varied behavior of the famer that were not controlled 
by rules as vice versa.  
 
The research has shown that the outcomes of smallholder collective action are mixed. 
Ideas in mainstream view on collective action claims that collective action institutions 
are crafted to specifically produce efficient resources management outcomes through 
the creating of structures that would control and ensure that actors and stakeholder 
play by agreed rules (Penrose-Buckley, 2007a). Such approach also claims that the 
crafting of institution will equally result to equitable sharing of resources, information, 
benefits, risk and costs (Markelova et al., 2009, Devaux et al., 2009, Barham and 
Chitemi, 2009). However, as has been shown throughout this study, such 
conceptualisation of collective action is narrow and problematic as it fails to recognise 
the multiple layers of expectations and outcomes. And because smallholder collective 
action is not particularly motivated only by economic incentives, expectations and 
outcomes also strives to achieve social recognitions. Collective action institutions also 
evolve to “socially fit” – its functionality may result in access to or exclusion from 
resources and does not always guarantee equal participation  (Cleaver, 2012, 
Cleaver, 2002). The sceptism at which non catholic look at the collective action 
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initiative underscore the religious acceptance and imperatives for such collective 
action.  
It has been argued that development approaches that draw on participation may fail 
to transform the way things are done within the community due to the underlying 
socially embedded institutions that are informed by values, beliefs and practices that 
have to do with the mode of social relations (Platteau and Abraham, 2002, p. 19). 
This suggests that these socially embedded principles that shape collective action 
and other community practices have historical and cultural roots that have endured 
over time and cannot be uprooted quickly by an external form that have consistently 
proved ineffective. Therefore, if formal institutional smallholder collective is to achieve 
its intended purpose and objective, it needs to embrace and accept the socio-cultural 
and deep-rooted aspect of the community life that has and will continue to shape 
community life. This therefore means an acceptance of the need to contextualize the 
design of smallholder collective action projects.  
 
In addition, smallholder collective action projects should also accept the flexibility 
needed to survive in local community and accept the community way of organizing 
rooted in complex and intricate way of life are always going to interfere. Adoption of 
flexible approach is best suited to prepare facilitators of such collective action project 
to adapt to unforeseen changes that crop up from cultural practices because a 
society‘s formal institutions must resonate with its shared habits and widely 
understood practices if they are to promote stability and development. 
    8.6   Thesis Contribution 
 
Literature on collective action has grown since the thesis by Olson Mancur, which 
focused on rationalising the action of individuals in collective action (Olson, 1965).  
Theories on collective action have grown since then cutting across different academic 
and scholarly disciplines ranging from economics, to social movement and to political 
organising. It has also stretched to community development, international 
development and participation as well as to agriculture and development.  Different 
scholars from different schools of thoughts have attempted to provide measured 
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insight on how collective action work amount different people. Some have interpreted 
it from the economic angle while others attempted to blend in the non-economic 
aspect.   
 
With specific focus on smallholder collective action, most of the literature that followed 
the 2008 World Development Report Bank(World Bank, 2007), attempted to interpret 
smallholder collective action from a formal institutional design viewpoint and often 
equate smallholder collective action to produce organisation and farmers union 
(Penrose-Buckley, 2007b) and ignored the informal form of smallholder collective 
action that are based on and rooted in informal social bonding and practices. 
Accordingly, this thesis sought to contribute to knowledge in the following ways: 
 
First, the findings will provoke more debates that is expected to provide nuanced 
understanding of smallholder collective action in rural communities but highlight the 
complex and intricate admixture of interactions and relationships that shape 
smallholder collective action. Smallholder collective action remains a recognised way 
of ensuring cooperation between smallholders in different communities. Therefore, 
exploring the complexities of smallholder collective action beyond the one offered by 
the mainstream institutionalism offered a deeper understanding and reflection on why 
smallholder collective action has continued to pose challenge to external facilitators of 
collective action projects and why there have been sustainability concerns of such 
project. This is due to its external imposition nature that is not reflective of local norms 
and practices but based on externally driven idea of controlling individual actors in the 
system.   
The study offers policy maker an opportunity to rethink the practice of smallholder 
collective action as part of broader poverty reduction agenda. The mix of both 
descriptive and critical analysis in this study provided the platform for understanding 
the theoretical and empirical opportunity for the advancement of smallholder collective 
action and the need to harmonise the various perspectives for a more nuanced 
approach.  
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The study raises concern on the possible generalisation of these project outcomes 
and argued for context specific approach to smallholder collective action. By 
highlighting the need to focus on the context and actors rather than the system, the 
study enriches the data and debate on smallholder collective action in a way that 
could lead to new research investigations on the challenges and not on telling 
successful stories. 
 
Fourth, this thesis underscores the importance of understanding historical practices 
as a way of understanding important current and contemporary approaches. The 
study in essence tasks researchers to look beyond the formal system in order to 
ensure an understanding of the informal system; it encourages researchers to 
embrace informality as a way of life and not as an anomaly in the life of a community. 
Therefore, this study attempted to fill the gaps of the mainstream institutionalism while 
contributing to the general debate on collective action through the everyday life of 
Ugbawka smallholder farmers in Enugu State, Nigeria.  
    8.7 Implications for Future Research 
 
This study revealed that smallholder collective action is more complex than the 
mainstream institutional view appears to suggest and that it requires an 
understanding of the context as well as the acceptance of the role of social and 
political factor in shape the outcome of smallholder collective action. On motivation, 
the study found out that economic and noneconomic incentives are important 
motivational factors in smallholder collective action. While capital and prospect of 
improved economic return could motivate a farmer to participate in smallholder 
collective action, noneconomic incentives like community practice and trust could 
influence the decision of a farmer to either participate or not.  
 
The researcher also found out that smallholder farmer accepts both formal and 
informal form of smallholder collective action albeit at different levels. Everyday life of 
smallholders in Ugbawka are shaped consciously and unconsciously by diverse 
institutional arrangements which could be formal or informal and their interactions with 
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these institutions could be purposive or impulsive. Therefore, it is not easy to always 
predict and/or condition smallholder farmers to act in a certain manner based on 
institutional and formal system requirements. Therefore, interactions with institutions 
are not predetermined nor controlled. Smallholder farmers are at liberty to select 
which institution they like to interact with at any given time depending on their interest 
and in some cases livelihood needs (Berry, 1989). People based on their subjective 
values had the agency to decide on which institutions to use to shape their everyday 
interactions (Osei-Kufuor, 2010). 
 
The reality in the communities is that institutions interact with each other. Formal and 
informal institutions cross paths to shape outcome at the local level. These 
interactions are sometimes intended but also unintended or as a result of policy 
outcome, which could be to resolve existing institutional conflict or advance policy 
prescriptions that concern both sides of the institutional divide. Therefore, it is 
important that smallholder collective action place more emphasis on understanding of 
informal system, socio-cultural and political factors as well as the formal sectors that 
puts emphasis on economic rationality based on design rule. Further research could 
then attempt to examine the possibility of building linkage between informal and 
formal form of smallholder collective action. It could require institutions that promote 
the effective nesting that could bridge the gap between formal and informal 
institutions. Institutional form involving both formal and informal governance 
mechanism are the norm because they make possible to accommodate the interest of 
both strong and weak powers as well as capture the rubrics of both traditional and 
modern systems (Stone, 2011, p. 33). Informal governance is as legitimate as formal 
governance and should not be viewed as disorder and abnormality to the functioning 
of the system.  
Understanding this crosscutting nature of formal and informal forms of governance in 
collective action is important for policy makers and institutions like the World Bank 
and Oxfam in designing future collective action projects for smallholder farmers. 
People attach importance to the formal system but also recognize the role of the 
informal traditional society in shaping their life. Designing a framework that supports 
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access to formal institutions as well as informal traditional could bridge the wide gap 
between formal smallholder collective action and the social embedded informal 
smallholder collective action that depend largely on social values and cultures to 
survive. Social actors as well do not necessarily subscribe to formal institutions or 
informal institutions; they rely on both to mediate their mundane interactions. This 
supports the argument of the critical intuitionalism on the importance of understanding 
context and underlying principles and social effects of institutions and not merely their 
visible forms(Cleaver, 2002). An understanding of the context, the content as well as 
the roles of the various institutions at play, helps in shaping our understanding of the 
functioning of collective action within a particular society. There is no one right 
institutional fix but rather an acceptance of the mix that matters and makes 
governance right (Rhodes, 1997). Therefore, designing collective action projects that 
incorporate individual subjective values and social context into the process of 
institutionalising smallholder collective action will result in greater understanding of 
the complexity and heterogeneity of the local context. In particular, designing 
smallholder collective action projects should consider history of existing social 
relationship, the ongoing struggles and contestations over power and resources within 
the locality and among diverse individuals. The diverse institutional channels that 
shape agency for different people, then, the dynamics of the social context will 
become explicit (Osei-Kufuor, 2010, p. 343). Consequently, smallholder collective 
action at the community level should be able to absorb both formal and informal 
ingredients of collective action and ensure that smallholder farmers are able to benefit 
and engage widely with governance and NGOs as well as manage collective action 
better within a hybridized system of collective action 
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    Appendixes:   
    Appendix 1: Research Respondents -Smallholder Farmers 
S/N Name  Gender  Age  Marital Status 
1 Ani Emmanuel  Male  40 Married  
2 Rita Nwoye Female  45 Married  
3 Donatus Ogbu Male  60 Married  
4 Emmanuel Okekechukwu Male  38 Single  
5 Bertrand Onyema 
Ogbonna  
Male  45 Married  
6 James Okoye Okoh Male  50 Married  
7 Christian Chukwu Onovo Male  52 Married  
8 Chief Alex Edeh Male  53 Married  
9 Mrs Veronica Edeh Female 41 Married  
10 Obiageli Edeh Female  39 Married  
11 Ani Bridget Female  42 Married  
12 Mrs Joshua Edeh Female  48 Married  
13 Emmanuel Edeh Mbanou Male  61 Married  
14 Chinelo Nwodo Female  50 Married  
15 Oyibo C Okoye Male  42 Married  
16 Alor Sarah Chinweolu Female 28 Single  
17 Sunday Innocent Edeh Male  63 Married  
18 Emmanuel Nwankwo Male  45 Married  
19 Ikechukwu Nnamani Male  61 Married  
20 Stephen Egbo Male  57 Married  
21 Ifeanyi Anene Male  28 Single  
22 David Chukwu Male  60  Married  
23 Ogbonna Chukwuebuka Male  29 Single  
24 Nkemdilim Ugbuaja Male  48 Married  
25 Mrs Chinyere Nnamani Female  45 Married  
26 Chief Innocent Ani Male  55 Married  
27 Rosaline Edeh Female  48 Widowed  
28 Mrs Angela Obiekwe  Female  53 Married  
29 Christian Onah Male  53 Married  
30 Anthony Emengini Male  39 Married  
31 Emmanuel Eze 
Ozoekwem 
Male  50 Married  
32 Ifeyinwa Chukwu Female  55 Married  
33 Mama Angela Female  40 Married  
34 Azuka Okonkwo Female  45 Married  
35 Nkiru Agu Female  42 Widowed  
36 Ogbonye Madu Female  47 Married  
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Appendix 2: Elders, Migrant Labourers, Traders and Milling Center 
Supervisors   
Elders 
S/N Name  Age  
1 Okonkwo Ogbu 84 
2 Pa Anene Okafor 82 
3 Ndukwe Ominyi  87 
Migrant Labourers 
1 Titus Made 32 
2 John Okafor 40 
3 Okwe Nkwa 42 
4 Tochi Mbamalu  34 
5 Ikenna Uzo 37 
6 Sunday Oriaka 39 
Rice Traders from the City 
1 Eunice Uzo N/A 
2 John Madu N/A 
3 Solomon Jideaku N/A 
4 Rosaline Amako  N/A 
5 Rita Ogbu N/A 
6 Emeka Okeke N/A 
Milling Centre Supervisor 
1 Oyibo Okoye  42 
2 Uzo Amaechi 46 
 
Appendix 3: Government Institutions, NGOs, Development Projects and 
Others  
S/
N 
Name Organisation  Designation  
1 Martin Ilo Enugu State Government  Secretary to the 
State Government  
2 Dr Eric Olaedo  Enugu State Government  Commissioner for 
Agriculture Enugu 
State Government  
3 Fr Mike 
Chukwuma 
Catholic Parish Ugbawka  Parish Priest  
4 Pastor Nobert Anglican Pastor  Pastor in Charge  
5 Egba T CADP Project Manager  
6 Nonso Ozubu ADP Project Manager 
7 Okafor 
Madubuko 
SONGHAI Enugu  Project Manager 
8 Ogom Anagwu Oxfam Novib Nigeria Project Support 
Officer 
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9 Constance 
Okeke 
ActionAid Nigeria Food Right Advisor 
Appendix 4: Rice farming in Ugbawka by Okonkwo Ogbu – 84 years  
 
In the 1940s through Ben Edeh who was then working as a civil servant during the war. 
After the war, he brought seeds of rice back and cultivated in the village. After that 
particular year, some of his brothers also joined him in rice farming. In the later part of 
1940s, other Ugbawka farmers joined in the rice farming and in 1954, my family got 
involved in rice farming.  My mother became one of the foremost women rice farmers in 
Ugbawka. Rice was still seen as a luxury food then and was cooked only during festive 
periods and mostly on Sundays and Christmas. The poor can hardly afford rice then 
and it is used to celebrate big ceremonies. There was no milling centre. Processing was 
by the use of mortar and pestle and harvesting was done using locally designed sickle 
by blacksmith.   
 
That was during the regime of Baluonwu as the Chief Agric officer for the old Eastern 
Region. Zonal Agriculture officer in charge of Nkanu zone then attracted the Chief 
Agriculture officer for supervision.  It was proposed that a rice mill was be to established 
in Ugbawka under private-public partnership. He proposed a partnership whereby 
Ugbawka community will contribute certain percentage of money and the government to 
contribute the rest.  The partnership evolved and the first rice mill came in Ugbawka 
came in around 1957/56. It was during the time of Egwundu the Agriculture officer for 
Nkanu Zone. Extension workers and trainers were also brought to manage this mill and 
to train farmers on methods of cultivation. It was also a huge government presence in 
rice farming. The mill was shared with other neighbouring communities that also started 
rice farming after Ugbawka had started.  
 
This spurred interest and attention and many farmers saw rice farming as profitable 
farming but also another crop. Investment into rice farming was increasing incrementally 
leading to private owned mills in Ugbawka. The ministry of Agriculture was fully 
supporting the development of rice farming in Ugbawka then and was also involved in 
marketing and distribution during the early periods.  The motivation behind the entry of 
many farmers into rice farming was purely because of its cash orientation. It was in hot 
demand in cities and people can come from different cities in search of rice.  
 
The development continued with introduction of fertilizer application system. Extension 
workers were still working actively and training of farmers was ongoing on regular basis.  
Rice farming then became widely spread across many families in Ugbawka until around 
1986/7 when the entire Ugbawka was hit by fungal and pest attack. This brought rice 
farming in Ugbawka to its’ kneel and many farmers lost their entire rice farm. It made 
people poor and turned many farmers away from rice farming. However gradually 
farmers began to crawl their way back into rice farmers and a few farmers have actually 
specialised in rice farming while maintaining little attention to other crops. 
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